Swedish Fly

Yes, that Sweden. For all its obvious disagreements with the United States, Sweden served as a bulwark against the USSR from 1945 until the fall of the Soviet Union. Sweden may have been officially “non-aligned,” but there was never any doubt of whose side the country was on in the Cold War. Sweden maintained one of the largest military establishments not only in Europe, but in the world, and it was not aimed at Norway, or Denmark, or Germany.

Sweden’s neighbor Norway shares a short but strategically vital border with Russia, up along the icy Barents Sea, through which the Soviet Northern Fleet would have to sortie to interdict convoys carrying reinforcements from the United States to Europe in the event of a Soviet attack on NATO. Russia shares a longer border with Finland, which had been reduced since the end of World War II to a compliant Soviet satellite (that’s why they called it “Finlandization“). In the event of war, it was generally assumed that the Soviet Army would rapidly attack Norway both directly and through Finland to seize control of the North Cape and assure its access to the Norwegian Sea.

Yet, until well into the 1980s, NATO earmarked very few forces to defend this vital northern flank. They were able to do this because Swedish forces stood ready to block any Soviet advance in that direction. Though not a member of NATO, and officially “neutral” in the great East-West showdown, Sweden let it be known that it would not tolerate any aggressive activity in its own backyard. And it backed up that resolution with a large and robust military force that included more than 800 front-line combat aircraft (during its heyday in the 1960s), as well as a large active and territorial army (including many units specializing in Arctic warfare), and a strong navy that included excellent diesel-electric submarines and fast missile patrol boats to block the Soviet Baltic Fleet.

As a “non-aligned’ country, Sweden sought autonomy in military equipment, including tanks, aircraft, submarines, ships, and artillery. Like Israel, it tended to optimize its systems for the environment in which it would fight. Thus, Swedish aircraft such as the Saab J.35 Draaken and the JA/AJ.37 Viggen were designed to take off and land from short stretches of highway rather than from fixed bases, and were capable of undertaking multiple missions with minimal maintenance. Swedish submarines and patrol boats were designed to operate in the shallow waters and archipelagos of the Baltic. The remarkable Stridsvagen 103 “S-Tank” had no turret, but elevated its 105mm gun using a unique hydropneumatic suspension that raised and lowered the entire vehicle. Swedish ordnance, produced by the state-owned Bofors company, had a worldwide reputation for everything from mortars to anti-aircraft guns, to torpedoes and artillery shells.

While seeking armaments autonomy, Sweden was not averse to seeking out the best available technology for its home-grown weapons, and early in the 1950s opened up a close relationship with the United States, which provided Falcon and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, turbine engines, radars, and other technologies for production under license. As a result, Swedish weapons and Swedish troops were well respected, and they served as a credible deterrent to Soviet aggression on the northern flank.

Even at the nadir of U.S.-Swedish relations during the Vietnam War, there was no wavering of the Swedish commitment to defend that flank, and cooperation with the U.S. at the military and industrial levels remained close.

Today, relations with Sweden are still very close–perhaps closer than they were during the Cold War. Though not a member of the NATO alliance, Sweden contributes more to NATO operations than many countries that really are full members. For instance, Sweden has some 345 troops in Afghanistan as part of ISAF, and heads the provincial reconstruction team for Mazari Sharif. Sweden is the lead nation in the EU’s Nordic Battle Group (together with Finland, Norway, Estonia, and Ireland), widely regarded as the best trained battle group ever deployed by the European Union. But for the intransigence of Ireland, the Nordic Battle Group would have been the obvious choice to deploy to the Chad-Sudan border, rather than the ad hoc force that actually was sent. Finally, Sweden is participating in a number of NATO and U.S. advanced warfighting experiments and is providing the U.S. with unique technologies in areas such as mine countermeasures, IED defense, and wireless communications.

Sweden is presently the driving force behind the Nordic Cooperation movement, an attempt to develop an integrated defense and industrial policy covering Sweden, Norway, Finland, and the Baltic States. This has picked up significant momentum in the last few years, in part because of the experience of the Nordic Battle Group, in part because of the recognition that these technologically advanced but sparsely populated countries cannot afford to field large forces individually, and finally, because of the recent rumblings of the Russian bear. Already the Nordic Cooperation group is engaged in joint system development and procurement, joint planning and exercises, and is moving towards some degree of specialization and division of labor in defense tasks.

