The architects of the surge, Frederick Kagan and General Jack Keane, and the man whose judgment of it seems to carry the most weight with the media, Michael O’Hanlon, share a byline in today’s Washington Post. The three start with the passage of the de-Baathification bill in the Iraqi Parliament:
And they address the role benchmarks should play in judging overall progress in Iraq, explaining of the benchmarks that were originally set out by the administration and Congress:
But on the most important matter, the timetable for drawing down U.S. troops, the three urge caution:
This is the key point. There can be little doubt that the Air Force and Navy could, and would as a matter of course, carry much of the load were a conflict to break out in the Taiwan Strait, on the Korean Peninsula, or in the Persian Gulf. To the extent that ground forces would be needed, surely the Army and Marine Corps would be able to commit adequate resources. But to pull forces from Iraq in order to improve readiness and without regard for the impact on the security situation in that country just wouldn’t make any sense. The point of maintaining readiness is to allow American forces every opportunity to secure victory in combat. To sacrifice victory in combat in order to improve readiness is a kind of backwards logic that obscures the real objective of its advocates.
