The Stakes for Iran

Interesting discussion from Tom Ricks at the Washington Post:

As the experts poke the ashes, I think the emerging consensus is that Moqtada al-Sadr won more than he lost, because he and the government agreed to a cease-fire. That makes him 3 for 3 in taking on state powers (the U.S. in the previous two rounds, and now the Baghdad government). If nothing else, this guy is a survivor. What puzzles me most is the role Iran played, especially in ending the fighting. There are lots of rumors that it brokered the ceasefire, but I have seen nothing definitive. If it did, that indicates that the Tehran government felt it had something to lose through the fighting.

Well, yeah. Iran’s plan is to keep the United States–and to some extent, Israel–occupied on the military, diplomatic, and political fronts while they build a small arsenal of nuclear weapons. Their strategy, from a military perspective, has been very effective so far. Through effective use of proxies in Basra and southern Lebanon, Tehran exploits the West’s greatest weakness–their low tolerance for chaos and unending conflict. All this while they strictly avoid direct contact with US/NATO/Israeli forces. Al-Qaeda Iraq has been decimated by the surge, so if the Iranians lose Sadr and his militias, their ability to sow the seeds of discord in Iraq is sharply reduced. It’s important to remember that Iran doesn’t expect to win battlefield victories in Iraq, but rather to exploit the chaos there as a means to their nuclear end. If they knock out the fledgling Iraqi government and kill a few Coalition troops in the process? All the better.

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