Forward Defense

In his review, Moyar stresses Goldstein’s linkage between preemptive war and the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction. For instance, he states:

One could contest that position, since it seems that it is the relative position of the parties in any regional dispute that matters, and not the absolute size of their nuclear arsenals. Neither India nor Pakistan, for instance, has a particularly large nuclear arsenal–a couple of dozen warheads each, by most counts–and neither has much in the way of delivery systems, but because each stands in relative parity with the other, there is no doubt that nuclear weapons have served to increase regional stability in that particular case. On the other hand, the United States had a huge nuclear advantage over the USSR well into the 1970s-yet the U.S. was not inclined to attack the Soviet Union in order to preclude Soviet nuclear parity However, while Goldstein stresses that radical asymmetries in nuclear weapons cause instability and therefore increase the risks of preemptive (if not preventive) war, the convergence of key military technologies and the changing nature of modern war is creating new radical asymmetries that increase the attractiveness (if not the necessity) of preemptive action in both conventional and low intensity warfare.

With regard to conventional war, defined here as combat between national armed forces employing large formations armed with tanks, artillery, aircraft and the whole panoply of modern combined arms combat, the key driver is the emergence of what the U.S. calls “network centric warfare,” but whose intellectual underpinnings originated with Soviet military theoreticians. During the 1980s, the Soviet military developed the doctrinal concept of “Reconnaissance-Strike Complexes” that would constitute the next “Revolution in Military Affairs”. The began work on this intellectual construct after the Israeli war in Lebanon, during which the entire Soviet-designed, Syrian air defense network was demolished by the Israeli air force in something under two days. After their analysis of the debacle, Soviet military theoreticians saw the convergence of several different technologies could engender a new form of warfare.

The first trend was precision-guided munitions, which allowed the destruction of point targets such as a tank, vehicle, bunker, or radar, with just one or two weapons, often over great distances. The second was the development of remote sensors including air- and space-based radars, electro-optical and infrared imaging, and electronic signal monitoring and location systems, which when combined could provide detailed location data on enemy military assets–units, command centers, combat vehicles, aircraft, etc. The third piece was the development of high-capacity data and communications networks, which would allow data from the sensors to be sent to command centers where targets could be identified and allocated to long-range precision weapon systems, which would then destroy them with precision fires.

The implications of this approach were dramatic. If one concentrated against an opponent who possessed a reconnaissance-strike capability, one was only presenting the enemy with a target-rich environment in which one’s assets could be destroyed in detail. Conversely, if one possessed a reconnaissance-strike capability and the enemy did not, then one could force the enemy to disperse to avoid being targeted, while one could concentrate his forces freely and destroy the enemy’s forces in detail. This is much like the effect that battlefield nuclear weapons exert, but using precision conventional weapons in order to avoid the nasty radiological effects.

If both sides had a reconnaissance-strike complex, then both sides would have to disperse, using camouflage, concealment, and deception to hide one’s sensors and strike systems, while simultaneously employing all sorts of scouts and reconnaissance systems to try to locate the enemy’s key assets. The winner of the reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance battle would finally lay bare the enemy’s critical assets and destroy them, after which the rest of the war would be mopping up.

We saw part of what happens when one uses a reconnaissance-strike complex in Desert Storm, albeit on a very primitive level. We were much more advanced during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. What everyone missed at the time was how inherently destabilizing reconnaissance-strike warfare can be.

Consider Case A, in which both sides have reconnaissance-strike capability. If allowed to disperse across the countryside, it is difficult to locate concealed forces, and the reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance battle will be long and fraught with risk. Therefore, as tensions rise, the temptation to strike first, in order to destroy the enemy’s sensors, command centers, and strike systems before they are hidden can be almost overwhelming. The knowledge that one is considering a preemptive strike engenders the suspicion that the enemy is planning the same, which pushes one closer to preemptive action. In fact, the first signs that one is beginning to disperse would probably trigger a preemptive response from the enemy, since if one side disperses before the other, it has an enormous advantage (this is similar to the mobilization trap of 1914).

In Case B, if one does not have reconnaissance-strike capability and the enemy does, then one would almost be forced to attack first in order to come to close quarters with the enemy before he can launch a precision strike (the Viet Cong spoke of grabbing the American forces by the belt buckle to avoid overwhelming U.S. artillery and air power).

Alternatively (reconnaissance strike capability being unaffordable by most countries), one might go asymmetrical, resorting to terrorism, insurgency, cyber-attack to circumvent the reconnaissance-strike advantage (which works best against conventional forces). Going for chemical, biological, or even nuclear capability would be another asymmetrical approach, an equalizer that offsets the conventional advantage: the reconnaissance-strike complex may get all of your delivery systems, but only one or two need to survive to impose unacceptable damage.

It is precisely that danger of unacceptable damage resulting from the use of just a single nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon–or even just a conventional weapon on a particular target, such as a dam, chemical plant or oil refinery–that drives the urge to preempt. Deterrence is founded on the notion of a rational actor whose core values you can hold at risk. “If you do this to me, I will do that to you.” The ideal is to make the consequences of an attack so devastating that it does not happen. That requires, of course, that the enemy has things one can hold at risk, and that the threats one makes are credible.

