Chinese defense minister Cao Gangchuan wrapped up a five-day visit to Indonesia yesterday. While in Jakarta, Cao and his Indonesian counterpart, Juwono Sudarsono, agreed to expand military ties between the two countries. Chinese press reports on the development carried the heading “Cao Gangchuan visits Indonesia; China will provide assistance to two major Indonesian military plants.” The two plants are identified as the state-owned ordnance manufacturer PT Pindad and the shipbuilding firm PT PAL. Cao’s visit reciprocated the trip to Beijing by Sudarsono in November last year, during which the two countries signed a defense cooperation agreement. In April 2005, Indonesia, the largest and most populous country in ASEAN, became the first member of the group to enter into a “strategic partnership” with China. The Sino-Indonesian “strategic partnership” encompasses the areas of trade, defense, anti-terrorism, drug interdiction, and maritime security. Chinese media noted at the time that “for China, creating secure strategic space on its periphery is essential to the realization of its rise.” What Beijing found most attractive about this OPEC member was its energy resources. In September 2002, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) signed what People’s Daily referred to as a “landmark” deal worth $8.5 billion to purchase liquefied natural gas from Indonesia. In addition, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has invested heavily in oil exploration in the resource-rich country. Anti-Chinese sentiment has long been an undercurrent in Indonesian politics. During the 1965-66 coup that brought Suharto to power, the ethnic Chinese community was suspected of supporting the Indonesian Communist party and became the target of mass killings. In addition, tens of thousands were expelled from their homes. In 1967 Suharto issued the “Basic Policy for the Solution of the Chinese Problem.” The proposed “solution” included outlawing Chinese characters in public places and shutting down Chinese schools in order to more fully integrate ethnic Chinese into Indonesian society. Also in 1967, Jakarta severed diplomatic ties with Beijing. Formal relations between the two countries were not restored until 1990, at a time when China was shunned by the international community following the 1989 crackdown at Tiananmen Square. In discussing Beijing’s “strategic partnership” with Jakarta, Chinese media took pains to note that it began to take shape only when Indonesia entered “a new era of democratization” following the 1998 riots that toppled Suharto, and during which the country’s ethnic Chinese were once again a main target. Last week’s announcement that Beijing is to provide assistance to Indonesian military plants was not well received by China’s online population. Shortly after the story broke, angry comments began to appear in Chinese cyberspace. Some expressed sadness. Many were outraged over the decision to “arm a wolf” and help a country that “owes the Chinese people a debt in blood.” A few postings declared–not without a hint of sarcasm–that “this is yet another act of great wisdom by our government” because it is all “for the sake of Malacca, where our energy lifeline lies.”
