They called it “the victory on the Potomac.” And truly, the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act transformed how the Pentagon worked. It elevated the chairman of the Joint Chiefs to greater status as “the” principal military adviser to the president, National Security Council and secretary of defense. It strengthened the authority of “combatant commanders” in the field. And, most consequentially of all, it established standards for “joint” professional development — the key to integrating the capabilities of the services. The move toward “jointness” was predicated on the idea that, when next the military went to war, it should function like an orchestra with each component contributing harmoniously within a coherent whole rather than each playing its own tune in a discordant cacophony. It worked. Almost too well, argued the Washington Post’s Dana Priest in her 2003 book, “The Mission.” Jointness, she noted, allowed the military to work much more effectively than other government institutions. As a result, Washington was relying more and more on “generals, grunts, and Green Berets” to perform nonmilitary functions.
Print subscriber? Click here to login/register your account
Digital subscriber? Click here to login/register your account.