The problem today is an asymmetry of values (as well as capabilities) between ourselves and our present and potential adversaries. How do you deter people if the things they value are not material, but rather religious or ideological? Such people cannot be deterred by threats of death or material destruction, since their motivations are spiritual and intellectual. Therefore, the conventional calculus of deterrence cannot work, which leaves one with a variety of active and passive defenses against attack. Traditionally, there are three basic forms of defense one can adopt: preclusive defense; defense-in-depth; and forward defense.

In preclusive defense, one tries to keep the enemy from penetrating into one’s territory by putting all one’s effort into guarding the periphery. Call this the “Great Wall” or “Maginot Line” approach. It has been tried at various times and places against many different threats, but in general it has always failed because one cannot be equally strong at all places. In regard to the WMD threat, especially in regard to rogue states and terrorists, a U.S. preclusive defense would have to include missile and air defense systems, but also very aggressive screening of all persons and goods entering the United States, because a WMD can be delivered by various means. When one considers the magnitude of the task, and the burdens it would impose on both the economy and our freedom of movement, it is clear that a preclusive defense is not really viable.

The second approach, defense-in-depth, accepts that the enemy will get through, somewhere, at some time. It aims to limit the damage the enemy can do, localize him, and eventually destroy him. This has generally been a successful strategy from a purely military approach, but it exacts a tremendous social toll, since the enemy is fought on one’s own soil, and therefore the damage inflicted by both sides is done to one’s self. In the context of terrorism and WMDs, defense-in-depth would require a quantum increase in the level of surveillance over society, greater intrusion of the government into the activities of its citizens, the construction of passive defenses against attack (shelters, response teams, reconstruction plans, etc.) in addition to active defenses (greatly increased police and security forces, anti-missile systems, etc.). The material and social costs are not likely to be accepted by the American people. Finally, there is the prospect that, in the case of WMDs, just one failure can have long-lasting, catastrophic effects.

The final approach, forward defense, aims to engage the enemy on his own territory, before he has a chance to attack. As such, preventive attack is an element of a forward defense strategy, but not the only one. Diplomacy remains a key element of forward defense, since it is better to get one’s allies to police their own backyards than to do it one’s self. One can also exert leverage on those states which either aim to develop or support others in the development of WMDs or who support and sponsor terrorists. Backing up diplomacy can be a range of active and passive suasion techniques, which would include military assistance (more training than materiel, in most cases), economic support, bribery (if necessary), and a host of threats and sanctions (which must be considered credible to have any effect).

Only when all of these methods have been tried and failed does actual preemptive attack become necessary or desirable. And even then, the preemptive attack does not have to involve overt military force–which really should be the last resort. Covert operations, what the Chinese strategist Sun Tsu would call “attacking the enemy’s plans,” are probably the most cost-effective means of precluding terrorists or rogue state WMD programs. One can infiltrate hostile organizations, feed them disinformation, sow dissent within their ranks, attack their communications and financial networks–all of which the U.S. has been doing with considerable success since 9/11. One can escalate the response through various forms of direct action, such as targeted assassinations of critical personnel (WMD expertise doesn’t grow on trees, particularly in the Third World), which could also have a deterrent effect on other key personnel (Israeli threats and attacks against German scientists effectively derailed an Egyptian missile program in the 1960s). One can set a thief to catch a thief by employing one’s own insurgents and terrorists against the terrorists themselves (but beware of blowback!). One can use one’s own special operations forces to attack key facilities, or assets–as the Israelis recently did in Syria. If properly planned, supported, and executed such methods can disrupt the enemy’s ability to attack, while posing relatively little political or military risk to one’s self (a country with an illicit weapons program or terrorist training camps can hardly complain in a public forum about the destruction of things it denies having).

Of course, if one has neglected to do these things, in the hope that the problem will go away, then the situation can escalate to the point that a massive military response is necessary. According to Israeli historian and military analyst Martin van Creveld, here the risk is one of doing too little rather than doing too much–one must excise the threat utterly as quickly as possible, using as much violence as necessary to ensure success. Having come this far, one really cannot cavil at “collateral damage,” but must act with utter ruthlessness.

This is one of two approaches to terrorism and insurgency advocated by Van Creveld in his recent book, The Changing Face of War, giving as an example Hafez al-Assad’s crushing of a rebellion in the city of Hama in 1982. Van Creveld makes one other key point–having done what needed to be done, one must never apologize, since this merely lends credibility to one’s enemy and effectively undoes much of what has been accomplished. Having done what one needed to do, unashamedly, one establishes the credibility of his deterrent and therefore has less need to resort to massive violence in the future:

But better by far to act before matters come to a head.

Adopting a forward defensive strategy against both terrorism and WMDs does not, of course, mean that the United States should ignore its defensive perimeter, or disregard the eventuality of a terrorist or WMD attack on our own soil. It does mean that we have to consider and rationally prioritize our allocation of resources–first, to engaging the threat in its backyard, not our own; then to defeating attempts to penetrate our borders, either with people or with weapons; and finally, to preparing to respond to an attack and restore normality as quickly as possible thereafter. A balanced and judicious approach to the twin threats of WMDs and terrorism can both protect us and keep us from having to employ the “Hama Rules.”

Stuart Koehl is a senior fellow at Johns Hopkins University’s Center for Transatlantic Relations and a contributor to THE WORLDWIDE STANDARD.