The top presidential envoy to Iraq from May 2003 to June 2004, Ambassador Paul Bremer, is out with his new book, My Year in Iraq. What’s clear from his memoir is that there were deep divisions among Bush officials — particularly between Bremer and Sec. Rumsfeld — on the issue of U.S. troop levels in Iraq going back to May 2003. Bremer also suggests that Sec. Powell was far more hawkish (and irritated) on getting the security situation in Iraq under control than media reports in the U.S. had indicated. For example, for months Bremer, and later Powell, pressed for an attack on the renegade Muqtada al-Sadr and his militia. In fact, when the attack on Muqtada was about to commence, Powell told the president, the vice president, and others: (Page 331)
“It’s not just a question of his militia. At the end of the operation, Muqtada’s got to be gone.”
On the troop strength debate, here are just a few examples Bremer offers regarding his disagreement with Sec. Rumsfeld: (Page 10)
The [Rand] analysis was stunning. I agreed with Secretary Rumsfeld’s efforts to transform the American military to the meet the emerging challenges of the 21st century…. But did the situation on the ground in Iraq support the conclusion that we would need only a third of the occupation forces sugessted by the Rand study? That afternoon, I had a summary of the draft copied and sent it down the corridor to Don Rumsfeld. “I think you should consider this,” I said in my cover memo. I never heard back from him about the report.
(Page 155, 162)
Don Rumsfeld flew back to Baghdad on Thursday, September 4 [2003]…. I knew that the principal reason for his trip was to assess personally the options to reduce American forces. And I also knew that he was putting a lot of pressure on the military to find a rationale to make that happen. It would be my job to make the case that we needed to keep enough troops in Iraq to stabilize the country. My concern about the Pentagon’s fixation with the “metrics” of security forces training was confirmed on September 12 [2003] when I received a memo from Don Rumsfeld addressed to General Abizaid and me…. Rumsfeld’s memo made clear that real pressure was building in Washington to “ramp up the Iraqi numbers” so as to “put less stress on our forces, enabling us to reduce the U.S. role.” Of course, this was the correct goal…[but] this, I had insisted, would take time, at least a year according to our experts.”
(Page 209)
“There’s a tendency in DOD to equate an Iraqi policeman with an American soldier and to assume that what matters is the aggregate total number of people — Coalition and Iraqis — involved in security at any given moment. This is flat-out misleading.” I said that although the secretary of defense had insisted that the planned troop reductions would “conditions driven,” this was not entirely correct. In fact the drawdown seemed more driven by the Army’s concern over their planned spring troop rotations.
(Pages 356-7)
On May 17 [2004], I had a meeting with General Sanchez to discuss the war. What would you do if you had two more divisions, Rick? I asked him. He was a practical soldier who didn’t normally speculate about the hypothetical when there were so many concrete problems to address each day. But he answered immediately. “I’d control Baghdad.” He hated the fact the insurgents seemed able to operate openly in the capital…. On May 18, I gave Rice a heads-up that I intended to send Secretary Rumsfeld a very private message suggesting that the Coalition needed more troops…. That afternoon I sent my message to Rumsfeld. I noted that the deterioration of the security situation since April had made it clear, to me at least, that we were trying to cover too many fronts with too few resources…. I stressed that while I did not think our mission was on the brink, I felt we were in a dangerous situation. I recommended that he consider whether the Coalition could deploy one or two additional divisions for up to a year. I verified that the secretary received my message. I did not hear back from him.
No doubt Sec. Rumsfeld will respond to Amb. Bremer in time.
