Immigration is a complicated issue. I wish I felt securer about reform one way or the other. But there are all sorts of considerations that cloud the issue — not least of which are conflicting values that each side fairly sees as fundamental:
- Respect for and preservation of the rule of law;
- Respect for the meaning of citizenship as well as the benefits that accrue to citizens;
- Respect for national sovereignty.
On the other hand, people value:
- A nation built by honest, hard-working immigrants who become real Americans;
- The freedom to trade and associate with whomever one wants;
- The freedom to improve one’s condition and to fight poverty.
But these value-sets can work at odds with one another.
And it’s not just that Americans’ fundamental values conflict. Practical barriers to immigration reform abound:
- Opening an already generous welfare state to all comers – legal or not – is not economically sustainable. As has been proven in the EU, such policies increase the incentives to immigrate and become dependent, which curbs the work ethic and dilutes the meaning of citizenship.)
- A saturated labor market will eventually decrease the incentives for immigration – legal and illegal – without any wall. This would be true especially if our borders were “open.” But that eventual excess in the labor supply for jobs that could be taken by unemployed Americans creates resentment.
- Deporting 12 million undocumented workers is neither terribly feasible nor cheap.
- Amnesties create moral hazards and weaken the institutions of legal immigration.
- Failure to track those coming into the country represents a security threat.
- Expanding the intrusiveness of the state into the lives of citizens and non-citizens alike (with ID cards and documents) is unideal and invites government abuses.
- Stricter immigration policies may only worsen problems associated with the current gray and black markets for labor (crime, balkanization and human smuggling).
- Laxer immigration policies similar to the Ellis Isle phenomenon of the early 20th Century could continue to overwhelm state and local budgets in areas where immigrants rapidly concentrate. (This is a majority perception about federal budgets, too.)
One consideration that is often overlooked, however, is assimilation. In fact, Jacob Vigdor has a new book out on the subject called From Immigrants to Americans: The Rise and Fall of Fitting In. (He spoke yesterday in Raleigh about the assimilation factor somewhat convincingly). He suggested that those who oppose both amnesty and the status quo are probably not concerned about overpopulation. It is more likely they are concerned about the symptoms of an inability of people to assimilate culturally and economically.
Failure to assimilate often means cultural balkanization, an associated failure to learn the language, the inability to gain employment in areas above the lowest rungs of the labor market, abandonment of local norms and customs, and the importation of curious – perhaps illiberal – political ideals. To find a good example of the failure of assimilation, one need only look at the ring of North African Arabs around Paris (the Banlieu). This population is utterly welfare-state dependent and often openly hostile to French culture and institutions. Something similar can be said about Holland and parts of Britain.
Vigdor points out some things that may not be apparent to either side of the debate: First, as he suggests in these pages, the threat of deportation creates barriers to assimilation: “Along other dimensions, the lack of legal status alters an individual’s decision calculus. Would you spend time and money learning a language abroad if you knew you could be deported from that country at any moment?” Next, those who came during the Ellis Isle years had a much better chance of assimilating. That era did not see the “bifurcation” we’re seeing today between poorer, lower-skilled workers (like those from Mexico) and other groups (like those from Vietnam) who are more eager to naturalize. Further, well-assimilated immigrants are more likely to be productive workers who expand the economic pie and consume fewer social services. And finally, demand for legal immigration slots is high, the supply of said slots is low, and the price for the slots is low. So what’s to be done?
In light of these considerations, Vigdor proposes expanding the number of available pathways to legal immigration and a $10,000 per person fee structure. Similar schemes exists for foreign entrepreneurs with plans to create or invest in U.S.-based companies, or for people willing to serve in the military. But a pay-to-immigrate model may not be an unreasonable compromise when one considers negative social costs associated with immigration on the one hand and current problems on the other. Part or all of Vigdor’s proposed fee would, however, be used for language and civics training, as well as fees normally associated with naturalization. One’s first reaction might be that such a price would exacerbate the current problems of illegal immigration for poor people by raising the costs of taking the legal path.
But remember: this fee is paid in exchange for a drastic increase in the number of available paths to legal immigration, naturalization and assimilation. And when one considers the overall costs of illegal immigration, this set up may be just what the doctor ordered.
Again, most of the “problems” of immigration come from a failure to assimilate that flows in part from the de facto black labor market. Just like resourceful families find the money to pay $3,000 to human smugglers, it is not difficult to imagine that – with other barriers to immigration reduced – even the poorest people could turn to forms of non-profit credit, mutual aid societies and successful families to make this transition.
This fee would not be a silver bullet, but it would attract more talented immigrants and offer a realistic path to citizenship for even the poorest and most desperate immigrants. It would also thin out the population of people recreating poor enclaves of illegals whose prospects for assimilation are currently bleak.
My friend Nathan Smith floated a proposal similar to Vigdor’s back in 2006. (Find his version here.) Smith’s version has some dimensions that can only improve upon Vigdor’s proposal to my mind (for example: disallowing access to the welfare state; “taxing” perceived negative externalities associated with immigration; and taking property to punish tax evasion instead of deportation.)
