Newly declassified FBI records from 2016 related to the bureau’s investigation of possible links between the 9/11 al Qaeda terrorist attacks and the Saudi government show that 2004’s 9/11 Commission Report fell short in a number of ways, missing key details about how Saudis assisted two of the hijackers.
Although Saudi Arabia has repeatedly denied any involvement in the attacks, the 9/11 victims’ families have pointed to links such as Omar al Bayoumi, said to have been a former Saudi intelligence officer, and Fahad al Thumairy, a former Saudi Consulate official who helped lead the King Fahd Mosque, who had contacts with Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi, two of the 15 Saudis among the 19 hijackers.
Mihdhar and Hazmi, “muscle” hijackers on the plane that crashed into the Pentagon, were the first hijackers to enter the United States, arriving in Los Angeles in January 2000. The two met Bayoumi at a Los Angeles restaurant on Feb. 1, 2000, and he reportedly helped the duo open bank accounts and rent apartments in the same complex as him in San Diego.
The 17 pages of declassified but partially redacted records, dated April 2016, concern the FBI’s “electronic communication” tied to Operation Encore. Many names are redacted, allegedly to protect “personally identifiable information” (PII).
Many of the newly declassified records centered on Bayoumi meeting the two future hijackers at the restaurant, casting serious doubt on his claims the meeting happened by chance.
FBI RELEASES DECLASSIFIED DOCS ON 9/11
“PII stated that he needed to bring Hazmi and Midhar to the Mediterranean Gourmet Restaurant located on Venice Boulevard in Los Angeles,” the FBI wrote.
The bureau said that “after meeting PII at the Consulate in late January 2000, Bayoumi, accompanied by Bin Don, drove to the Mediterranean Gourmet Restaurant where they encountered Hazmi and Midhar” and that “this is the same restaurant” the redacted person said “he needed to deliver Hazmi and Midhar to.”
“Bayoumi’s logistic support to Hazmi and Midhar included transaction, travel assistance, lodging, and financing. Anomalous money transfers within Bayoumi’s bank accounts coincide with translations wherein Bayoumi provided assistance to Hazmi and Midhar,” the bureau continued. “Bayoumi provided statements in 2003 to federal investigators as to how he met Hazmi and Midhar on or about 2/1/2000 and how he assisted them… Bayoumi’s statements are directly contradicted by eyewitness statements.”
According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the hijackers “encountered Omar al Bayoumi and Cayman Bin Don at a halal food restaurant on Venice Boulevard in Culver City, a few blocks away from the King Fahd mosque.”
The report said: “Bayoumi and Bin Don have both told us that they had driven up from San Diego earlier that day so that Bayoumi could address a visa issue and collect some papers from the Saudi Consulate. Bayoumi heard Hazmi and Mihdhar speaking in what he recognized to be Gulf Arabic and struck up a conversation… Bayoumi told them how pleasant San Diego was and offered to help them settle there.”
“Bayoumi has said that he and Bin Don attempted to visit King Fahd mosque after lunch but could not find it. Bin Don, on the other hand, recalls rising the mosque twice that day for prayers, both before and after the meal. Bin Don’s recollection is spotty and inconsistent,” the commission said in 2004. “Bayoumi’s version can be challenged as well, since the mosque is close to the restaurant and Bayoumi had visited it, and the surrounding area, on multiple occasions, including twice within six weeks of February 1. We do not know whether the lunch encounter occurred by chance or design.”
The FBI wrote in 2016 that “approximately one hour prior to meeting Hazmi and Midhar, Bayoumi and Caisin Bin Don visited the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and met with” a redacted name, and after the meeting, Bayoumi and bin Don drove to a “Mediterranean Gourmet Restaurant.”
Bayoumi told the FBI there was then a “chance” encounter with Hazmi and Midhar, but the bureau said this was “contradicted in eye-witness descriptions provided by Bin Don.” Bayoumi claimed he heard the two future hijackers talking, recognized their Gulf Arabic accents, then went over to talk with them, but bin Don “contradicts Bayoumi’s statements, saying Bayoumi entered the restaurant and positioned himself to be looking out the front window” and that “when Bayoumi observed Hazmi and Midhar walk into the restaurant, he approached them from a distance where he could not have heard them speaking first.”
FBI Special Agent Jacqueline Maguire testified during a public 9/11 Commission hearing in June 2004 that the bureau had “no direct evidence of a connection between” Thumairy and the two hijackers. In relation to Bayoumi meeting the two hijackers at a restaurant, Maguire also claimed that “all indications is that that meeting was a random encounter.”
“Obviously we disagree quite profoundly with the testimony and, candidly, I think it’s a bit unfortunate that someone from the intelligence sector would express that kind of a view at that time,” a 9/11 family lawyer told the Washington Examiner. “We now know how much remained unexplored as of 2004, and it seems the prudent thing for someone from an intelligence background at that point to say it’s unclear and there’s a lot more to be explored, and it certainly doesn’t seem that there was sufficient evidence, certainly not evidence that’s clear enough, to make that kind of an assessment at that time.”
The 9/11 Commission also said that “after exploring the available leads, we have not found evidence that Thumairy provided assistance to the two operatives.”
Yet, the FBI’s newly declassified records stated that “PII was tasked by Thumairy to assist Hazmi and Midhar while they were in Los Angeles” and that the redacted person described the hijackers as “two very significant people.”
The 9/11 Commission also said “Thumairy has denied preaching anti-Western sermons, much less promoting violent jihad” and that he “claimed not to recognize Hazmi or Mihdhar,” adding that “both denials are somewhat suspect.” The commission said Thumairy “likewise denied knowing” Bayoumi, “even though witnesses and telephone records establish that the two men had contact with each other.”
The declassified FBI records said that “Bayoumi stated he never spoke to Hazmi or Midhar about Jihad,” but one month after 9/11, the ex-wife of a redacted individual was interviewed, saying she met Bayoumi multiple times, that “Bayoumi was always talking about the Islamic community needs to take action,” and that he told her and her husband they were “at Jihad.”
The 9/11 Commission Report concluded: “We have found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded the organization.”
CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER
A 9/11 family lawyer said Monday: “That language was always, in our estimation, very carefully crafted to allow for the possibility that there were officials in the Saudi government that the 9/11 Commission was not characterizing as ‘senior Saudi officials’ who had played a role in all of this, and the report itself very clearly left open the possibility that Thumairy and Bayoumi had played some role in supporting the hijackers.”
