As the second year of the war in Ukraine draws to a close, the map of the battlefield looks much the same. Yet much has changed.
Despite waning global attention, especially after the headline-grabbing War in Gaza began in October, several monumental events changed the conflict this year. Wagner’s aborted mutiny presented the greatest danger to the Russian state since the 1993 constitutional crisis. Ukraine’s much-anticipated counteroffensive in Zaporizhzhia was met with disappointment, costing significant losses in men and military equipment — along with significant Western support.
The third year of the war in Ukraine may be the most decisive yet, as Ukraine and Russia are likely to face their greatest challenges so far. Here are five factors that will decide the war in 2024.
Western support for Ukraine
It’s no secret that Ukraine has been able to resist the Russian invasion so successfully, primarily due to massive aid from the United States and NATO. So far, it has received over $180 billion in aid, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said recently, with $70 billion of that coming from the U.S.
However, two years into the conflict, continued foreign support is under threat. As of mid-November, the Pentagon has spent 97% of the $62 billion earmarked for Ukraine, the White House stated. Further aid is in limbo, caught in battles between Congressional Republicans and Democrats, who hold that the southern border should take priority.
Both officials and military experts warn that U.S. aid, which is far greater than that of Ukraine’s other backers, is the decisive factor in the war.
“We support Ukraine or Ukraine loses the war,” Fred Kagan, director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, told Foreign Policy. “It really is that stark.”
With this in mind, the U.S. 2024 presidential election has the potential to decide the war. The likely Republican nominee, former President Donald Trump, has openly expressed skepticism about aid to Ukraine, and pledged to resolve the conflict within 24 hours. A Trump presidency has a high likelihood to cut off Ukraine’s lifeline, something that would be sure to bring Kyiv to the negotiating table from an unfavorable position.
A change in Russian strategy?
As Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive and Russia’s grinding advance into Bakhmut and Adviivka showed, the war largely disadvantages the side that is on the attack. Russia has refrained from the sweeping advances of its initial invasion since its withdrawal from around Kyiv in April 2022, likely out of fear of heavy losses. It has since settled on the defensive, such as in Kherson and Zaporozhye, or a grinding advance, where gains are often measured in meters.
The Kremlin’s decision to avoid daring offensives, contrary to some military experts’ guesses at the beginning of 2023, has allowed it to avoid further mobilizations to replace depleted manpower. Its strategy of attrition appears to be paying off, having rebuffed Ukraine’s largest military gamble yet with little territorial losses.
With the Kremlin appearing as confident as ever, however, this could change in 2024.
“As far as the Russian leadership is concerned, the confrontation with the West has reached a turning point: The Ukrainian counteroffensive has failed, Russia is more confident than ever, and the cracks in Western solidarity are spreading,” Tatiana Stanovaya, senior fellow with Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, said in a recent analysis, according to the Associated Press.
Perhaps sensing weakness in Ukraine, and a fall in critical Western support, the Russian military could move back to a strategy of large-scale offensives, even into fronts not currently active.
While the most likely axes of attack are in the Donbass, where the conflict first began nearly a decade ago, analysts have also suggested offensives behind the heavily fortified defenses of the region through Belgorod in Russia proper, entering Sumy or Kharkov, where Russian forces were expelled in September 2022.
Any major new offensive from Russia would be a major gamble. It could either provide visible, concrete gains to boost morale and the war effort, or end in catastrophic losses that would drain the fighting capabilities and morale of the Russian military. It could also put Ukraine back into an advantageous position, allowing Kyiv to catch its breath as Russia throws its forces against heavily fortified defensive lines.
Resilience of the Russian economy
One of the biggest surprises of the war has been the resilience of the Russian economy, which has been able to survive unparalleled sanctions. The resilience of 2022 was surpassed in 2023 by shocking growth, rather than the expected contraction. Growth even surpassed the Kremlin’s own estimates— analysts at Bloomberg Economics estimated that growth in 2023 will surpass 3%. A report from the New York Times referred to the exodus of Western businesses from Russia as turning into a “bonanza.”
Though the performance of the Russian economy has crushed all expectations — there is a catch. The economy is running dangerously close to overheating, as showcased in reports from the Economist and elsewhere.
A shortage of labor due to the war and emigration, combined with skyrocketing demand, has driven up inflation a significant amount. In turn, Russia’s central bank has hiked interest rates, running further risks. A Bloomberg analysis in October estimated that Russia has a 70% chance of entering a recession. On top of this, Russia is doubling its defense spending in the upcoming year, to levels not seen since the fall of the Soviet Union.
Taking into account these factors, 2024 will likely decide whether Russia will continue its economic miracle or if its luck will run out.
Russian and Ukrainian political stability
Though Russia appeared the bigger loser in 2023 in terms of its political stability, with Yevgeny Prigozhin’s aborted coup, Ukraine suffered as well. For the first time since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, cracks in the unity of Ukraine’s political and military establishment became public, largely between Zelensky and military head Valery Zaluzhny. In a series of public interviews, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko decried Zelensky as turning Ukraine increasingly authoritarian, reminiscent of Russia.
In November, Zaluzhny wrote an essay for the Economist, outlining a view and strategy regarding the war that was at odds with Zelensky’s. Zaluzhny’s view has been characterized as more realist, stressing the need to prepare for a long war of attrition, while Zelensky maintains his optimism that Ukraine can and should go on the offensive.
Whether the rift will be resolved or grow worse will be decided in 2024. Conversely, with Prigozhin gone and Wagner no longer a threat, the Kremlin appears largely secure from domestic threats.
CLICK HERE FOR MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER
Ukrainian manpower
Casualty estimates for the war in Ukraine are notoriously hard to come by, but it can be reasonably ascertained that Russia and Ukraine have suffered significantly. Russia, with a population several times larger than Ukraine’s, can more easily replace its losses. In order to field enough troops to hold the line against Russia, Ukraine has undertaken several waves of mobilization. Its recruiters have had to resort to increasingly unpopular methods to get more fighting-aged males to the front line, including storming nightclubs and cafes and using intimidation tactics, the New York Times reported.
The Jamestown Institute estimated in July that Ukraine’s current population is roughly 20 million— less than half that of 20 years ago and two-thirds that of just before the Russian invasion. Around 10% of the remaining population has been mobilized, with the overwhelming majority of the rest being too young, old, or women. The institute warned that Ukraine has reached a “critical threshold” with its manpower.
Ukraine will be tested in the coming year to determine whether it can sustain the quality of its military with the current levels of attrition while lacking an excess of manpower.
