Michael brings up some excellent points about the problems with the Afghanistan campaign. The lack of unity in the military command and the absence of a central political force to direct a coherent counterinsurgency campaign harm our efforts. These problems are compounded by a major shortage of troops and the fact that many of the nations that contribute soldiers restrict their activities via “caveats.” NATO was created to deter, and if needed, fight a conventional conflict against the Soviet Union on the plains of central Europe. NATO was not conceived with the idea of fighting a protracted, low intensity campaign in the backwaters of central Asia. While coalition warfare can provide domestic and international political cover to fight protracted and unpopular conflicts, it severely restricts any individual nation’s efforts to fight a counterinsurgency campaign. Afghanistan provides a series of challenges that make the problems of Iraq seem simple. Afghanistan is landlocked, with Iran, Pakistan, and the ‘Stans of the former Soviet Union hemming it in. Logistical support to Coalition forces in Afghanistan requires the West to over rely on Pakistan, which, like it or not, is one of our prime allies in the Afghan war. Yet significant support flows from both Iran and Pakistan to the Taliban and al Qaeda. Iran has supplied weapons, aid, and training, according to military officials. The Taliban has the ability to recruit, train, arm, rest, and refit in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan. It is unclear that the perfect counterinsurgency campaign could significantly decrease the problems in Afghanistan. A significant percentage of the Taliban insurgency is based out of Pakistan. Michael succinctly makes a point I’ve made repeatedly when discussing the situation in Afghanistan. “The situation in Afghanistan is not critical–there is no sign that the effort there is on the verge of some kind of collapse–but in a counterinsurgency campaign, if you’re not winning, you’re losing. And we are not winning.” In the past I’ve stated that Afghanistan is doomed to a sort of impasse–but not wholly because of failures in our counterinsurgency campaign. Until some meaningful progress is made to rout the Taliban and al Qaeda in the northwest and southern regions of Pakistan, Afghanistan will remain mired in fighting, no matter how good our counterinsurgency strategy is. We should work to create a unified political command in Afghanistan, eliminate the harmful caveats, and improve our counterinsurgency strategy. But we must also seek a realistic solution to deal with the rising tide of Taliban and al Qaeda across the border in Pakistan.
