The public demonstrations and storming of government buildings in Kazakhstan serve as a warning to the Kremlin about Russia’s future.
Although the Kazakh protests were evidently manipulated by rival factions in the ruling elite, they served as another warning to Moscow that public anger may simmer for years below the surface but can explode suddenly and spread rapidly. The appearance of stability and public passivity in Russia cannot be taken for granted. A triggering event such as a price increase or a rigged election can unexpectedly escalate public demands for broader political changes and replacement of the regime.
Moscow promptly dispatched military units to Kazakhstan under a multinational umbrella not only to shore up the government of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev but also to demonstrate that power struggles and public protests will be subdued in Russia itself. The Kremlin also acted swiftly to shore up the regime of President Alexander Lukashenko in the summer of 2020 during extensive public protests over blatant election fraud. Kazakhstan and Belarus have highlighted two of the brewing internal challenges to Putin’s rule: elite conflicts and public revolts.
Elite loyalty toward the Kremlin is not based on shared ideology or policy but on raw economic and political advantages that high-level connections bestow. Elements of the elite will lose confidence in the regime if resources for corruption become scarcer, international isolation shrinks the economy, and social unrest expands. Fear and disaffection among business oligarchs can contribute to unseating Putin.
This could be precipitated by a more assertive Western policy that freezes or seizes the assets of Putin-linked tycoons in the wake of a further invasion of Ukraine. The business elite also fears that a besieged regime will confiscate their properties as it seeks scapegoats to manipulate public support. A government crisis can also precipitate feuds between various powerful FSB factions and other security organs to replace Putin.
The conventional wisdom about a passive Belarusian public on the eve of mass street protests in 2020 mirrors the widely held image of Russian citizens. Although the protests in Belarus were extinguished, the root causes of public unrest have not been addressed. The Kremlin also fears any repeat of the “color revolutions” that previously shook Ukraine and Georgia when corrupt authoritarian governments could no longer contain or suppress public demands. State repression has a limited life span. Without economic modernization and market diversification, in combination with political democratization and decentralization, Russia faces multiple political, social, and regional crises.
Since 2009, the Russian economy has been stagnant, and the authoritarian regime has no incentive for drastic reform, which would weaken its hold on power. At the same time, the Putinist system is not equipped to emulate the mass repression and population expulsions conducted by the Soviet Communist Party and security apparatus, especially during Stalin’s rule. It is also unable to fully isolate all citizens from outside influences.
Instead, the government will confront growing unrest in multiple cities and regions during Putin’s attempts to indefinitely extend his presidency beyond the expiration of his mandate in 2024. The sudden, widespread, and violent demonstrations in Kazakhstan have magnified the Kremlin’s fears. According to Putin, social networks that involve Russian citizens in protest actions are a precursor of “terrorist attacks,” indicating increasing anxiety about social opposition that cannot be monitored or contained.
Janusz Bugajski is a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington, D.C. His recent book Eurasian Disunion: Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks is co-authored with Margarita Assenova. His upcoming book is titled Failed State: Planning for Russia’s Rupture.
