A Russian defense analyst with close ties to the country’s state-run arms export agency has denounced recent reports of a large upcoming sale of Russian weaponry to Iran, describing them as part of a U.S.-U.K.-Israeli conspiracy to disrupt Russia’s attempts to sell arms to other Middle Eastern nations. Since the Paris air show in June, sources in Moscow and New Delhi have stated that the Russian arms export monopoly, Rosoboronexport (ROE), was preparing to sell a number of sophisticated weapons to Iran. Russian sources had previously confirmed that there was a sale of both Mikoyan MiG-31 and MiG-29M/M2 fighter aircraft in the works. Those sources had not confirmed the end user for these weapon systems, although they were officially being sold to Syria.
An Indian Su-30, similar to those Russia is rumored to be selling to Iran,
at AeroIndia 2007. Photo by Reuben F. Johnson.
But, other sources stated that the expectation was that Iran was financing the sale and that the aircraft would be transferred to Iran. At the same time, there were other rumours about the sale of up to 250 Sukhoi Su-30MK fighter aircraft to Iran, but there were no comments or denunciations at all from Moscow on this sale. That is, until last week when the Israeli website debka.com ran a story on the Su-30MK sale. This prompted Konstantin Makiyenko, the deputy director general of the Center for Strategy and Technology Analysis, to tell the official RIA-Novosti news service in Moscow that this story was “obvious disinformation.” However, several aspects of this denunciation (and the less than-categorical denials by Russian officialdom of these sales) are suspicious as best. To begin with, Makiyenko’s think tank is often linked to the Russian government. He is also the one Russian defense analyst who is regularly quoted by Western aerospace and defense publications. At times he appears to be the only Russian expert who is permitted to go on record on this subject. Makiyenko is also not exactly an impartial observer of Russia’s defense-industrial complex. “He is not only close to the senior management at ROE, but he is also a graduate of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO),” said one Moscow colleague. “Need I say anything more?” MGIMO is the chief higher education institution for those who end up serving in the Russian foreign ministry and intelligence services, and ROE is chock-full of former (and active) employees of the latter. In this world, the Russian version of the “old school tie” still governs the sharing of information and confidences between former classmates. Also, at this summer’s Paris air show, ROE general director Sergei Chemezov publicly stated that no such export contract existed. “Russia has no plans to supply fighters to Syria and Iran,” he assured reporters at the agency’s official press briefing. “If talks start with these countries, it will be announced.” Just ten days later, on June 28, Moscow dispatched Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Jerusalem for the express purpose of clarifying the Russian position on arms sales to Syria. “Whatever we do in the area of arms supplies is absolutely in line with our international obligations,” Lavrov told the Israelis. “It’s also absolutely in line with the national legislation of the Russian Federation,” he said. “Whatever we supply to Syria is transparent and is not offensive. In any case, it is not destabilizing the balance [of power] in the region.” If the Russian government felt it necessary to send Lavrov to Israel to defend Russia’s right to make arms sales to Syria, it’s hard to believe the statement from ROE that there are no such sales in the offing. A third curiosity is what Makiyenko said when he made his statement to the Russian state news agency–that no such sale to Iran could be contemplated because “firstly, totally fantastic figures were given. Iran is hardly in a position to find financial resources required for the purchase of 200 fighter jets. According to even modest estimates, one billion dollars will buy no more than 20 aircraft.” (Makiyenko seems to be unaware of the current price of oil.)
Makiyenko only discusses the possibility of Iran purchasing aircraft from one of the several plants that can produce Sukhoi fighters. “If any purchase is to be discussed at all,” he stated, “this would not concern more than 24 aircraft, but most likely there was not anything at all. Secondly, Russia simply does not have the production capacity for such a number of aircraft at present. The Irkutsk plant, which produces a variant of the aircraft, has its books full of orders until 2014.” A Washington, D.C.-based analyst who specializes in arms sales to China and follows the links between the Chinese and Iranian defense industries told the WWS that “it is rather curious that Makiyenko mentions only the Irkutsk plant and not the other main Su-30MK production facility at Komsomolsk (KnAAPO). KnAAPO are the chief supplier of aircraft for the Chinese PLAAF. They also do not have the backlog of orders of the Irkutsk plant. Given the Chinese ties with Iran it is more logical for KnAAPO to make this Su-30MK sale, but Makiyenko never mentions them.” But, perhaps the most obvious confirmation that there is a large sale from Russia to Iran in the works is the recent proposal by the Bush administration to sell some $20 billion in advanced U.S. weaponry to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE–as well as renewing for another ten years the $3 billion per year in foreign military assistance to Israel and the $1.3 billion a year to Egypt. The current Iranian military is in no condition to take on the combined air and ground forces of regional powers like the Saudis and Israelis. Massive transfers of weaponry on the scale that Washington is proposing would only be necessary if the “obvious disinformation” about Russian sales to Iran were indeed close to the mark.
