It is critical to U.S. security and the post-World War II international order that Taiwan’s democratic sovereignty be preserved.
Only one factor should curtail U.S. service of that interest: the risk of Americans fighting and dying for a nation that is unwilling to defend itself. Unfortunately, it’s a real risk, reflected by the Taiwanese military’s generally weak morale, inadequate training, and deficient capability.
Were the U.S. military to fight for Taiwan’s survival against a Chinese invasion, but do so while Taiwanese forces offered little resistance of their own, an immediate consequence would follow. Even if Taiwan was successfully defended, Americans would ask a simple question. Namely, whether our allies are worth their cost to American lives. The fabric of the post-WWII international order (an order responsible for the greatest advance of prosperity and freedom in human history) would be at as much risk were Taiwan not to fight, but survive, as were Taiwan defeated.
The intersection of NATO and former President Donald Trump’s foreign policy helps underline the risks here. While many U.S. foreign policy commentators believe NATO is a near-priceless alliance (I’m among them), Trump rightly pointed out its current flaws. He lamented the injustice of a defense structure in which those most at risk of territorial threat (Europe) pay and provide the least to defend against said threat. Some improvements have been made thanks to Trump’s pressure, but major NATO allies such as Germany and Belgium continue to betray their alliance responsibilities. In doing so, they fuel NATO’s long-term collision course with a U.S. population that is weary of freeloading.
Back to Taiwan.
Facing a prospective People’s Liberation Army invasion, the freedom of Taiwan’s nearly 24 million people is not yet doomed. The causes for hope include Taiwan’s distance from the Chinese mainland. (The Taiwan Strait is 81 miles at the narrowest point.) That’s a long distance for an amphibious assault force to traverse. It would take approximately four hours for PLA troop transports to make the trip, ample time for submarines and anti-ship missiles to target them. Taiwan’s special forces, light infantry, and air force are also well trained, led, and motivated. And Taiwan’s mountainous, forested center allows for hardened command and control centers.
But when it comes to the rest of Taiwan’s largely conscript military, the story isn’t inspiring. The democracy doesn’t have enough anti-ship missiles, mines, or submarines/underwater drones. It lacks air defense redundancy and sufficient counterintelligence capabilities (to detect rampant PLA spies and saboteurs). It has too few aircraft/aerial drones and too few aircrews. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen has significantly boosted defense spending after years of neglect. Still, Tsai’s ability to get spending at the emergency level it needs to be at is limited by domestic popular opinion.
Put simply, as with many European populations in NATO, too many Taiwanese believe their government need not spend that much on defense because the U.S. will always be there to save the day. The Wall Street Journal documented this concern earlier this week, noting the prevailing opinion by poorly trained young Taiwanese reservists that they will not need to fight and that the U.S. will steam to the rescue even if the fight comes.
This is a recipe for disaster. Taiwan’s ability to successfully defeat a Chinese invasion (ultimately, I do not believe invasion can be deterred) will rest on its ability to do certain things very well. That means isolating PLA airborne and special forces advance forces, absorbing the PLA’s saturation air and missile strikes, sinking or forcing into retreat large elements of the invasion force, and containing remaining invasion forces at the coastline. Herein lies the problem: Taiwan isn’t just lacking that capability — too many of its citizens think the capability isn’t even needed.
If the United States truly wishes to support this ally, it must change Taiwan’s social-strategic calculus. One way to do so would be for the U.S. to commit to defending Taiwan until a set date, perhaps 2025, but make clear that unless Taiwan meets certain benchmarks by that date, U.S. security guarantees will be removed. To assist Taiwan, the U.S. should expand the expedited sale of necessary weapons and sensors. It should very significantly bolster the presence and specialty of U.S. military trainers on Taiwanese soil. The U.S. should request unprecedented U.S. military access to and influence on procurement boards. Finally, the U.S. should clarify that Taiwan will have to continue allocating these investments if it intends to rely on U.S. support during war.
This may seem harsh. It may be harsh. But the survival of the post-war international order won’t survive if Americans are unwilling to support it. If Americans are to fight and die for another land many thousands of miles from home, it must be alongside bold natives of that land. Otherwise, how can Americans be expected to bear a similar burden in the future?
