‘The Good, The Bad, The Secret: The Nuclear Deal with Iran’

When word came that Secretary of State John Kerry was winging his way back to Geneva, there was little doubt a deal had been reached with Iran for some nuclear concessions in exchange for a modicum of sanctions relief.  Reaction was predictable from most quarters, with those concerned about Iran’s bona fides slamming the de minimis requirements of the agreement — particularly a failure to secure Iran’s agreement to cease all enrichment, a key demand of all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions.  Naturally, both Iran’s and Obama’s friends in Washington were equally quick to praise the “historic agreement”.
The good in the dribs and drabs reported about this agreement are straightforward:

a halt of work at Arak, the heavy water reactor that provides Iran a second route to a bomb
A suspension of installation of new centrifuges
Intrusive new inspections
A cap on the stockpile of enriched uranium

The bad is in what is left out:

all enrichment
cooperation in revealing details of Iran’s military work at Parchin
Construction (though not installation) of new centrifuges
Reversal of nuclear progress

Chatting last week with a prominent nuclear expert in Washington (a Democrat), we talked about the problems with the then prospective deal.  Ironically, we were in complete agreement:

Phased deals such as this buy more time for the would-be nuclear state to advance its program while giving key concessions on the sanctions front.
Sequenced agreements of this kind don’t work (viz: North Korea).
The administration was too desperate for a deal.
There will be no phase two.

In reality, Iran has given nothing of substance other than a “pause” in its program.