THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE’S stunning recent victories in Afghanistan have created an opportunity to destroy the Taliban much more rapidly than seemed possible just a few days ago. If additional American military force can be brought to bear in a timely fashion–including the introduction of mobile ground troops–there is a good chance to achieve a decisive victory before the end of the year.
In a series of attacks that range across the country from Herat in the west, through Mazar-i-Sharif near the border with Uzbekistan and now into the capital city of Kabul itself, the Northern Alliance has ripped open the Taliban front lines in Afghanistan. In the north, only an isolated pocket around Kunduz remains. Perhaps more important, this broad push, supported by increased U.S. air strikes, has demoralized the Taliban military, shattered its command structure, and weakened its political grip: After years of repressive Taliban rule, advancing Northern Alliance forces have been welcomed as liberators.
But the real key to the Taliban’s rule is the south and the city of Kandahar. “For all practical purposes,” said Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, “the Taliban capital is in Kandahar.” Because it has been the center of Taliban strength and al Qaeda influence; Kandahar must fall to mark the end of their rule. Taking the city could also pin down the Taliban and Osama bin Laden and greatly complicate their escape.
The Northern Alliance’s successes have opened the door to Kandahar and the south, but the next step must come quickly to prevent the Taliban from reorganizing its defenses. And press reports, though sketchy, also suggest that Kandahar is already in chaos and even may have been seized by groups deserting the Taliban. Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda lieutenants may well be on the run.
This is a situation tailor-made for U.S. military forces. To begin with, only American forces have the tactical capabilities and operational reach to exploit the fast-changing conditions on the ground. The Taliban can probably retreat and reorganize before the Northern Alliance can consolidate and advance; indeed, the fall of Kabul appears to have caught the Alliance leadership somewhat off guard.
But the Alliance’s victories have created a moment of opportunity. If the Taliban does manage to reorganize itself, even partially, it would have a difficult time standing up to constant assault. This demands not only continued–and, if possible, increased–bombing, but the insertion of U.S. ground forces. If American air power has had a more telling effect in recent days, it is in some measure a result of the moves by Northern Alliance ground troops that forced the Taliban to mass and become a more attractive target. Alliance forces would be challenged to sustain such maneuvers. Even relatively small numbers of American ground troops, if inserted now, would be highly effective. Their combination of mobility and firepower, in synergy with air strikes, could sweep away any concentration of Taliban forces.
This will require a greater force than the special operations contingents now in the region, although this is also the moment for commandos to be effective in chasing down bin Laden and al Qaeda as they flee. The troops from the 10th Mountain Division, now guarding air bases in Uzbekistan, can be married up with Black Hawk and Apache helicopters that can self-deploy from Germany. The Northern Alliance’s gains over the past several days make it possible to secure and operate out of several airfields inside Afghanistan.
Even larger and more powerful reinforcements are also available. There are two Marine infantry battalions afloat in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean and equipment for an Army heavy brigade plus a larger support operation on prepositioned ships at the island of Diego Garcia. Paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne could be directly flown from Fort Bragg, dropping in to secure rear areas and providing additional manpower. Within three weeks, follow-on heavy forces from the United States can arrive in the region. Forces promised by Turkey, Great Britain and other allies, could also take part. And, of course, greater U.S. and allied air power can be brought to bear.
With some creativity–and employing the tactical and technological advantages of U.S. forces to be bold rather than cautious–there is a chance to turn the recent successes in the north into an operation that decides the campaign. Simply announcing the intent to deploy greater U.S. forces, broadcasting the movement of airplanes and troops, will have an important psychological effect.
To be sure, there may still follow months of “mopping up” operations as pockets of Taliban, al Qaeda, and perhaps bin Laden himself are tracked down. Further, this would be merely the beginning of our involvement in Afghanistan. Securing the country, creating a state–and, for example, eliminating the many religious schools that have been breeding grounds for anti-American hatreds and revolutionary Islam–and building an enduring peace will, as we have learned in the Balkans, require many years of effort. But though there can be no easy “exit strategy” in Afghanistan, the door is now open for an easier entry.
Finally, we must ensure that a campaign begun in response to an attack on America ends with a recognizably American victory. Not only will that make it easier to root out the Taliban and its al Qaeda allies, but it will make it clear that we will do what is necessary to win in the larger war over the United States’ presence and role in the region.
Gary Schmitt is executive director and Tom Donnelly deputy executive director of the Project for the New American Century.
