It’s either the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, says President Obama, or it’s another Middle East war. Opponents of the Iran nuclear agreement argue that this is simply a scare tactic the White House is using to get Congress to sign off on a lousy deal.
Robert Satloff, executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, explains that war is highly unlikely. Moreover, even if UN and EU sanctions are lifted, remaining U.S. sanctions will continue to isolate Iran, and not—contrary to the administration’s warnings—the United States.
Satloff writes:
Advocates of the agreement have suggested that a successful congressional resolution of disapproval would kill the deal. They have argued that Iran would lose faith in America’s commitment to the agreement, pull out, and ramp up its enrichment program to new levels, and that the Europeans would cry foul at America’s lack of fair play and end sanctions of their own accord. Advocates of the accord also suggest that without agreed limits on its nuclear program, Iran would sooner or later trigger either American or Israeli military action, which would unleash regional war.
There are strong arguments why each of these predictions is misplaced. First, Iran is unlikely to respond to congressional disapproval by enriching uranium with reckless abandon and thereby validating the skeptics who never trusted its commitment to a solely peaceful nuclear program. . . . Iran is far more likely to fulfill its core requirements so as to earn the termination of UN and EU sanctions. . . . Along the way, Tehran would note that America, not the Islamic Republic, was isolated because of its intransigence.
For its part, Europe is unlikely to respond to a vote of disapproval by unilaterally terminating its sanctions. More likely, it would want to see its negotiating position validated by following the agreement’s terms—that is, waiting until Iran fulfills its core requirements before rewarding it with sanctions relief. . . . If the administration maintains effective enforcement of its nuclear-related sanctions, along with enforcement of the primary and secondary aspects of the non-nuclear sanctions that will be unaffected by the Iran deal, European business leaders are ultimately unlikely to value the Iranian market more than the U.S. market, and much of the existing sanctions regime would stay in place.
In that scenario . . . the global sanctions regime would be less effective than it is today but would still have significant bite. It would collapse only if the United States failed to enforce its own sanctions. Yet it is difficult to see a scenario in which the threat of war would be substantially higher than it is today.
There are strong arguments why each of these predictions is misplaced. First, Iran is unlikely to respond to congressional disapproval by enriching uranium with reckless abandon and thereby validating the skeptics who never trusted its commitment to a solely peaceful nuclear program. . . . Iran is far more likely to fulfill its core requirements so as to earn the termination of UN and EU sanctions. . . . Along the way, Tehran would note that America, not the Islamic Republic, was isolated because of its intransigence.
For its part, Europe is unlikely to respond to a vote of disapproval by unilaterally terminating its sanctions. More likely, it would want to see its negotiating position validated by following the agreement’s terms—that is, waiting until Iran fulfills its core requirements before rewarding it with sanctions relief. . . . If the administration maintains effective enforcement of its nuclear-related sanctions, along with enforcement of the primary and secondary aspects of the non-nuclear sanctions that will be unaffected by the Iran deal, European business leaders are ultimately unlikely to value the Iranian market more than the U.S. market, and much of the existing sanctions regime would stay in place.
In that scenario . . . the global sanctions regime would be less effective than it is today but would still have significant bite. It would collapse only if the United States failed to enforce its own sanctions. Yet it is difficult to see a scenario in which the threat of war would be substantially higher than it is today.