In short, Sweden’s non-alignment is very much a thing of the past, and Sweden is seeking closer ties with its Western neighbors through the EU and NATO. There is even credible talk about Sweden becoming a full member of NATO, albeit only after Finland makes the jump.

If Russia continues its military rearmament and takes an aggressive policy towards its neighbors, then a Nordic Cooperation group led by Sweden will have a key role in providing stability and deterrence in a resource-rich area. It would therefore be in the American interest to cement and reinforce the ties that already exist between the United States. and Sweden. Yet there is at present a storm gathering on the horizon that could deal U.S.-Swedish relations a serious setback.

The cause of the dispute is the release of a U.S. developed Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar for an upgraded version of the Saab JAS.39 Gripen. An AESA radar does not have a mechanically steered dish, as does a conventional radar, but rather has a transmitter/receiver array composed of numerous individual transmitter/receiver modules which can steer radar beams electronically. An AESA radar can thus track multiple targets simultaneously while scanning for others, it can operate in two different modes (e.g., air-to-air and air-to-ground) at the same time, and also provides greater resistance to electronic countermeasures. Lacking mechanical components, AESA radar is also lighter and more reliable than conventional radar. The United States has deployed AESA radars in the F-15 Eagle, FA-18E Super Hornet and F-22 Raptor. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will also have an AESA radar, amd the U.S. has exported AESA radar on the Block 60 F-16 Falcons sold to the United Arab Emirates.

The latest Swedish multi-role fighter, the JAS.39 Gripen, is comparable to late models of the F-16 and FA-18, the French Dassault Rafael and the Eurofighter Typhoon. First flown in 1988, it is very much an example of U.S.-Swedish cooperation, with some 54 percent of the aircraft’s components originating in the United States. In recognition of its performance and low operating costs, it has already been exported to the Czech Republic and Hungary. However, to keep pace with state-of-the-art Russian fighters such as the Su-30 Flanker and even more advanced follow-ons, Sweden is developing a second-generation Gripen with a more powerful engine and improved avionics. It also wants to equip the plane with an AESA radar.

But Sweden finds itself in the dilemma faced by many countries looking to develop an indigenous modern fighter–its domestic requirements are too small to fund the development and production of the aircraft at an affordable price. Therefore, it must seek export sales to spread the cost out over a larger production run and a broader customer base. To that end, it is looking to enter the Gripen in the upcoming Norwegian Fighter Competition. And that, in turn, puts the Gripen in direct competition with the Joint Strike Fighter program.

For those who have not been paying attention, the F-35 Lightening II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is a stealthy multi-role aircraft intended to replace the F-16, the FA-18C, the A-10 Thunderbolt II, and the AV-8B Harrier II V/STOL fighter. To this end, the plane comes in three distinct variants: a land-based conventional takeoff and landing version; a carrier-based conventional takeoff and landing version, and a V/STOL variant that can take off and land on small carriers or from short, unprepared landing fields. Early on in its development, it became apparent that not even the United States could afford to procure the JSF in the numbers required unless it became a multinational program, and so a host of allied nations were enlisted to underwrite its development under a unique program managed by the prime contractor, Lockheed Martin. One selling point of the JSF is its stealthy, multimode AESA radar, the same radar that Sweden would like to put on the Gripen II.

Now, on the face of things, there seems little chance that the Gripen could actually beat the JSF for the Norwegian fighter competition: the JSF is a whole generation of technology ahead of the Gripen; it has real stealth, superior agility, and highly advanced network-centric communications; and Norwegian Air Force pilots prefer it. But the program has been plagued with huge cost overruns and development delays, and a number of the smaller partners have begun to wonder whether they can, in fact, afford to buy it. On the political front, Norwegian industry is unhappy with the workshare allocated to it on the program, while the new left-wing coalition government in Norway is openly hostile to the United States and would prefer to go with a European solution. With the withdrawal of the Eurofighter from the competition, the only remaining choice is Gripen.

At an economic level, this makes sense: with a flyaway cost estimated between $50-75 million, Norway could probably buy two Gripens for the cost of one JSF. Moreover, Sweden appears quite willing to provide Norwegian industry with the workshare it wants, while providing additional “offsets” in the form of investment capital in Norwegian high technology companies (Norway is looking forward to a future without North Sea oil). The only thing that makes the Gripen uncompetitive at this point is its outmoded radar; hence acquisition of AESA is critical to the success of their bid.

