During the 1952 campaign, Dwight Eisenhower boldly announced that if he won the presidency, “I shall go to Korea.” He believed he could broker peace in the Korean conflict, which had reached a stalemate under Harry Truman. About two months before he took office, Ike flew to Korea on a visit that would set the stage for the end of the Korean War six months into his presidency.
President Truman was outraged that a president-elect would step into foreign policy in such a direct way. It was an audacious break with protocol. But the public was behind Ike, and, more important, the North Koreans and their Chinese allies took him seriously. In their eyes, he was not the inexperienced president-elect but the revered general who meant business. He had credibility with them that Truman lacked. When I was researching and writing my new book, Three Days in January: Dwight Eisenhower’s Final Mission, I was intrigued by this story. I thought it demonstrated how a nonpolitician could shake things up.
Ike’s Korean venture immediately came to mind when President-elect Donald Trump broke decades of U.S. China policy by having a direct phone conversation with the president of Taiwan. The Obama administration was horrified that Trump would trample on such delicate soil before he’d even assumed office. Trump’s detractors immediately howled that it was a gaffe, only to learn that the call had been planned. Trump, it seems, is operating under the same premise—if something is not working, try a new way.
The comparisons between Eisenhower and Trump are irresistible, even if the contrasts are obvious. As the first nonpolitician to be elected president since Ulysses Grant, Eisenhower came into office determined to do things differently and fix what wasn’t working. He had a healthy distrust of professional politicians and, much like Trump, wanted a cabinet of doers, not operatives. A journalist joked that Eisenhower’s cabinet consisted of “eight millionaires and a plumber.” (The plumber was his secretary of labor, the leader of a plumber’s union.) Some of Ike’s choices might have been made by Trump—such as Charlie Wilson, the CEO of General Motors, as secretary of defense, a real outlier move, comparable to Trump’s selection of Rex Tillerson, chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil as secretary of state.
In Trump’s view, successful diplomacy is a matter of being a tough negotiator and dealmaker, and Tillerson has certainly been that in countless foreign undertakings on behalf of his company. President Trump is betting he’ll bring those skills to work for the American people. For defense, Trump has made another surprise choice—retired general James Mattis, who, without a congressional waiver, would not even have been eligible for the job. The ideal of civilian control of the military is so essential to American governance that military officers are banned from serving as secretary of defense for seven years after retiring. Mattis had no trouble getting his waiver, but Eisenhower might not have approved. As a general himself, Ike was sensitive about not filling his administration with military men. He was afraid of giving the impression that he saw the White House as a war room, and he valued the civilian counterpoint.
Hidden hand vs. 140 characters
One of Eisenhower’s greatest strengths was what political scientist Fred I. Greenstein called his “hidden hand” style. This quality allowed him to mask his true intentions until the time was right, playing his cards carefully, just as he did at his beloved game of bridge.
Trump’s penchant for surprise and redirection of media focus can at times have similar effects. Trump often talks about his ability to size up the strengths and weaknesses of others and thus find ways of working with them and getting what he wants. He likes to keep people in suspense. On the other hand, Trump’s Twitter feed reflects a more impulsive style (like his tweets about the tepid ratings of his former show The Apprentice that went after the show’s new host, Arnold Schwarzenegger). The instant response, instant reaction mode of Twitter can come across as rash and undisciplined, especially when it is employed late at night. Trump’s supporters love his off-the-cuff tweets, but most experts say they may not serve Trump well once he’s in office. Governing is a very different matter than campaigning. That said, most “experts” were wrong about the election results.
The Russia question
One of Eisenhower’s top priorities as president was to establish a working relationship with the Soviet Union—and this seemed a tantalizing possibility after the death of Stalin. Ike’s openness came from his personal experience with the Russians during World War II when they served as our allies to defeat Hitler. He was inspired by their enormous courage and sacrifice, and he could never bring himself to see them as evil. He believed that our two nations could find points of agreement on major issues, even if our ideologies were vastly different. He waged a slow and steady effort for compromise, always making it clear that he was willing to retaliate if the Soviets stepped out of line, but always hoping for a better outcome.
