Metro’s crash-alert system failed four years ago just as it did last month when nine people were killed and more than 70 were injured.
But in that case, the two train operators were able to stop their trains — just barely — to avoid crashing into a third stopped train. Recently retired train operator Larry P. Mitchell told The Examiner his train stopped on that June 2005 evening just 35 feet short of the standing train. A train behind him came to a stop just 12 feet before impact.
“I shudder to think of what might have happened,” Mitchell said. “We were under the Potomac, three trains fully loaded. The casualty rate would have been enormous.”
He said the June 22 crash on the Red Line, in which one train crashed into a stopped train, echoed his close call. It was a rush hour trip on a June day. A train was stopped along curved track. And the automatic train system failed to stop a train, forcing the operators cruising along in automatic mode to push the brakes.
“The scenario was exactly the same,” he said. “That was four years ago. What have they done to rectify that problem?”
Metro declined to comment on the similarities. “It’s important to note, we do not know the official cause of the June 22 accident. It is still under investigation,” Metro spokesman Steven Taubenkibel said. “Therefore, it’s not appropriate to compare the two incidents.”
Jackie Jeter, president of the union representing Metro train operators, told Congress last week that some train operators have told her since the June 22 crash that they have had similar signal problems.
But General Manager John Catoe told reporters he had seen no records showing any such problems. He said he was “unable to give any legitimacy” to her comments.
But General Manager John Catoe told reporters he had seen no records showing any such problems. He said he was “unable to give any legitimacy” to her comments.
“Mr. Catoe was not here in 2005, and he simply may not have ever known about the 2005 incident,” Taubenkibel said.
Federal investigators have found a circuit that appears to have failed to show a train was stopped June 22. A device installed five days before the crash had been failing intermittently before the crash, and the area continues to show problems.
After the 2005 crash, Metro officials said a track circuit failed primarily because of a defective 3,000-foot communications cable between the Foggy Bottom and Rosslyn Metrorail stations. The failure meant that a 1,000-foot section of track was not keeping trains from getting too close.
But transit experts have said Metro’s system is supposed to have a backup that stops trains in any situation. “It’s something that should never have happened,” said Vukan Vuchic, a University of Pennsylvania professor of transportation.
Even if the system has an electronics defect, he said the system should be secured in several ways so that it would stop trains when components fail. He said investigators must determine whether the system was improperly designed or whether it was improperly maintained and inspected.
