|
Qods Force logo, click to view. |
Since the end of April, Multinational Forces Iraq has released a multitude of press releases noting the capture or killing of members described as belonging to “a secret cell terrorist network known for its use of explosively formed penetrators, or EFPs, as well as facilitating the transport of weapons and EFPs from Iran to Iraq, and bringing militants from Iraq to Iran for terrorist training.” Coalition and Iraqi forces have killed 25 members of this network and captured 68 more since April 27, 2007. These are Shia terrorists who are trained, armed, funded, and directed by Iran’s Qods Force, and have connections to Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army. Multinational Forces Iraq is cryptic yet clear when discussing this network of Iranian backed operatives. General David Petraeus, the commander of Multinational Forces Iraq, first identified the network at a press briefing on April 26. He described it as a “secret cell network” to which the Iranians had “provided substantial funding, training on Iranian soil, advanced explosive munitions and technologies as well as run of the mill arms and ammunition, and, in some cases, even a degree of direction.” Since then, 17 press releases have referred to raids against the network. In his briefing on April 26, General Petraeus mentioned both the Sheibani and Qazali networks, specifically. The overarching network is actually the Sheibani Network, according to one intelligence official. The Qazali network was described as a radical splinter unit of the Mahdi Army operating under the aegis of the Sheibani network. “There’s no question, again, that Iranian financing is taking place through the Qods force of the Iranian Republican Guards Corps,” General Petraeus noted, as documentation seized during raids provided evidence of this. Qods Force [or Jerusalem Force] is a branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and is responsible for planning and conducting foreign operations, gathering intelligence, and managing the the regime’s terrorist affiliates. The unit works extensively with Hezbollah. and Qods Force regularly uses its diplomatic missions to provide cover for its operatives. The U.S. currently has seven senior members of Iran’s Qods Force in custody after raids in Baghdad in December of 2006 and Irbil in January of 2007. The Qazali Network responded by kidnapping and murdering five U.S. soldiers during a complex attack on the Joint Provincial Coordination Center in Karbala on January 20. On May 19, Coalition forces killed Azhar al-Dulaimi during a raid in Baghdad’s Sadr City.
|
Handout photo released by the U.S. military shows an 81mm mortar round believed to be from Iran and found in Baghdad in January 2007. Click photo to view. |
Azhar al-Dulaimi was described as the “mastermind” and “tactical commander” of the Karbala attack and is known to have been a key player in numerous other high-profile terror attacks in Iraq. He was a major figure in the Iranian-supported Qazali network. “Intelligence reports indicate Dulaimi received military training from Iranian intelligence agents and from Lebanese Hezbollah, to include training on how to conduct terrorist-style kidnapping,” according to the Department of Defense. The Sheibani Network’s role in supplying the Qazali network was unmasked after “an individual named Sheibani, who is one of the heads of the Sheibani network,” was captured, General Petraeus noted in April. “His brother is the Iranian connection. He is–was in Iraq. And that has been the conduit that then distributes these among the extremist elements again [to] these secret cells and so forth.” In July of 2006, Abu Mustafa Al-Sheibani, the leader of the network, was placed on the list of the 41 most wanted, and a $200,000 bounty was offered for “information leading to his capture.” While it isn’t clear, it is believed that Abu Mustafa was the captured Sheibani to whom Petraeus had referred. In August of 2005, Time described the activities of the Sheibani network and documented the role of Iranian Qods Force in the movement of weapons, specifically the deadly explosively formed penetrators (EFPs). Back in 2005, U.S. forces believed “al-Sheibani’s team consisted of 280 members, divided into 17 bombmaking teams and death squads,” Time noted. The U.S. also believed “[the Sheibani network] trained in Lebanon, in Baghdad’s predominantly Shi’ite Sadr City district and ‘in another country,'” presumably Iran. The vast majority of the Iraqi and Coalition raids occurred in Sadr City, the Shia dominated neighborhood in northeast Baghdad and stronghold of Muqtada al Sadr, the leader of the Mahdi Army. Sadr, who recently returned from Iran after fleeing the country at the onset of the Baghdad Security Plan, was said to have a role in the “secret network,” according to Azzaman. “Sadr’s sudden emergence and his meetings have been prompted by the defection of one of his most senior aides, former Health Minister Ali al-Shammari,” anonymous sources inside Sadr’s inner circle told Azzaman. “The sources said Shammari was close to Sadr and had insider information of the movement’s influence, spread and organization. The movement fears that Shammari might have passed to the U.S. confidential information on how the movement procures arms and training and the links it has with Iran.” The Associated Press recently described the split in Sadr’s militia as one between “a larger group that calls itself the ‘noble Mahdi Army’ and accuses others in the Mahdi Army of going too far by killing innocent Sunni civilians and embezzling militia funds,” and more radical elements that are “trained and armed by Iranians.” As the Mahdi Army fragmented last winter, a force of about 3,000 Mahdi fighters led by Qais al-Khazaali (or Qais al Qazali) were said to have sided with Iran and to be training in Iranian camps. Iran’s Qods Force has set up the Qazali and Sheibani networks to provide the regime with plausible deniability. “Military intelligence officers describe their Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps counterparts’ strategy as one of using “nonattributable attacks” by proxy forces to maximize deniability,” Time noted in 2005. Qods has built Iraqi networks manned by Iraqi operatives, which provides a degree of separation from the Iranian regime.
|
Imad Mugniyah, Iranian operative and leader of Hezbollah’s military. Click image to view. |
However, Qods Force and the IRGC are not opposed to having foreign members in its ranks. International terrorists such as Imad Mugniyah, the operational leader of Hezbollah, also hold rank within Qods Force. “Imad Mugniyah embodies the complexity of where to tackle this terrorism because he stands with one foot in Hezbollah, reporting directly to [Hezbollah leader Hassan] Nasrallah, but he also has one foot in Iran, with the Iranian MOIS [the Iranian intelligence service] and the al-Qods, or the Jerusalem Force, of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard,” terrorism and Hezbollah expert Magnus Ranstorp told the Council on Foreign Relations. “He allegedly works within the highest levels of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iranian intelligence and is said to take orders directly from Ayatollah Khamenei,” notes the CFR. Leaders within Sheibani Network, and by extension the Qazali network, while Iraqi in nationality, are members of Iran’s Qods Force. A time line of the raids against the Qods force “secret cell terrorist network” since April 27, 2007. Coalition and Iraqi forces killed 25 and captured 68 during these raids.
