For the Army, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ speech this week to the cadets at West Point gave the institution a lot to think about. But it also should have given those who follow our national military policy some reason to think as well.
Sec. Gates made some rather meaty statements that really beg to be unpacked a bit, because there are some implications in his words that some may find disturbing. Gates warned the Army that it must “confront the reality that the most plausible, high-end scenarios for the U.S. military are primarily naval and air engagements – whether in Asia, the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere.”
By “high end,” Gates means force-on-force, high intensity modern warfare. He sees little likelihood of the same sort of warfare on land. That, essentially, is the vision, then, which will drive force structure and modernization. Gates is telling the Army to prepare to be smaller and less heavy (read: large armored and mechanized formations).
Some policy analysts might disagree with the Gates assessment and give as proof Russia’s recently announced military build up of $650 billion dollars, or the Chinese exponential increases in military spending in recent years. Neither will convince skeptics that heavy formations are mostly a thing of the past and that our role in “Asia, the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere” will be limited to “naval and air engagements”.
But that is indeed Gate’s apparent belief:
By no means am I suggesting that the U.S. Army will – or should – turn into a Victorian nation-building constabulary – designed to chase guerrillas, build schools, or sip tea. But as the prospects for another head-on clash of large mechanized land armies seem less likely, the Army will be increasingly challenged to justify the number, size, and cost of its heavy formations to those in the leadership of the Pentagon, and on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, who ultimately make policy and set budgets.
Winners? Navy and Airforce. Losers? Army and Marine Corps – at least in the high budget dollar military procurement area. What Gates is telling the Army is that we have more of a need for aircraft and ships than we do for tanks and artillery. He’s saying that the Army that is left when all the budgeting and allocating is done will be smaller, leaner, lighter and modeled more after expeditionary forces than the traditional heavy units we find in the Army today.
While certainly the argument can be made that engaging in nation-building is not something we should again commit ourselves to in the future, that doesn’t necessarily mean that any introduction of a land army into Asia or the Middle East must end with us doing that. Kuwait, for instance, was an example of a punitive expedition designed to attack, push the Iraqis out of Kuwait and destroy their capability and desire to attempt it again. We did in within 100 hours, but it was a heavy force that was able to do that. We then withdrew and left the countries to sort themselves out.
Instead of contending that we will fall into the same sort of war and result ( i.e. nation-building), if we introduce ground combat units in those areas, we should more neatly define our purpose and mission before committing them. Obviously, our purpose and mission shouldn’t be nation building. It should instead be to deliver a swift, decisive and devastating blow to the forces of an enemy and to destroy their ability to further wage war. A punitive expedition – Kuwait should be the model, not Iraq; short, sweet and to the point – but saying that we should never again be willing to introduce ground combat forces in the area is, on its face, short-sighted.
What about our allies in those areas mentioned by Gates? What should they take away from the speech? If I were them, I’d conclude that the United States’ commitment to them militarily will come only in the guise of naval and air power. And although that can be extremely powerful, it may not be the sort of commitment that will give them a “warm fuzzy” feeling given our almost open-ended commitments to them in the past. That’s especially true of South Korea which faces a million-man North Korean Army and a nation that is increasingly unstable.
And the state of Israel, which has always been able to handle its own defense, may not find taking something off the table it has never needed, but always felt more secure knowing was probably available in the worst case, is no longer an option.
As I said, there’s much in the speech that is significant – not just to the Army but to our defense policy in general and certainly to our allies and potential enemies alike. You can bet they’re taking it apart and studying it too. Gates’ overall point is the world has changed in a significant way since the financial crisis. What the US was able and willing to do yesterday, it probably won’t be able to do tomorrow. That means institutional change, certainly, as each of the services adjusts to the new reality. But it also means a difference in approach to national security problems than what we might have done a scant five years ago.
Our potential enemies will note this, of that you can be certain. This country cannot afford to pull back too far or they will attempt to fill the vacuum that is created. But we must be prepared to meet the most likely scenarios to develop in the future, while our allies pick up more of the cost of their own defense. That is the message Gates seemed to be delivering in his talk with the cadets.
