(Austin Bay has more here related to my post from last week) The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has posted on its web site several al Qaeda-related documents that have been “captured in the course of operations supporting the GWOT.” Two letters, dated September 30, 1993 and May 24, 1994, relate directly to al Qaeda operations in Somalia. The letters are from “Hassan al-Tajiki” to the “African Corps.” Assuming their authenticity, the letters are consistent with the propaganda of bin Laden in the 1990s that Mogadishu and other events showed that America was “a paper tiger” and “a weak horse.” He and his followers would use such imagery as a recruiting tool for al Qaeda, “the strong horse” in bin Laden’s words, throughout the 1990s. In fact, though little reported in the media, al Qaeda had recruited and trained thousands before September 11, 2001. Indeed, Richard Clarke told PBS’ Frontline that by the end of 2000 al Qaeda had a presence “in probably between 50-60 countries [and] that they had trained thousands, perhaps over 10,000 terrorists at the camps in Afghanistan.” The September 30, 1993 letter called for attacks “to expel” US forces “from Somalia.” (Later, a U.S. government indictment charged that bin Laden and other al Qaeda members had trained those who attacked the U.S. Rangers.)
Therefore, the most important need is to expel them from Somalia, even were a semi-Islamic, semi-democratic, semi-etc. government subsequently to assume power…. When you entered Somalia, the Somali arena was barren and futile. The situation changed, however, after the intervention by America and the Knights of the Cross. You most resembled a hunter aiming his rifle at the dead branch of a tree, with no leaves or birds on it. Suddenly, a bald eagle lands on the branch of the tree, directly in line with the rifle. Shouldn’t the hunter pull the trigger to kill the eagle or at least bloody it? The American bald eagle has landed within range of our rifles. You can kill it or leave it permanently disfigured….
The May 24, 1994 letter congratulates the Africa Corps for the “great victory” in the American withdrawal. It notes that the “victory in Somalia over the Americans has profound implications ideologically, politically, and psychologically…” and that the U.S. “fled in panic before their true capabilities could be exposed.” Furthermore, “the Somali experience confirmed the spurious nature of American power and that it has not recovered from the Vietnam complex. It fears getting bogged down in a real war that would reveal its psychological collapse at the level of personnel and leadership. Since Vietnam America has been seeking easy battles that are completely guaranteed.”
We congratulate you, ourselves, and all Muslims for that great victory in the land of Islamic Somalia…. I would have liked to write on this subject unemotionally and somewhat objectively, were in not for my overwhelming desire to kiss the heads and hands of all those who took part in this action…. General observations on the operation: 1. The Africa Corps did not enter the Somali arena with a clear vision, specifically a strategic vision, either militarily or politically. 2. Likewise, Americans did not enter the Somali arena with a clear vision of the objectives of its presence. Moreover, its vision of East Africa and the Horn of Africa failed to crystallize. I believe that the buffoon Clinton was motivated by election considerations and a personal inclination toward flamboyance, as if for a fleeting moment he believed the falsehood that he was the leader of the most powerful country in the world. These are not just my words. Rather, this is the considered opinion of many inside America and abroad. What was the result? The result was that our amazing Corps was equal to America for the first time, but in a limited area -the area of darkness regarding a strategic vision. So how were our amazing Corps and its starving African Muslim allies able to be victorious over the greatest power in the world today? … The Muslim victory in Somalia over the America has profound implications ideologically, politically, and psychologically that will require lengthy studies. You have the duty to record notes about these implications and keep them until it is time to study them in depth. Just the same, there is an important observation that we must not ignore, which is that the Americans were not defeated militarily in Somalia. Effective human and economic losses were not inflicted on them. All that happened was that the Somali battle revealed many of their psychological, political, and perhaps military weaknesses. 5. The Somali experience confirmed the spurious nature of American power and that it has not recovered from the Vietnam complex. It fears getting bogged down in a real war that would reveal its psychological collapse at the level of personnel and leadership. Since Vietnam America has been seeking easy battles that are completely guaranteed. It entered into a shameful series of adventures on the island of Grenada, then Panama, then bombing Libya, and then the Gulf War farce, which was the greatest military, political, and ideological swindle in history. The outcomes were 100 percent guaranteed. Even so, the Americans brought with them forces from 30 countries to take the blows on their behalf, should events not turn out the way they were supposed to. In the end, the Arabs, the Europeans, and Japan paid the costs of the war, plus fees! America wanted to continue this series of farces. It assumed that Somalia was an appropriate space for another ridiculous act. But the Muslims were there-so the great disaster occurred. They fled in panic before their true capabilities could be exposed. 6. In Mogadishu and Beirut, urban deterrence operations caused the American forces to flee in a shameful and humiliating manner. Doesn’t this demonstrate the importance of this type of warfare and the need to develop our warfare capabilities in terms of personnel, training syllabi, equipment being used, its level of technological advancement, development of security syllabi, development of security procedures, and training of competent elements for the security field.
What’s clear is that the supposed “stability” of the 1990s was illusory.
