The Washington Free Beacon is running an excerpt of Jay Cost’s new book A Republic No More: Big Government and the Rise of American Political Corruption. In this chapter, Cost explains how the staggering growth in the number of registered lobbyists–their ranks have swelled more than 300-fold since 1968–undermines the public interest:
Professional lobbying is an often misunderstood practice of modern politics. The average person is wont to think of it in terms similar to the quid pro quos suggested by the muckrakers who uncovered graft in the Gilded Age (the 50 years after the Civil War widely remembered for its graft and mismanagement of public affairs): a politician writes a letter requesting cash or some other consideration, the lobbyist obliges, and then later writes back requesting favorable legislation. But that is not really how it works in the modern age.
Above all, lobbying is about the provision of information from a trusted source. In almost every field of public policy, legislators and administrators are faced with mind-bending complexity. Our government seeks to do so many things, that in turn have so many second-, third-, and even fourth-order effects, it is simply impossible for a legislator to develop expertise on all the areas on which he or she is required to legislate. The legislator has trouble predicting what consequences a law will have, both in policy terms (how it will affect my constituents?) and in political terms (how will it affect my reelection prospects?). Enter the lobbyist. From the first to final stages of lawmaking, lobbyists are there to provide legislators with crucial information. They help them write bills. They help them mark them up during committee hearings. They provide feedback during conference committees. They provide technical information to executive agencies looking to clarify legislative intent. They do it all. And they are everywhere. In 1968, there were fewer than one hundred registered lobbyists working the House side of Capitol Hill. In 2000, there were approximately fifteen thousand lobbyists working both sides. In 2006, there were more than thirty thousand.
Though this system of influence is not nearly as coarse as the behavior of the Gilded Age, it is just as pernicious. While lobbying is most effective when there is a trusting relationship between the lobbyist and the legislator, this does not mean that the information the lobbyist provides is impartial. That’s not to say that lobbyists outright lie to legislators; it is to say that they present them with their employer’s perspective on the truth, one that is inevitably tied up in private interests, and not necessarily the public’s interests. The real danger for the public interest is to be found therein: if legislators lack the expertise to determine whether a policy is in the public interest, and the only ones who know are those whose interests are private, then how can legislators be sure that the public interest is served? Of course, they cannot.
Above all, lobbying is about the provision of information from a trusted source. In almost every field of public policy, legislators and administrators are faced with mind-bending complexity. Our government seeks to do so many things, that in turn have so many second-, third-, and even fourth-order effects, it is simply impossible for a legislator to develop expertise on all the areas on which he or she is required to legislate. The legislator has trouble predicting what consequences a law will have, both in policy terms (how it will affect my constituents?) and in political terms (how will it affect my reelection prospects?). Enter the lobbyist. From the first to final stages of lawmaking, lobbyists are there to provide legislators with crucial information. They help them write bills. They help them mark them up during committee hearings. They provide feedback during conference committees. They provide technical information to executive agencies looking to clarify legislative intent. They do it all. And they are everywhere. In 1968, there were fewer than one hundred registered lobbyists working the House side of Capitol Hill. In 2000, there were approximately fifteen thousand lobbyists working both sides. In 2006, there were more than thirty thousand.
Though this system of influence is not nearly as coarse as the behavior of the Gilded Age, it is just as pernicious. While lobbying is most effective when there is a trusting relationship between the lobbyist and the legislator, this does not mean that the information the lobbyist provides is impartial. That’s not to say that lobbyists outright lie to legislators; it is to say that they present them with their employer’s perspective on the truth, one that is inevitably tied up in private interests, and not necessarily the public’s interests. The real danger for the public interest is to be found therein: if legislators lack the expertise to determine whether a policy is in the public interest, and the only ones who know are those whose interests are private, then how can legislators be sure that the public interest is served? Of course, they cannot.
You can read the rest of the excerpt here, and buy Jay Cost’s new book here.
