In the early morning darkness of Jan. 8, several thousand U.S. troops huddled in Saddam Hussein-era bunkers in western Iraq as 11 ballistic missiles rained destruction on parts of the sprawling al Asad air base — Iran’s promised “harsh revenge” for the killing of its top general, Qassem Soleimani, in a U.S. drone strike five days earlier.
The night sky lit up, and the bunkers shook as two waves of missiles struck over an hour and a half, sending a shockwave through the air and rattling some American troops who were above ground standing watch.
Even with the benefit of an advance warning of the attack, there was little the troops could do but duck and cover — and hope it would not be their day to die.
“All is well!” President Trump tweeted when the attack was over. “So far, so good! We have the most powerful and well-equipped military anywhere in the world, by far!”
But despite well over $350 billion spent in the past three decades, when they were most needed to protect U.S. forces and potentially prevent an escalation to all-out war, America’s vaunted missile defenses were missing in action.
From the tours the military gave reporters two days later, it was clear that while a warning from the Iraqis gave the United States time to disperse its forces and lower the risk of casualties, the fact that no one died or suffered more than a concussion was also due in large part to sheer luck.
It was also apparent that there were no defenses against ballistic missiles protecting the U.S. troops at the base despite the rising tensions with and direct threats from Iran, which possesses a formidable arsenal of both ballistic and cruise missiles.
A request by the Washington Examiner for an explanation of why no Patriot missile batteries had been deployed to Iraq prompted a pro forma response.
“As a matter of policy and due to operational security concerns, we are not going to discuss force posture, assets, or specific capabilities in the U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility,” said an unattributed email statement from CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida.
The answer, though, is really no secret.
The U.S. only has so many “theater” missiles defenses, and all are currently deployed elsewhere, including Patriot anti-missile batteries recently sent to Saudi Arabia last September in response to Iran’s missile and drone strike on a Saudi oil processing facility.
“The U.S. has a finite, limited capacity of manpower to operate and systems to deploy — composed of 15 Patriot missile defense battalions and seven Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries that are already deployed globally to defend critical U.S. assets in Japan, Guam, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Europe, and with a Department of Defense Global Response Force,” says Riki Ellison, head of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, an independent lobbying group. “There is not enough missile defense systems and manpower to defend all of the critical U.S. assets, and it is clear we need more systems and manpower.”
It’s now likely that some assets may be repositioned.
“We continuously monitor and assess the security situation to ensure the safety of our personnel,” said the statement from CENTCOM.
The budget passed by Congress in December allocates more than $10 billion for missile defenses. Still, much of the money is earmarked for systems designed to shoot down long-range missiles on a high trajectory.
“Most of the hundreds of billions of dollars spent on missile defense over the past 40 years have been squandered on unworkable plans to intercept long-range missiles. We still do not have effective defenses against short- and medium-range missiles that represent the greatest threat to our troops,” says Joseph Cirincione, the head of Ploughshares Fund, an arms control advocacy group.
“Any rational policy would focus on these and then build up. Most of all, we should mandate that every system be rigorously tested against real-world threats, like the Iranian missile that just hit us. None of our systems have been so tested,” Cirincione argues.
While some experts, and at least one Iranian commander, have asserted that Iran missed on purpose to make a point and avoid sparking a war, the Pentagon rejects that narrative.
“Based on what I saw and what I know, is that [the missiles] were intended to cause structural damage, destroy vehicles and equipment and aircraft, and to kill personnel,” Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters at the Pentagon.
Other experts pointed out that ballistic missiles, unlike U.S. satellite-guided cruise missiles, are not accurate enough for pinpoint targeting.
“They have no idea in the end where those missiles are going to come down,” said retired Gen. John Allen, a former deputy CENTCOM commander on CNN. “So I don’t buy the idea that they were pure in their targeting with no intention ultimately of hurting the United States or Iraqi forces.”
In fact, errant or poorly guided missiles can be even more dangerous.
The single most deadly day for U.S. troops in the 1991 Persian Gulf War was when an Iraq Scud missile randomly landed on a military barracks in Saudi Arabia, killing 27 and wounding nearly 100 American military personnel.
It was the threat posed by short-range missiles that prompted the U.S. to make significant technical improvements to the Patriot system, adding “hit-to-kill” technology, so that American forces would not be sitting ducks again.
Instead, when the threat became real, U.S. troops were lucky to have dodged a bullet because they had no way of stopping it.
And if there had been significant casualties, the U.S. might well have been in a shooting war by now, all for want of a few Patriots.
Jamie McIntyre is the Washington Examiner’s senior writer on defense and national security. His morning newsletter, Jamie McIntyre’s Daily on Defense, is free and available by email subscription at dailyondefense.com.
