The bad logic of intervention in Libya

Marc Lynch explains the strategic importance of intervention in Libya (via the Dish):

Libya matters to the United States not for its oil or intrinsic importance, but because it has been a key part of the rapidly evolving transformation of the Arab world.  For Arab protestors and regimes alike, Gaddafi’s bloody response to the emerging Libyan protest movement had become a litmus test for the future of the Arab revolution.  If Gaddafi succeeded in snuffing out the challenge by force without a meaningful response from the United States, Europe and the international community then that would have been interpreted as a green light for all other leaders to employ similar tactics.

The strong international response, first with the tough targeted sanctions package brokered by the United States at the United Nations and now with the military intervention, has the potential to restrain those regimes from unleashing the hounds of war and to encourage the energized citizenry of the region to redouble their efforts to bring about change. This regional context may not be enough to justify the Libya intervention, but I believe it is essential for understanding the logic and stakes of the intervention by the U.S. and its allies.

While I agree that a brutal suppression of the Libyan protest-turned-rebel movement could have broader implications for the region as a whole, effectively crushing the momentum of the democratic uprising there, this argument still fails to convince me of the wisdom of intervention.

First, there are no signs that US intervention in Libya has led to a cessation of force in other nations such as Bahrain. Indeed, intervention against Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, or any other oil-rich US allies in the Gulf is almost unthinkable. We could intervene in half a dozen other Asian or African nations and those states would still not feel threatened by our shows of force.

Hell, we could topple the leader of Iraq and occupy that nation for years on end and we still wouldn’t convince the governments of these nations that America poses a threat.

Second, entangling ourselves in a third conflict in the Middle East makes it less likely that we will intervene if another government decides to take the Gaddafi-esque show-no-mercy approach to putting down protests. Do we honestly think that intervention in Syria, for instance, would be a good idea should protests there erupt into a civil war? Now that we’ve spread our military so thin, could we intervene if Bashar al-Assad decided to crack down?

The real problem with this strategy is that we have to maintain truly unrealistic levels of response in order for it to work. If it’s nothing more than part of an elaborate game of chicken, then we need to be willing to enforce no-fly zones over the next Arab state to test us, and the one after that, until we’ve convinced the entire region that America is, in fact, Batman. If we don’t – if we blink – then the whole house of cards comes crashing down. The only way this strategy “has the potential to restrain those regimes from unleashing the hounds of war” is if we can follow through with more interventions should the need arise.

This strikes me as a pretty big gamble with very steep slippery slopes, and one I can’t imagine we have the political will or resources to follow through on.

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