A Department of Defense task force accused of mishandling millions of tax dollars may leave behind a corroded and aging Soviet-built natural gas pipeline at risk for “catastrophic failure” as it pulls out of Afghanistan forever.
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction John Sopko pointed to “troubling allegations” of mismanagement within the Pentagon’s task force for business and stability operations, including “imprudent spending” and “profligate travel by employees and contractors.”
Sopko’s comments were contained in a pair of letters to Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel that were made public Tuesday.
The task force, which handled nearly $700 million of defense funds between 2010 and 2013, has focused on stabilizing the Afghan economy by lowering unemployment rates, and developing the country’s industrial, agricultural and energy sectors, SIGAR said.
Part of these duties included helping Afghan engineers address problems with an aging natural gas pipeline that were documented years earlier. With the task force slated to cease operations by the end of 2014, SIGAR worries about the Afghan government’s ability to complete needed pipe replacements and to safely operate the pipeline on its own.
The Sheberghan-Mazar pipeline was constructed by the Soviet Union in 1970 and has since “suffered years of corrosion,” Sopko said. It transports natural gas eastward from the Khoja Gorgorjak field in northwest Afghanistan to a fertilizer and power plant in Mazar-e-Sharif, a major Afghan city.
A June 2004 report on the pipeline by French engineering company Sofregaz found “corrosion, poor design, low quality welding and a lack of proper pipe supports,” all of which “created the conditions for catastrophic failure,” SIGAR said.
The task force in its response to SIGAR pushed back on the watchdog’s interpretation of the Sofregaz report, citing the report’s findings that “the only evidence that exists on the state of the lines is the anecdotal evidence of gas leaking.”
The Sofregaz report recommended the Sheberghan-Mazar pipeline be tested for leaks and corrosion and a repair plan be put in place.
Eight years later, Afghan engineers began testing a selection of spots along the pipeline using the task force’s equipment and guidelines, SIGAR said. The watchdog provided no explanation for the lengthy gap between the discovery of problems and the initial tests.
The spring 2012 analysis revealed evidence of corrosion that would require the pipeline’s “eventual replacement,” but engineers with the state-owned Afghan Gas Enterprise still concluded the pipe’s walls were thick enough to significantly increase the amount of gas transported through the pipe.
The SIGAR letters noted an expected increase in demand for natural gas, though the task force claimed in its response that the Afghan government plans to eventually construct a new pipe between Sheberghan and Mazar-e-Sharif that would reduce reliance on the existing line.
In August 2012, the task force secured 15 kilometers of new pipe to replace damaged sections and to support the anticipated surge of natural gas, the SIGAR letter said.
While the task force assisted Afghan engineers in replacing 12 kilometers of pipe, it shuttered field operations before it could help with the remaining three, SIGAR said.
The Sheberghan-Mazar pipeline spans nearly 90 kilometers, or about 55 miles, above and below Afghan terrain.
According to the task force’s response letter, the 12 kilometers of pipeline that the task force did replace had accounted for the majority of leaks. The section it replaced was completely underground.
Officials with the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul claimed the task force’s analysis may have missed the full extent of the corrosion because it only tested a handful of sections, rather than the full length of the pipe, SIGAR said.
Those officials warned that the Afghan engineers would not be able to complete the renovations without the task force’s help, stating “the Afghan government would likely blame the U.S. if a catastrophic failure occurs along the pipeline.”
Safety officials with the Department of Transportation said the pipeline is missing a special protection system that would shield metal from corrosion, SIGAR noted.
According to the Sofregaz report, such a system would allow engineers to gauge the actual state of internal and external corrosion — a nearly impossible task given its absence, SIGAR found.
DOT recommended the task force install a protection system in the replacement pipelines, but the task force opted to ignore the recommendation because it would be “prohibitively expensive and time-intensive to install” and might not have been necessary given the lack of corrosion documented by the Afghan engineers.
Problems persist in the long-term plan to turn operations over to the Afghans. Some sections of the pipeline run through “insecure areas” that could prevent Afghan engineers from testing for leaks, the letter said.
The Afghan Gas Enterprise does not have the ability to handle increased gas flow without technical assistance, the task force said in its response. The Afghans will need the help of a contractor if they plan to raise pressure inside the pipe, the task force said.
But SIGAR’s concerns about the Defense Department business task force extended far beyond its involvement with the Sheberghan-Mazar pipeline.
The watchdog highlighted “significant financial expenditures” from a program designed to boost the Afghan gem industry.
Despite the fact that the task force spent lavishly on the program, sending Afghan jewelers to months-long training programs in India and to “jewelry shows” in Europe and Asia, SIGAR said it found little evidence the gem program boosted the industry’s employment or economic development in any way.
The task force sparked allegations of “mismanagement” for two attempts to map underground natural gas reserves, SIGAR said. The watchdog stated its plans to release an audit in early 2015 that explores the issue further.
SIGAR asked the Pentagon to provide the names of the officials responsible for approving task force expenditures and programs that received funding from the Defense Department, as well as evaluations of the gem program.
Its letter also requested financial reports and related information regarding the task force’s contractors, which included the Rand Corporation and the Kinsey Group. While every aspect of the task force’s operation will be closed out by March 2015, SIGAR asked the Defense Department to preserve its records for an “ongoing review.”
