A REPORT PERSISTS IN WASHINGTON that the Clinton administration will soon seek permanent most-favored-nation status for the People’s Republic of China – – possibly in exchange for some concessions on human rights or for shaping up on standards for admission to the World Trade Organization. The office of the U.S. trade representative has denied the report, but it is becoming more and more credible considering Clinton’s references to his new “inevitability” policy, according to which the United States need not confront China over its human rights abuses or violation of agreements because China’s peaceful transformation to democracy is inevitable.
Even if freedom and democracy are inevitable in China, do not expect that I will greet the first elected president of post-Communist China by saying: “I thought about depriving the old regime of economic and political benefits, but since your success was inevitable, I had Jiang Zemin and Gen. Chi over for coffee at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.” The inevitability theory does have one thing going for it: predictability. We can all fill in our 1997 calendars now. In mid-March, pencil in “U.S. cave-in at Geneva U.N. Human Rights Commission.” In the last week of May, jot down “Renewal of MFN.” You can be pretty specific about exactly what moment that will occur: Put it down for 6 p.m. the Friday before Memorial Day when the administration traditionally delivers the notice just in time to make the Saturday papers but after members of Congress have left for home.
Needless to say, supporters of permanent MFN look forward to the time when the annual debate over renewal can be avoided. They decry the “sterility” of the debate. Lobbyists for business interests chortle over the “annual exercise” and smugly shake their heads at misguided anti-MFN diehards. Their attitude is that America should put a stop to the annual debate over MFN because the Chinese know we are not serious. This is a variation of the inevitability theory: “Best not to have a debate over principle among elected representatives because when the majority favoring MFN wins, it just confuses the Chinese.”
The idea that it would be valuable for China to enjoy permanent MFN status rests on the myth that all trade is a moderating force on repressive regimes and encourages reform. China’s MFN status was restored in 1980, yet there is no evidence that this has led to an improvement in human rights in China. The 1996 State Department human rights report, just released, acknowledges that repression in China increased last year. According to the report, human rights abuses were widespread; the government used intimidation, exile, prison terms, and other measures to silence dissent. Persecution of independent Protestant and Catholic churches intensified. Minorities, including Tibetans, who are Buddhists, and Uighurs, who are Muslims, also experienced serious repression. China’s human rights performance is dictated by the nature of the regime — an arbitrary, one-party state struggling to maintain as many aspects of totalitarianism as it can while reaping economic benefits for party leaders and the military.
In China, the government controls international trade and the economy. While the United States grants China the same trading terms we give to nations where our businessmen compete on a level playing field, China limits our access to its markets. Rushing to conclude an agreement before Madeleine Albright makes her first visit to China as secretary of state, U.S. and Chinese negotiators last week cracked open China’s markets for drapes and home furnishings. Typically, negotiators declined to specify how much greater access U.S. companies will have under the agreement. The U.S.-China Business Council and other MFN proponents rarely acknowledge that the United States has a $ 35-39 billion trade deficit with China. (China says the deficit is $ 10 billion.)
So China is not buying American; Belgium buys more U.S. goods than China does. Who benefits from this state of affairs? The Chinese government, of course. When China does buy from the United States, it predominantly buys aircraft, power-generating equipment, computers, and telecommunications equipment. U.S. trade with China is putting sophisticated technology — including machine tools useful in making not just commercial aircraft but bombers and missiles — in the hands of military-owned and controlled companies. The withdrawal of MFN for China is an effective tool precisely because China needs our markets. The trade surplus figures show that China relies on our consumers to buy its products.
China’s growth is raising living standards, but wealth and property do not in and of themselves enable individuals to resist arbitrary government. Law does. It restrains the government and protects the citizens. But in China, the rule of law does not exist. Entrepreneurs who run afoul of a Chinese business with official connections often find themselves not in court but in jail. American businessmen have been targets of what amounts to official extortion for attempting to enforce a contract. Even companies with an ironclad legal claim against a state-owned enterprise are left holding the bag. Revpower, an American company, has been trying since 1993 to enforce a $ 6 million arbitral award that China is obligated to honor as a party to international agreements.
Supporters of “engagement” claim that China will be transformed into a responsible law-abiding state by its membership in the World Trade Organization and other multilateral organizations. China’s behavior disproves this theory. Receiving MFN treatment for its products has not led to a more democratic, humane, or internationally responsible China, as demonstrated by its failure to respect either its citizens or agreements on issues from intellectual property to nuclear nonproliferation to Hong Kong. Renewing MFN will continue to help China’s economy and military expand and modernize, while its citizens look for crumbs.
Jesse Helms, a Republican from North Carolina, is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.