Following U.S. export and technology transfer regulations, Sweden has applied to the U.S. for release of AESA technology for the Gripen program. So far, the U.S. has refused to release the system. At present no reason has been given for this decision, though several have been postulated. One is security related: transfer of AESA technology would threaten the U.S. lead in radar technology, as well as revealing secrets of our stealth and counter-stealth capabilities. However, Sweden is, if anything, more scrupulous than the United States when it comes to technology transfer to third parties; and we are going to release the AESA to Norway on the JSF in any case. And we have also already released AESA to the United Arab Emirates, among others. A variant argument posits that Saab would be the first foreign integrator of the technology into a non-U.S. aircraft, and that this would require more detailed knowledge of the radar than if it was just handed off to Sweden as a “black box.” But integration of the radar could be handed off to an American subcontractor, with firewalls installed to ensure that Saab never gets its hands on the family jewels. Some Swedes with whom I have spoken believe it is pure protectionism, that American companies don’t want Saab getting AESA technology. But this makes no sense, if we are speaking of U.S. radar companies. Raytheon would make the radar, whether it went on Gripen or JSF. So what gives?

The answer, I believe, is a convergence of interests on the part of Lockheed Martin and the U.S. Air Force to protect the JSF program at all costs. With the price of a JSF escalating by the minute, the lesser partners in the program, and particularly Norway, are beginning to look towards the exits. They have invested huge sums of money in the development program to date and are beginning to see the airplane priced out of their budget, so they are looking towards any viable alternative. Gripen with AESA is such an alternative; Gripen without AESA is not. If Sweden can integrate AESA on the Gripen, then there is a chance (not a huge one at this moment, but growing) that the Norwegian government, in the name of economy and Nordic Cooperation, would pull out of the JSF program to buy the less capable but more affordable plane (after all, does Norway really need all the bells and whistles of the JSF?). And if Norway bolts, it’s Katie bar the doors–other partners presently “on the bubble” will also begin to rethink their commitment. Every time a partner leaves the program, the anticipated production run shrinks and the unit cost rises. And, as the cost differential between the JSF and the “high end” F-22 begin to disappear, the United States will also have to rethink the program (which is losing Congressional support as the price tag soars). Therefore, it is in the interests of both Lockheed Martin and USAF to keep all the partners in line, and beat down any emerging competition.

In this regard, history seems to be repeating itself. Back in the 1980s, Sweden wanted to export the Viggen fighter to India, Chile, and several other Latin American countries. The United States, hostile to India and at the same time wanting to sell F-16s to Latin America (in order to make the plane more affordable for USAF), blocked those sales, invoking the International Traffic in Arms Regulations because the Viggen had a U.S.-derived engine. As a result, Sweden never developed an export market for the Viggen, and therefore could not maintain the frontline strength of the Swedish air force at the level needed to provide a secure deterrent to the USSR. NATO in consequence had to do something it had not done before–deploy a multinational battle group to northern Norway to counter the Soviet threat. Thus, an economic decision had significant, unforeseen strategic fallout.

Something similar may be happening in this today, in a slightly different manner. First, it must be understood that for Sweden, Gripen exports are a make-or-break issue determining whether there will be an indigenous Swedish aerospace industry in the future. The Swedes are determined to maintain this strategic capability, and are willing to work around U.S. obstruction to do so. Already, Sweden is looking to the French company Thales Group to provide an alternative AESA radar for Gripen; though they don’t think it is as good as the U.S. radar, they think it may be “good enough.” If they have to do this, the United States will have no say over when and to whom they can sell the aircraft. If Norway doesn’t buy it, the Swedes believe they can sell one hundred or more to India. Other countries may follow suit–including members of the JSF consortium. Thus, any victory for export control may be Pyrrhic at best.

Worse still will be the long-term effect on U.S.-Swedish relations. As noted, Sweden has been one of the most transatlantic-oriented, Euro-skeptical countries on the continent. Sweden, a member of the EU, would prefer closer ties to the United States precisely because it distrusts the EU both to respect Swedish sovereignty and protect Swedish security. Intransigence in the AESA case would serve to push Sweden into a more Euro-centric posture, and reinforce calls–already prominent in Norway and other European countries–to make all future armaments development “ITAR free”; i.e., to design and build advanced weapons systems without any U.S. technology, so as to be free of the bureaucratic hassles and export restrictions that are imposed by U.S. technology transfer regulations. If that happens, both our strategic position in Europe, and our access to European defense markets, will suffer significantly.

Stuart Koehl is a contributor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD Online.