No, not really. From the Air & Space Power Journal:
First, the USAF has operated with some success in COIN environments before but has lost the peculiar capacities associated with COIN following drawdowns or conversions after each conflict. This is an unsurprising result, given the fact that budgets for unused tools are a luxury not easily afforded in any era. But the extended lead times required to essentially relearn COIN each time it becomes necessary have significantly affected the USAF’s ability to effectively contribute early in the fight. Second, we need to change the USAF’s mind-set from fighting COIN to enabling a partner to fight COIN. In the absence of every other alternative, the USAF may actually become the fighter in COIN, but even at that point, the service should adopt the mind-set that it will conduct a holding action while the supported partner spins up its own capacity. As a practical note, the USAF simply does not have the size to function as the air service for every nation it fights alongside, even if it sounds like a good idea (it is not). Winning strategies are conducted by, with, and through the supported partner. Furthermore, barring annihilation options, no substantial history exists to support the idea that any outside power can win an inside war.
Bottom line, the Air Force still can’t be bothered with counter-insurgency ops. If they do stand up a wing of COIN birds, it will be to create a logistics infrastructure around the new airframe so that other nations will buy it, employ it, and do the icky ground attack mission so that the Air Force doesn’t have to. I’m starting think that only way to get Blue-suiters serious about the ground attack role is to offer fixed-wing combat aircraft to the Army. HT: Defense Tech Update: An interesting response from one of our readers:
I’m afraid you’ve mised the point of the Air & Space Power Journal article that you critiqued in your blog today. The article is focused on the fact that airpower is a critical piece of COIN strategy, but that it will always be subordinate in importance to the supported commander – which is almost ALWAYS the US Army or Marine Corps. In short, the author’s point is that airpower CANNOT win the war by itself, which is an awknowlegement that should be heralded by those who mistakenly believe that the AF thinks it is the be-all-end-all service. Your assertion that the AF doesn’t care for the “icky” ground attack mission is simply laughable. Since 9/11, the F-15C and AWACS communities have been (rightly) marginalized as we focus more and more resources to the key COIN missions of ISR and ground attack. We’ve weaponized ISR platforms like the Predator, revamped the budget to field the Reaper, retrofitted ancient A-10s to carry GPS-guided weapons, etc. Your implied suggestion that we should create dedicated COIN aircraft is baseless. Any aircraft with an ISR, strike or logistics capability can and is being used for COINOPS. You don’t necessarily need new airframes, you simply need to properly use the ones we’ve got. Do you have any fact-based criticism of the way we’ve been employing our aircraft? We have more strike aircraft active and available each day in both Iraq and Afghanistan than there are requests for airstrikes. NOBODY on the ground is complaining that they can’t get CAS when they need it. As an Air Force officer with 30 months in the Middle East (out of my 16 years of service), I’m not sure whether to be insulted or amused by your blog entry today. Your heart is in the right place, but I think you misunderstand both the facts of and the mentality of the Air Force in the conduct of this war. Respectfully Lt Col [withheld] USAF
Noonan Responds: While I agree that the Air Force has moved in the right direction, they still have a long way to go. I’ve heard a fair share of grumbling from ground pounders about the close air support that the Air Force provides. Either they were not getting the support they needed in a timely fashion, or there were friendly fire issues. Of course it should be mentioned that complaining about the Air Force is a right bestowed on the grunt by the gods themselves–it’s what they do–and often times the groaning isn’t exactly accurate. The problem with the Air Force approach to COIN lies in their acquisitions strategy. The price of one F-22 can buy almost a full squadron of Warthogs or Reapers, platforms far more suited to supporting the infantry. Still, I understand the good Colonel’s frustration here. Today’s Air Force is overtasked and underfunded. Budget cuts have forced them to close base after base, and trim manpower by a whopping 40,000 Airmen. They have to remain strong against a resurgent Russia and occasionally hostile China, while fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, maintaining dominance in space, proficiency in global mobility, combat search and rescue, close air support, and dozens of other secondary missions. Congress owes it to our military to fund all services in a manner commensurate with the wars that they are fighting. But, as long as the Air Force is forced to choose between fighting a hypothetical war against the Chinese or Russians and the actual wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, COIN ops should be their number one priority. In the end though, I think that the Colonel and I can agree that this is a distinction that the Air Force shouldn’t have to make.
