NATO’s ability to defend its Baltic member states — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — is at risk.
With NATO’s announcement that Finland and Sweden are on the fast track to become the alliance’s newest members, Poland’s Suwalki Gap just became some of NATO’s most strategic real estate. It needs better defending.
The Suwalki Gap is a 40-mile-wide stretch of border between Poland and Lithuania. The gap’s two highways are the only land corridors by which NATO troops are able to reinforce its Baltic member states freely. With Russia’s heavily militarized Kaliningrad Oblast bordering on the west and Belarus on the east, this strategic passage is more than vulnerable. As of now, it is likely undefendable. War games suggest that the speed at which Russia and Belarus could seal off the land bridge greatly exceeds the time NATO would need to deploy a response force.
In response, the U.S. Army developed the DEFENDER-Europe 20 exercise, which exercises the ability to move a large combat force of soldiers and equipment from the continental United States to Europe rapidly. NATO also developed a new Joint Support and Enabling Command focused on ensuring that military hardware and forces can quickly cross national borders in the event of a crisis. Both initiatives are designed to decrease the amount of time necessary to mobilize and deploy a response force. The question remains, however: Will there be enough warning time to accommodate these initiatives?
The three Baltic states are advocating that NATO establish a larger, permanent military footprint on its eastern flank to deter further Russian aggression. NATO and the U.S. must consider a permanent presence in the region given the heightened tension created by NATO’s looming expansion. The best course of action would be the establishment of a permanent base on either side of the Polish–Lithuanian border that would house a military force strong enough to secure and hold the Suwalki Gap — at least for the amount of time necessary for NATO to mobilize and deploy a force large enough to relieve that holding force.
Another course of action would be to reactivate and deploy the U.S. Army V Corps Headquarters to the Suwalki Gap region on a permanent basis. From this forward location, the headquarters would manage the Operation Atlantic Resolve rotational deployments of combat-credible forces to Europe.
A third course of action, and least likely given its political fallout, involves Turkey. Should Turkey attempt to block the acceptance of Finland and Sweden into the alliance, NATO could move its Land Forces Command from Izmir, Turkey, to the Suwalki Gap region. All three proposals involve the establishment of a permanent headquarters in the Suwalki Gap region — a military presence designed to demonstrate to Russia the strategic importance placed upon this piece of key terrain by NATO and the U.S.
A permanent base in the region will be met with resistance from Russia. Still, such a base is necessary.
The Suwalki Gap is not only NATO’s lifeline to the Baltic states, it is NATO’s best conventional deterrence against any future Russian aggression in the region. Defending and keeping this critical corridor open is essential if NATO is going to maintain the capability of defending its members’ territorial integrity. Moscow’s “special military action” in Ukraine has reinforced that Moscow simply cannot be trusted. NATO’s Baltic partners deserve the reassurance that the alliance is ready and able to defend them.
Retired Army Col. Jon Sweet (@JESweet2022) served 30 years as a military intelligence officer. His background includes tours of duty with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
