The drone strike that killed al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri in Kabul is good news. Still, it evokes deep emotions from scores of U.S. intelligence personnel who worked for decades in the shadows to find, fix, and finish al Qaeda. Many of us buried friends in the Zawahiri hunt.
Take the tragedy in Khowst, Afghanistan, on Dec. 30, 2009, where seven of my CIA colleagues lost their lives at the hands of a double agent who dangled leads to Zawahiri to pique our interest. It’s the starkest example of the tragic costs borne by those in the counterterrorism fight. From my perspective, the strike on Zawahiri, while of course taken to stop future attacks against Americans that he was plotting, was also for the agency personnel killed in our two-decade global counterterror campaign. The sacred memorial wall at CIA headquarters lists so many who we have lost in the struggle against al Qaeda. I know their names and life stories, even if the rest of the world does not. I hope this strike provides some small measure of closure to the families of all the fallen.
I’m currently in the Outer Banks of North Carolina. Why does this matter?
I spent six weeks on a beach here in the late summer of 2012 after serving a year in Afghanistan as the chief of one of our bases. This was my decompression time after an intense year hunting high-value targets like Zawahiri. I returned several nights ago to this same beach to reflect on the strike. As I looked at the spectacular sky, the countless families walking late in the evening, and the surf crashing, all I could think of was that my former colleagues are truly the unsung heroes in this fight. They toil in anonymity to protect Americans — just like those at the beach — but ask nothing in return. One of my good friends spent 10 straight years on the hunt for Osama bin Laden. Ten years, all in South Asia, not Paris or Berlin. In the conflict zones, in the arena. That is all he did. That is all he knew. That is who we have working for us in the intelligence community. Heroes.
The U.S. national security community has been worried about the resurgence of al Qaeda in Afghanistan after the botched U.S. withdrawal in August 2021.
Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul demonstrates the real danger that a Taliban-led government poses to U.S. interests. It appears that Taliban officials were well aware of his presence in Kabul and that Zawahiri was residing in a house belonging to the family of Taliban Interior Minister Siraj Haqqani. To be clear, Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul makes a mockery of the Doha agreements. Incompetently negotiated by the Trump administration and shockingly agreed to by the Biden administration, the Doha agreements centered on the promise that the Taliban would renounce al Qaeda and not allow it to reconstitute in Afghanistan.
That certainly has not happened. I started working on the Afghanistan issue in 1994. The Taliban that took power in 1996 is the same Taliban that took back power in 2021.
More positively, this strike does again reinforce how the U.S. government has perfected the art of “manhunting.” This effort fuses human intelligence (spies on the ground), signals intercepts, and eyes in the sky from drones or satellites to find and eliminate terrorist targets. We are simply the best on the planet in doing this. This makes some uncomfortable, as it involves kinetic, or combat, activity. But why the hand wringing on killing those who wish to do great harm to our fellow Americans?
Presidents often come into office with some trepidation about using this incredible tool in the arsenal. Regardless of political affiliation, in the end, they all realize quickly that targeted killing makes us safer.
In fact, many of us worried this capability would be degraded with the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and it is true that the number of strikes in Afghanistan has vastly diminished. But it’s also clear from the Zawahiri strike that when required, we remain able to track down patiently and eliminate high-value targets in South Asia.
But make no mistake. There is more to be done. In the words of my old friends in Israeli intelligence, one must not only “cut off the head of the snake” but also keep the pressure on the foot soldiers. One-off strikes like the one on Zawahiri are simply not enough to degrade and defeat al Qaeda. It will be interesting to see if the Biden administration’s much vaunted “over-the-horizon” strategy can accomplish both-leadership strikes, but also a sustained air campaign against other al Qaeda terrorists at lower ranks. I remain skeptical.
I also take offense to the drumbeat from some in the academic community and even some former national security officials that the United States somehow lost its way by concentrating so much effort on counterterrorism. Maybe they should change their tune after the Zawahiri strike? Have people forgotten what it was like on Sept. 12, 2001? Even today, al Qaeda and ISIS are still plotting to kill Americans. These terrorist groups do not ever take a knee. But it is the same old “militarized” CIA that many so easily criticize that ultimately takes the terrorists down. Top line: The agency can walk and chew gum at the same time. A shift of resources to focus on China and Russia is necessary. China is no doubt the greatest long-term strategic threat to the U.S. But that must not mean a significant degradation of our counterterrorism capabilities.
With the potential ascension of Iran-based Saif al Adel as Zawahiri’s replacement as al Qaeda leader, we now have yet another glaring thorn in the side of U.S.-Iran relations. Adel’s location highlights Iran’s leading role as a state sponsor of terrorism. Can the U.S. really sign a nuclear deal with Iran while the likely next emir of al Qaeda roams free in that same country?
Marc Polymeropoulos is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. A former CIA senior operations officer, he retired in 2019 after a 26-year career serving in the Near East and South Asia. His book Clarity in Crisis: Leadership Lessons from the CIA was published in June 2021 by HarperCollins.
