Barcelona Attack Shows the Gains ISIS Has Made in Europe

The Islamic State (ISIS) quickly claimed responsibility for the van attack in the popular Las Ramblas area of Barcelona on Thursday. At least 13 people were killed, and dozens more wounded, when a terrorist drove the vehicle into pedestrians. Amaq News Agency, the group’s propaganda arm, declared that the perpetrators are “Islamic State soldiers” who ran civilians over “in response to calls for targeting coalition countries.”

Hours later, a car was used in a second attack about 75 miles south of Barcelona in the coastal town of Cambrils. At least one woman has died as a result of the wounds she suffered.

Authorities also shot and killed several people suspected of plotting even more terror. This cell has been preliminarily linked to an explosion that leveled a building in the Mediterranean town of Alcanar on Wednesday. Officials initially suspected that a gas leak caused the explosion, but they now think something more nefarious was afoot. The building may have housed a bomb-making factory, but the men who ran it accidentally detonated their creations before using them.

All of this raises the possibility that a significant network was plotting a series of attacks on Spanish soil. Spanish authorities are still piecing together the precise details of that plot. Many details remain to be confirmed. But there are good reasons to think that Amaq’s claim is accurate.

The Islamic State has repeatedly called on its followers to turn simple vehicles into weapons of mass terror. It is a diabolically simple way to kill people.

Since mid-2016, jihadists have used a vehicle as their main weapon in Nice, France (July 14, 2016); Columbus, Ohio (Nov. 28, 2016); Berlin, Germany (Dec. 19, 2016); London (Mar. 22 and June 3, 2017); and Stockholm, Sweden (Apr. 7, 2017). In all but one case (Stockholm), Amaq claimed that the Islamic State’s “soldiers” or “fighters” were responsible. We can now add Barcelona to the list. And the group may claim the assault with a car in Cambrils as well, even though it was foiled by authorities before more damage could be done.

What does the Islamic State mean when it describes a terrorist as its “soldier”?

Some argue that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s organization will claim any attack just to garner attention. But this is simply not true. A number of attacks in Europe have gone unclaimed. And the Islamic State hasn’t even crowed about all of the high-profile operations that its members or sympathizers are suspected of carrying out. In Sept. 2016, for instance, Ahmad Khan Rahami placed bombs in New York and New Jersey. Despite the fact that Rahimi’s diary explicitly referenced a call for attacks issued by the Islamic State’s spokesman (as well as similar calls from al Qaeda), Baghdadi’s propagandists did not claim him as one of their own.

It is true that some of the Islamic State’s claims of responsibilityfor attacks in Turkey and the Philippines, for exampleappear to be erroneous. But Western authorities have discovered that there is at least some evidence of a connection, even if only a digital one, in many cases.

There are a number of scenarios.

On one end of the spectrum, the Islamic State’s “soldiers” were indeed fighters for the group overseas. These professional terrorists were then dispatched to Europe, or elsewhere, on a mass murder mission. The November 2015 assault on Paris and the March 2016 bombings in Brussels relied on such pros.

But aspiring terrorists have also counted as Islamic State “soldiers.” The Islamic State has frequently employed a tactic known as “remote-controlled terror,” in which an operative in Iraq or Syria acts as a virtual guide for amateurs in Europe, the U.S., or elsewhere. These amateurs may have little to no training, and no ties to professional jihadists outside of the digital realm, yet they too count as “soldiers” in the Islamic State’s parlance.

Still other terrorists may be merely sympathizers and lack even a virtual tie to the so-called caliphate. Western officials often describe these terrorists as “lone wolves,” but that description can be misleading. If a man or woman lashes out in the name the Islamic State (or al-Qaeda), then he or she is part of the broader ideological cause, and not truly alone. Indeed, both the Islamic State and al-Qaeda have published step-by-step guides for people wishing to serve the jihadists’ cause without direct assistance.

Assuming Amaq’s claim for the Barcelona attack is accurate, then Spanish officials will have to determine where in this spectrum the terrorists lie. We already know that more than one individual was involved, so the “lone jihadist” theory won’t hold. Investigators are undoubtedly probing the possibility that one or more of the men have some professional background.

It is far too early to draw any firm conclusions, but there is no doubt that the Islamic State has a significant number of followers in Europe who are willing to carry out its bidding.

Spain has disrupted jihadist networks on its soil since the 1990s. The country’s proximity to jihadist hubs in North Africa has long made it an appealing target. And if Amaq’s statement is accurate, then the Islamic State has finally capitalized on this longstanding threat.

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