Right now the entire focus of public debate on Iraq seems to be on when the troops should leave. The Bush administration argues for troops to remain until the job is done, while Democrats want troops to withdraw anywhere between today and next summer. But before pulling out of Iraq, we ought to have a good understanding of what happens if we leave. Peter Neumann–the director of the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College London–addresses the question here:
First, no matter what happens inside Iraq, any U.S. decision to withdraw will be celebrated as a victory by al Qaeda. Whatever way the spin doctors in Washington dress it up, bin Laden is certain to portray the pullout as another example of what he once described as the “low spiritual morale of the American fighters.” Al Qaeda, in other words, will be emboldened-even if it fails to set up a permanent safe haven or establish an Islamic theocracy. Most worryingly, the foreign fighters-now experienced and battle-hardened veterans of the “global jihad”-will soon turn up and cause trouble in other places, such as Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan.
Even more questionable than hoping that al Qaeda’s victory can be spun away is the idea that the Sunnis can be pushed to the negotiation table. This may have worked in 2003 and 2004. But in the current situation, Sunnis can no longer be assumed to have any faith in a government which a majority of them regard as openly sectarian. With many members of the Iraqi cabinet thought to be linked to the Shiite militias or Tehran, the Sunnis have concluded that the government has little interest in national reconciliation. Rather, they suspect that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and his colleagues are bent on cementing Shiite hegemony and making the Sunnis pay for their privileged position under Saddam Hussein.
Hence, a withdrawal announcement is much more likely to drive more Sunnis into the arms of the insurgency than it is to compel the insurgents to the negotiating table. As in many other ethnic conflicts, security and survival will increasingly come to be seen as one and the same thing, with the insurgents the only ones who can be relied on to deliver both. If anything, being seen by their community as the “last line of defense” against Shiite atrocities will make it easier for the insurgents to overcome their internal divisions…
In their quest to win the policy argument, those who favor heading for the exits in Iraq shouldn’t dismiss as mere political rhetoric the idea that a sectarian blood bath-not reconciliation-is the most likely outcome. Most importantly, though, U.S. political leaders should understand that the game is not over once a withdrawal date is set. On the contrary, getting out of Iraq without unleashing a civil war is likely to be as delicate an operation as getting into the country was in the first place. Let us hope that if the United States does leave, the planning is better this time around.
When the decision to leave Iraq is presented as one without any costs–‘leave now and Americans stop dying’–it sounds great. But the real world ramifications are far deeper. If advocates of an easy, pain-free withdrawal get their way, they may be shocked when they encounter the buyer’s remorse that follows.
