As Muammar Qaddafi’s reign of terror presumably comes to an end (or comes close to an end), there is one part of his regime worth saving: the Libyan intelligence service’s files. Tyrants tend to be diligent record keepers, with vast bureaucracies recording every noteworthy misdeed. This is generally true for the dictators’ embassies abroad, as well as internal security organizations at home. Qaddafi was no different.
When Libyan rebels took over the embassy in London earlier this month, they pledged to turn over thousands of intelligence files to British authorities. The embassy there, as elsewhere, had acted as a “spy centre” for decades. The Telegraph (UK) was shown some of the files and reported that they document “payments to British individuals and companies.” The potential for uncovering shady, unethical or even illegal payments is palpable. Every oil rich dictator has sycophants and shameless opportunists on the payroll.
Identifying the recipients of Libyan oil graft isn’t the only reason to preserve Qaddafi’s files. Perhaps we will learn more about Qaddafi’s successful effort to have convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Baset al Megrahi freed from a Scottish prison. A leaked U.S. State Department cable reports that the Libyans bullied the UK, threatening “dire” consequences if Megrahi died of cancer while in prison. The January 28, 2009 cable reads:
And Megrahi, of course, was not on death’s door when he received a hero’s welcome from Qaddafi.
Libya’s “thuggish” approach to diplomacy, as it was described by the State Department, is hardly surprising. The Libyan intelligence files likely contain numerous other examples of this strong-armed approach to international relations.
As a persistent abuser of human rights, Qaddafi ordered his goons to quash dissent at home and hunt down Libyan dissidents throughout the world, including in the West. Documenting this murder spree is necessary both to honor the memory of the fallen victims and to write a more complete history of Qaddafi’s tenure.
Then there is Qaddafi’s sponsorship of terrorism. The Pan 103 bombing is only the most notorious act of Libyan sponsored terrorism. Qaddafi’s Libya was long one of the premier state sponsors of terror. And Qaddafi’s lust for blood frequently led him to strange terrorist bedfellows.
In 2003, for example, Qaddafi hired a team of al Qaeda hit men to kill then Saudi crown prince Abdullah. Qaddafi and Abdullah had a televised verbal altercation in the lead up to the Iraq War and Qaddafi, who is not the type of person to let this sort of thing pass, decided to off Abdullah. According to the New York Times, Libyan intelligence officers and al Qaeda assassins were inside Saudi Arabia when the plot was broken up. The deal with al Qaeda was brokered by Libyan representatives inside London, who reached out to al Qaeda front men living there. If the Libyan embassy in London preserved its files on the deal, then they could make for very interesting reading.
The plot to kill Abdullah shows that even a dictator al Qaeda would like to dethrone was capable of allying himself with the terror group to advance their common interests. Al Qaeda’s Libyan affiliate, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), targeted Qaddafi for more than a decade. Yet, that didn’t stop Qaddafi from partnering with other members of the al Qaeda terror network.
Libyan embassies and offices in Southeast Asia likely contain documents concerning Qaddafi’s terror ties, too. Qaddafi maintained longstanding ties to the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, both of which are affiliated with al Qaeda. In 2000 and 2001, Qaddafi’s intelligence apparatus acted as an intermediary to secure the release of Westerners kidnapped by the ASG and other extremist groups in the Philippines. Libya reportedly funneled between $10 million and $20 million to the ASG from European governments that were willing to pay the terrorists’ ransom.
At first blush, this might appear to be a relatively benign gesture by Qaddafi’s regime. But in reality it demonstrated just how much the ASG and affiliated groups trusted Qaddafi. The Congressional Research Service reported in 2002 (PDF), for example, that Qaddafi offered the ASG money for “livelihood projects” and the troubling relationship “raises the possibility that Libyan money gets channeled to Abu Sayyaf,” even as the Libyan regime publicly condemned the kidnappings. In addition, published reports indicate that Qaddafi provided arms to the MILF.
Qaddafi’s files may explain these ties to al Qaeda-affiliated terror groups in Southeast Asia further.
Other terrorist groups, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), were befriended by Qaddafi. Qaddafi’s support of the IRA is well-known as the dictator shipped arms and explosives to the group, and also provided training for its operatives. The victims of IRA terrorism have long sought compensation from Libya because of Qaddafi’s lethal support. Qaddafi’s files surely include more evidence concerning Libya’s sponsorship of the IRA.
Finally, there are Qaddafi’s weapons of mass destruction programs. Qaddafi famously gave up his nuclear program following the 2003 toppling of Saddam’s regime. Some of the details of the nascent Libyan nuclear program are publicly available. Still more may be found in Qaddafi’s files – especially concerning Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, who dealt with the Libyans as part of the Pakistani proliferation scheme.
For all of these reasons and more, Qaddafi’s formerly clandestine intelligence files should be preserved for posterity. From the Soviet Bloc to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, many secrets have been learned after dictatorships have fallen.
It is time to learn Qaddafi’s secrets as well.
Thomas Joscelyn is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
