Now that the Reaper has, for the first time, demonstrated the ability for unmanned aerial vehicles to drop precision-guided munitions in combat, it’s worth taking a step back to analyze what this means for the Air Force, and for the future of air warfare. The advent of armed UAVs represents a fundamental change in air warfare, at least in the context of low-intensity operations. Until the war in Iraq, UAVs were seen mainly as reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) platforms–and that remains their primary mission today. Because of their low signature and long endurance, UAVs such as Predator and Global Hawk can provide persistent surveillance of the battlefield in a way that manned platforms cannot. A U-2 can stay on station for about eight hours (depending on the distance from base), but a Global Hawk or Predator can stay up for days at a time. Moreover, because it does not have to carry a human being, a UAV can be made smaller and cheaper than a manned platform carrying the same sensors. Armed UAVs–or Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs)–were originally conceived as “reusable cruise missiles” to penetrate dense enemy air defenses to attack high-value targets. A cruise missile is a very expensive way of delivering a 500-1000 lb. warhead to a target, since all the expensive stuff (engine, guidance system, and airframe) can only be used once. A stealth fighter like the F-117 Nighthawk can do the same job, delivering the equivalent of two cruise missile payloads on every sortie, but it requires the support of a host of other aircraft, including tankers, radar jammers and AWACS–and can only operate safely at night. Even then, any manned aircraft can be shot down (the Serbians managed to get an F-117, the only combat loss of a stealth aircraft to date), with all of the political ramifications involving a lost pilot. So, in theory, a UCAV would combine the precision and low signature of a cruise missile with the reusability of a stealth aircraft. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has in fact been developing a sophisticated UCAV under the X-39 and X-45 programs, which resemble nothing so much as miniaturized B-2 bombers. Capable of carrying upwards of 2,000 lbs of precision munitions, they could attack up to eight different targets using the new Small Diameter Bomb. The X-45 is still in flight testing, and will not enter service for several years at the earliest. But a funny thing happened in the interim: the U.S. found itself at war not with a sophisticated adversary possessing integrated, multi-layered air defenses, but with insurgents and terrorists whose weapon of choice is the car bomb and suicide belt. To the extent that U.S. forces needed air support, it took the form of providing long-term overwatch of ground forces. This involved attack aircraft such as F-15s, F-16s, F-18s and A-10s flying long, boring missions that take their toll on both pilots and aircraft. Most of the time, nothing happens on these flights: the planes carry their bombs back to base unused. Since there were no enemy air defenses to consider (other than machine guns and short-range shoulder-fired missiles), the main risks are mechanical error and pilot failure. Surely there had to be a better way to deliver ordnance under these conditions.
The Air Force gets credit for first considering arming the MQ-1 Predator as an experimental program initiated after the war in Kosovo, where Serbian forces became adept at hiding from NATO aircraft. With its small signature, the Predator could literally sneak up on a target, but in the time needed to bring up bomb-carrying aircraft, the target frequently got away. Since the Predator already carried both optical sensors and a laser designator (to illuminate the target for laser-guided bombs and missiles carried by other aircraft), and since it had enough reserve payload, why not arm it with a pair of AGM-114 Hellfire anti-tank missiles? The CIA picked up on the concept during its pre-9/11 covert surveillance of Afghanistan, resulting in accelerated development and live-fire testing. However, the armed variant (designated MQ-1) did not go into service before 9/11. It was extensively used in Afghanistan after the U.S. invasion, and was credited with killing a number of high-ranking al Qaeda leaders. A number later served in Iraq. But the MQ-1 had a number of shortcomings, including limited range, ceiling and payload. The MQ-9 Reaper (also known as Predator B) is an enlarged Predator with longer wings, more fuel, and up to four weapons pylons with a combined payload of 3000 lbs. Capable of flying at an altitude of 50,000 feet for 15 hours (up to 42 hours with external fuel tanks), it can carry a much wider array of weapons than the original MQ-1, including Hellfires, GBU-12 laser guided bombs and GBU-38 JDAMs. With the introduction of the 250-lb. Small Diameter Bomb, the Reaper would be able to address as many as 24 different targets in all weather conditions. It thus provides the same support capabilities (in the low-intensity environment) as a modern strike fighter costing from 20-50 times as much. The implications for the Air Force are immense. As I’ve noted before in relation to Chinese air defenses and the recent grounding of all USAF F-15 Eagles, the fighter aircraft fleet is aging rapidly, and the high operational tempo of the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan is driving up maintenance costs (as well as causing problems with pilot retention). But the capabilities of an aircraft like the F-15 are largely wasted in the operational context of Iraq and Afghanistan, where persistence is worth more than performance, and the benign environment eliminates the need for high speed, maneuverability, and complex countermeasures. Predators and Reapers operating from austere bases within Iraq and Afghanistan can provide 24/7 coverage of the entire area of operations, and, because of their low speed, loiter over specific ground units for hours at a time, constantly on call. Moreover, with the “pilot” seated in a comfortable ground control station, problems of fatigue and disorientation are largely eliminated. The low speed of the Reaper, combined with its high-resolution sensors, allows the operator to discriminate between friendly and enemy forces, reducing the chances of fratricide (all too common still, when using “fast movers” for air support). Equipped with laser- and GPS-guided weapons, the Reaper has the same degree of accuracy as the sexier strike fighters, but are much cheaper to operate and are probably more effective in low intensity operations. Fielding adequate numbers of MQ-9 Reapers, the Air Force could reduce the number of manned fighter aircraft supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, or at the very least, reduce the number and duration of the sorties flown each month. This would allow the Air Force to conduct much needed maintenance and overhaul of the fighter force, as well as reduce the deployment rate for pilots to a more manageable level, thereby increasing readiness and pilot retention. In the long term, the deployment of the Reaper could be the harbinger of a new concept of operations in which unmanned aircraft take over the lion’s share of support duties in counterinsurgency and other low intensity conflicts, allowing the Air Force to focus its manned aircraft more on the kind of high intensity missions likely to be required in the event of a conflict with China, North Korea, or Iran. Freed from the need to support low intensity operations with manned aircraft, the Air Force could afford to replace more of its front-line fighters with next-generation F-22 Raptors and F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, a move which in itself would do much to deter the possibility of high-intensity conventional conflicts. Still, there remain a number of operational and institutional issues that need to be addressed before the operation of combat UAVs can be considered “routine.” These include the integration of manned and unmanned aircraft in the same airspace, control and release of weapons from unmanned platforms, whether UAV operators should be rated pilots, etc. But most of these will be resolved in the course daily operations in the combat area through a process of trial and error. The combat baptism of the Reaper therefore is a true milestone in the annals of air warfare.
