Fred Barnes writes on the START follow-on treaty with the Russians:
Precisely. START I was signed at a time when the U.S. had a commanding lead in long-range bombers (with the B-52 plus new cruise missiles, the B-1, and a B-2 under development). We were also deploying a new class of ballistic missile submarine, and had plans for a road mobile “Midgetman” ICBMs, a rail-mobile variant of the Peacekeeper missile, as well as the silo-based Peacekeeper (the latter was decommissioned by Secretary Rumsfeld). So START was smartly tailored by Reagan to force the Soviets to sharply adjust their ICBM force, which was incredibly difficult to track and monitor, and boasted far more throw weight than our own. The initial treaty served global interests by pushing down the massive number of deployed US-Soviet nuclear warheads, but — and this is the important part — didn’t compromise US strategic security. Today, the reverse is true. The Russians have the upper hand. They’re not only developing the Topol-M ICBM into the newer RS-24 (which is a blatant violation of START), but also a new class of ballistic missile submarine. They are building an additional 2 Blackjack bombers a year for the next 15 years. The bomber force is particularly concerning. During the height of the Cold War, the Russians only had roughly 150 bombers with the legs to reach the CONUS. By the time their modernization is complete, they will have over 200 (and we barely have enough fighters to guard our own internal airspace against another 9/11 style threat. We could not meet and defeat that bomber fleet should it ever be used in anger). Right now the only nation on earth capable of a counterforce strike (that is, a nuclear strike that specifically targets our strategic forces — subs, ICBMS, bombers, plus support facilities) is Russia. This is what scared us the most during the Cold War, as it was the only situation where we could potentially “lose” a nuclear war should the Soviets negate those strategic assets in a surprise attack. If President Obama significantly degrades our ICBM force, the most stabilizing and secure leg of the Triad (also the cheapest), we would be drastically cutting down the number of deployed strategic assets to the point where China’s smaller nuclear arsenal could counterforce us. We need to be extraordinarily cautious negotiating this new treaty. We could inadvertently put ourselves in a dangerous position — similar to the end of the Carter years — where the Russians have a significant strategic advantage over the U.S. and NATO. President Reagan was smart about treaty negotiations. He bargained from a position of strength, he didn’t sacrifice his most important bargaining chips (like European missile defense) before negotiations took place, and he would never consider weakening America’s strategic security in exchange for photo ops and soaring speeches in Olso. Reagan ushered in the largest reduction of nuclear weapons in history. That’s a model worth following. Indeed, it’s a model worthy of a peace prize.
