U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia Joseph A. Mussomeli and
Cmdr. Joseph Deleon conduct a press conference in Cambodia.
Last Wednesday, at a ceremony in the Ream Navy Headquarters in Sihanoukville, the only deepwater port in Cambodia, the China State Shipbuilding Corporation delivered to the Cambodian government what People’s Daily described as “a batch of marine equipments [sic].” The shipment included four 46-meter patrol boats, three 20-meter patrol boats, one landing ship, and one 60-meter floating dock. According to Japan’s Kyodo News, the package also included radar facilities. Worth roughly $60 million, the equipment was purchased with a soft loan from Beijing to help Phnom Penh combat piracy, terrorism, and drug and human trafficking. China also gave Cambodia six navy patrol boats in 2005 to help fight crime and smuggling in the Gulf of Thailand. Last Wednesday’s delivery came less than three weeks before the scheduled visit to Cambodia by the USS Essex. As noted in a November 3 People’s Daily report, the Essex is to dock in Sihanoukville from November 26 to December 2. This past February, the USS Gary paid a port call to Sihanoukville. It was the first time in more than 30 years that an American military vessel had visited Cambodia. A February 26 report in People’s Daily characterized the visit as prompted by a “strong China factor.” The report begins by observing sarcastically that while the United States navy “sails the four seas in length and breadth,” it hadn’t been back to “these waters of sorrow” since suffering heavy losses in 1975 in the battle of Koh Tang. It goes on to say that Gary‘s visit to Sihanoukville must be motivated by something other than a desire to “relive an old experience.” The explanation the paper offered for Washington’s increasing military presence in Cambodia is that it serves a three-fold purpose. One is to obstruct Sino-Cambodian relations; i.e., to counter the so-called “string of pearls” strategy that Beijing is reportedly pursuing. Second, to help Cambodia combat piracy in the Gulf of Thailand, thereby increasing Phnom Penh’s dependence on Washington for maritime security. And third, to enlist Cambodia’s help in the search for 74 American soldiers still listed as missing in action from the Parrot’s Beak Operation in 1970. Judging by the tone of Chinese media coverage at the time, the February visit by the USS Gary occasioned a certain amount of angst in Beijing. China has been beefing up its own efforts to strengthen military ties with Phnom Penh. It is, for example, the biggest supplier of military aid to Cambodia, including a scholarship program for the kingdom’s soldiers to receive training in China. Last week’s delivery of patrol boats is just the latest manifestation of continuing military cooperation between the two countries. In 2006, the Cambodian army had built its general hospital with Chinese assistance, and the opening ceremony was attended by the chief of general staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. China has also invested heavily in Cambodia’s infrastructure. Between 1997 and 2005, Beijing provided loans and grants to Phnom Penh totaling some $600 million. In 2006, during his visit to the kingdom, premier Wen Jiabao “opened a new chapter in Sino-Cambodian relationship” by pledging an additional $600 million in aid for the construction of a hydro-electric project, bridges, and government office buildings. That sum is, coincidentally, just one million shy of the US$601 million in annual aid Cambodia receives from the Western-financed Cambodia Consultative Group.
