By definition, all of the international summits are a success and the next one in Strasburg-Kehl, where the allies will celebrate the 60th anniversary of NATO, will be no different. The final press release will most certainly reflect the collective satisfaction of the Alliance’s achievements in its first 60 years of existence and will offer best wishes for the members in the coming decades.
In a way they are right: Doesn’t everyone–even the French–want to be part of this western defensive organization? NATO as an institution is not in danger. Its effectiveness and centrality, however, are. The Alliance currently has three big problems that are going to determine the organization’s future. The first is an operational problem: Afghanistan. The allies went to that country because many believed that Afghanistan was the good war as opposed to the bad one in Iraq. Moreover, the large majority went there because they thought the American troops had already defeated the Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists and, therefore, their mission was going to focus on reconstruction and not security. No matter what anyone says, that was the spirit that led NATO to take charge of ISAF in 2003. Precisely for that reason, only a few of the allies, and countries that are not members of NATO like Australia, have been prepared to take on combat missions. A couple of years ago, the joke on the ground was that the real meaning of ISAF was: “I See Americans Fight”. Today, the situation has not improved: Americans are the ones that are going to try to change the delicate balance of forces that exists today in Afghanistan and which threatens to become an embarrassment for NATO as a whole. The allies can only expect two things there: defeat or victory. To achieve the latter, they have to be willing to take on a responsibility that they have been eluding for the last few years. NATO cannot, and should not, be only the U.S. Marines.
Second, NATO has a serious political problem. There has been a loss of credibility with regard to collective defense and the necessary solidarity among its members, and this has gotten worse with its capitulation to Russia. The European allies’ dependence on Russian energy supplies and the United States’ dependence on Moscow to stop unwanted situations, like the nuclearization of Iran, has meant that NATO has in fact accepted the Kremlin’s policy of imposing its own sphere of influence on Eastern Europe. We have seen the invasion of Georgia and Moscow’s repeated meddling in Ukraine, the constant threats and bravado of its leaders, its neo-imperial vision and its threats to return to the Cold War with military deployment in the Caribbean. Instead of acting calmly, clearly avoiding provocation but with a firm hand, the allies have preferred to forget their promises to Georgia and Ukraine. To keep Moscow happy they have applauded Obama’s decision, even though it was unilateral, to abandon the anti-missile shield on European soil. Ronald Reagan embraced the Russians from a position of strength, and he brought the communist regime to an end. The recent NATO Council of Ministers has continued its sessions with Moscow in exchange for nothing. Germany, France, and Italy must be happy because they stress having good relations with the Kremlin above all else, but the Baltic countries and the Polish, Czechs and Hungarians cannot be pleased. If Russia gets its way without paying a price, Georgia will not be the last to be trapped in its net. Deploying part of its infrastructures and forces in the more eastern members of the Alliance would be enough to reinforce the feeling of solidarity that is needed in any military alliance. They have a legitimate right to do so, and this would allow the allies to hold talks with Moscow on a more equal basis.
Third, the Alliance has a serious strategic problem. NATO, the center of the world for four decades, from its birth in 1949 until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, has voluntarily stayed on the sidelines of the world’s main security issues in recent years. First, declining to accept a role in line with its resources in the war against Islamic terrorism. Beyond activating article 5 of the Treaty when the 9/11 attacks occurred, very little else has been done. The essence of antiterrorist policies has been left in the hands of EU members. Nobody in Europe wanted to be branded a militarist after condemning the belligerent George W. Bush. Iraq is also part of the strategic problem. The Alliance was cut wide open when some countries wanted to use it as an anti-American platform. Its inability to get involved collectively or, even worse, to help Turkey when it needed it, not only isolated the Alliance from the Middle East, but from its main driving force, the United States. And from what we are seeing from the new Obama administration, its Atlanticism seems to be just lip service since it does not count on its allies when making decisions that affect them all. Finally, NATO has chosen not to face the strategic issue of our time, Iran and its accelerated nuclear program. It has not wanted to join the movements to stop the bomb from falling into the hands of the ayatollahs, nor has it prepared itself to ensure greater protection and deterrence in case we have to deal with an atomic Iran in the near future. It could have sent some ships to visit the Gulf or give support to American forces in the region. And it should have accelerated the anti-ballistic missile defense projects. But it did neither. It is about time the allies discuss among themselves what they want to do with Iran.
France is returning to NATO, ending 43 years of anomaly. The return is, however, less important in operational and military terms, since France already participates in NATO operations just like the rest of the allies. An important step will be to end our French neighbor’s constant struggle to weaken American influence in Europe and put France in its place. NATO has suffered a great deal in having to deal on a daily basis with two antagonistic views of what it should be and should do. If the French return truly means ending that, it will be positive. If it is only a struggle to scale the ladder of the allied structures, France may gain something by placing 800 officers where they had none until now, but collectively NATO will gain very little. The Alliance urgently needs one single strategic conception which gives meaning to what it is doing and guides it with regard to what it should do. France can contribute to this, but, as always, the indispensable power will be America. Without the United States, NATO is nothing. The European allies should know this, and Barack Obama should learn this quickly.
Rafael L. Bardají is the founder of the Strategic Studies Group and National Security Advisor to former Spanish president José María Aznar.
