In testimony today before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Rice outlined a bold strategy to “break the back” of the insurgency. She rejected largely Democratic calls (like the one delivered this morning on the Senate floor by Sen. Durbin of Illinois) to soon begin troop withdrawals — noting that the terrorists want us to “quit” and “believe we do not have the will to see this through.”
In short, with the Iraqi government, our political-military strategy has to be to clear, hold, and build: to clear areas from insurgent control, to hold them securely, and to build durable, national Iraqi institutions…. We know our objectives. We and the Iraqi Government will succeed if together we can: * Break the back of the insurgency so that Iraqis can finish it off without large-scale military help from the United States. * Keep Iraq from becoming a safe haven from which Islamic extremists can terrorize the region or the world. * Demonstrate positive potential for democratic change and free expression in the Arab and Muslim worlds, even under the most difficult conditions…. Our strategy is to clear, hold, and build. The enemy’s strategy is to infect, terrorize, and pull down…. But their ultimate target is the coalition’s center of gravity: the will of America, of Britain, and of other coalition members. Let us say it plainly: The terrorists want us to get discouraged and quit. They believe we do not have the will to see this through…. Clear the toughest places — no sanctuaries. As we enlarge security in major urban areas and as insurgents retreat, they should find no large area where they can reorganize and operate freely. Recently our forces have gone on the offensive. In Tall Afar, near the Syrian border, and in the west along the Euphrates valley in places like Al Qaim, Haditha, and Hit, American and Iraqi forces are clearing away insurgents…. As this strategy is being implemented, the military side recedes and the civilian part – like police stations and civic leaders and economic development — move into the foreground. Our transition strategy emphasized the building of the Iraqi army. Now our police training efforts are receiving new levels of attention…. [W]e must build truly national institutions. The institutions of Saddam Hussein’s government were violent and corrupt, tearing apart the ties that ordinarily bind communities together. The last two years have seen three temporary governments govern Iraq, making it extremely difficult to build national institutions even under the best of circumstances. The new government that will come can finally set down real roots…. We are moving from a stage of transition toward the strategy to prepare a permanent Iraqi government for a decisive victory….
