In 1963, the world came as close as ever to war between two nuclear powers. Sixty years later, the prospect of great power conflict is rising once again — this time across the Taiwan Strait.
Tensions over Taiwan have been mounting for several reasons. First and foremost is the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has effectively eliminated its own hopes for “peaceful unification” with Taiwan. China’s campaign of repression in Hong Kong undercut the prospect that a “one country, two systems” model would appeal to those living in Taiwan. Polls now show that fewer than 10% of Taiwan’s residents want to be part of the People’s Republic of China.
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var _bp = _bp||[]; _bp.push({ "div": "Brid_69932167", "obj": {"id":"27789","width":"16","height":"9","video":"1198465"} }); ","theme.0000017c-2d32-d5c4-af7f-7d77b7920000.:core:enhancement:Enhancement.hbs.enhancementAlignment":null,"theme.0000017c-2d32-d5c4-af7f-7d77b7920000.:core:enhancement:Enhancement.hbs._template":null,"_id":"00000184-e1e5-d5ff-a7af-fdff33060000","_type":"2f5a8339-a89a-3738-9cd2-3ddf0c8da574"}”>Video EmbedAs a result, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s desire to gain control of Taiwan is increasingly reliant on the threat of force. Xi has consolidated power in the 20th Party Congress, so some worry that he may look toward his legacy, including “solving” the Taiwan issue. This has driven concerns that Xi might act opportunistically and attempt to seize Taiwan in a moment of U.S. weakness or distraction.
Indeed, some in the U.S. government apparently believe Xi is “determined to pursue reunification on a much faster timeline.” With the balance of power in the western Pacific worsening, others argue the “danger zone” could climax five years from now. Unfortunately, the year ahead is likely to be a particularly risky period, with multiple potential flashpoints.
First, Taiwan will hold elections in early 2024, and China has a history of increasing pressure on Taiwan around elections. Recent Chinese actions have backfired, strengthening the Democratic Progressive Party. But more independence-leaning leaders, such as current Vice President Lai Ching-te, could draw Xi’s ire once again, leading to a tense period for China-Taiwan relations.
Second, the U.S. presidential primaries will be in full swing in 2023, exacerbating tensions between Washington and Beijing. Candidates on both sides of the aisle are likely to be critical of China. Some Republicans have already suggested in public that the United States should do away with America’s “One China” policy, to say nothing of the U.S.’s “strategic ambiguity” policy.
Third, the U.S. Congress is unlikely to sit idly by. Probable House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) has indicated an interest in bringing a large delegation to Taiwan early next year. A similar trip by Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) sparked a crisis this summer, so this could pose another challenge for U.S.-China relations, particularly if McCarthy presses the case for Taiwan’s de jure independence.
In addition to these foreseeable risks, there is also the prospect of unrelated Chinese coercive actions or an unpredictable spark triggering a crisis or conflict. What can be done to manage these challenges? Washington has sought to erect “guardrails” around the competition with Beijing, but these efforts have thus far failed. Also concerning is the fact that some key channels between Washington and Beijing are gone. Communication between U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan and China’s Yang Jiechi has not been perfect, but it has been better than other avenues. Yet Yang is retiring, and there is little trust between some rising Chinese interlocutors and their American counterparts.
For all these reasons, it appears that 2023 will be a difficult year in U.S.-China relations — perhaps the most difficult in decades. This is not to suggest that a great power war is likely in the year ahead. But the risk is rising, and leaders in Washington, Taipei, and Beijing will have to work hard in 2023 to avoid the type of serious crisis that the world faced 60 years ago.
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Zack Cooper is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a lecturer in public and international affairs at Princeton University.