In 1959, near the end of Ike’s second term, it looked as if he had achieved a breakthrough when Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev visited the United States. After Khrushchev made a tour across the country, the two leaders settled in for a private time at Camp David, where the woodsy setting inspired an unexpected intimacy. They watched westerns together after Khrushchev admitted he shared Ike’s love for them and talked in an unusually warm and personal manner. At the end of the visit, Khrushchev invited Ike and his family to visit him the following year in Moscow, but it never happened. The downing of a U.S. spy plane over Soviet airspace refroze relations.
Then, as now, the relationship between our nations was complicated and often dangerous. The Russia Trump will meet is different from the old Soviet Union—perhaps less ideological and more concerned with traditional national interests—despite Russian president Vladimir Putin’s posturing. President Trump believes he can establish common ground with Putin, and Ike might favor that goal, but he would also advise caution, knowing well how quickly circumstances can change and how adeptly Putin uses his own “hidden hand.” The hacking ahead of the election that U.S. intelligence officials are convinced was directed by the “highest levels” in the Russian government further intensifies the split between how the new president has talked about potential U.S.-Russia relations and how his party has viewed the Russian threat. Trump’s reflexive retorts on Twitter questioning the intelligence that blames Russia for the hacking is counterbalanced by his choice of former Indiana senator Dan Coats to be his nominee for national intelligence director. Coats has a long public history of speaking out about the geopolitical threat posed to the United States by Russia.
The biggest contrast
In the weeks before he took office, President Trump created buzz by not taking all of his daily national security briefings, choosing to say, “if something changes come tell me.” Were Eisenhower alive he would issue a strong warning similar to one he gave John F. Kennedy during the weeks and days before the latter took office. In drawing comparisons, it might surprise people to know that Trump and Kennedy have one very significant characteristic in common: an apparent disdain for the vast national security apparatus. Ike once said he thought Kennedy viewed the presidency as “an institution that one man could handle with an assistant here and another there.” Trump, with his small circle of close advisers, may share that penchant.
Repeatedly, President Eisenhower explained to President-elect Kennedy the significance of national security briefings—with everyone in the room, vigorously debating options. Kennedy clearly brushed off the counsel, and quickly dismantled much of Ike’s structure once he took office. The result: Months into his presidency Kennedy made a fateful decision on the Bay of Pigs invasion that led to the Cuban missile crisis the following year. Kennedy later called it a disaster.
But Kennedy then knew where to turn for advice—to the former President Eisenhower, whom Kennedy flew to Camp David to consult. “No one knows how tough this job is until he’s been in it a few months,” Kennedy said to Ike at a Camp David meeting after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Eisenhower replied, “Mr. President, if you will forgive me, I think I mentioned that to you three months ago.” After researching Eisenhower for Three Days, I’m almost certain Ike would likewise advise Trump that while the president is the ultimate decision-maker, he needs that guidance every day.
Trump can be a risk taker, but he makes risk-reward calculations designed to win the high stakes game of foreign policy. For him, winning is everything—he notoriously despises “losers”—so his determination to strike a new tone and strategic approach on foreign policy is fundamentally based on the belief that he can succeed where others have failed. Richard Nixon thought so too. In December 1987, when Trump was first considering a run for the presidency at the age of 41, he gave an interview to Phil Donahue, arguing one of his favorite themes—that our allies must compensate the United States for its military protection. The appearance earned him a letter from Nixon, whose notable foreign policy achievements included a normalization of relations with China. Nixon wrote to Trump, “I did not see the program, but Mrs. Nixon told me that you were great. . . . As you can imagine, she is an expert on politics and she predicts whenever you decide to run for office you will be a winner!” Trump says he plans to frame the letter and hang it in the Oval Office.
Bret Baier is the chief political anchor of Fox News Channel and the anchor and executive editor of Special Report with Bret Baier. His new book, Three Days in January: Dwight Eisenhower’s Final Mission, has just been released.
