Ready, Steady

The shocking–if year-old–story in Monday’s Washington Post that readiness rates for U.S. Army tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, Black Hawk helicopters, and the notoriously finicky radars that allow precise and rapid counter-mortar fires appeared as the paper’s lead item. Not surprisingly, it also became the headline of the hour for John Kerry, who saw in it yet another instance of President Bush’s shortcomings as commander-in-chief. Never mind that much of the $87 billion supplemental budget for Iraq operations, which Kerry voted against, is devoted to purchasing spare parts.

But experienced soldiers, particularly those with, ahem, Vietnam experience, might wonder at the sorts of readiness rates achieved in Iraq. While comparing readiness rates–which are the most arbitrary measures to begin with–across time and between even relatively similar systems is no science–and a very questionable art–the idea that 80 percent availability for tanks and Bradleys and 70 percent rates for helicopters is a scandal is, well, a scandal. Any U.S. armored commander who completed a two-week training rotation at the National Training Center with an 80 percent readiness rate might get a gold star for maintenance–and perhaps a black mark for failing to maneuver his forces fully. High readiness rates are often a sign of operational inactivity; if you never drive your car, it’s always gassed up and ready to go.

Buried down in the story was the fact that equipment in Iraq is being used at a very high pace–it’s called combat–with “tanks operating at 3,000 or 4,000 miles per year,” according to Lt. Gen. Claude B. Christianson, the logistics chief on the Army staff. That’s about five times the Army baseline, and does not factor in the difficulties that arise when the enemy actually shoots back.

Naturally, the really disturbing parts of the story received little attention. The basis of the Post article was a memo sent by Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez last December, when he was operational commander in Iraq. Sanchez threatened that he could not “continue to support sustained combat operations with [readiness] rates this low.” While one ought to have some sympathy for a field commander trying to flagellate his supply system into a quick response, Sanchez was whining at a very high pitch. In World War II, Wehrmacht panzer divisions routinely went into battle against the Red Army with no more than 10 or 20 tanks out of a nominal strength of 200. Most Vietnam-era Huey pilots would have been very happy with a 70 percent readiness rate, even at they would have marveled at how much better–and tougher–the Black Hawk is.

More disturbing still, is that such a story highlights the long-term mismatch between our reduced military means–most particularly when it comes to ground combat forces–and our new political and strategic ends in the greater Middle East. The post-Cold-War, 40 percent reduction in the U.S. Army is measured not simply in manpower terms, but in reduced fleets of tanks, Bradleys, Black Hawks, radars–you name it. The entire institution has been deflated. On top of that, both the Clinton and Bush administrations have become enamored of the alleged “revolution in business affairs”–the application of Wal-Mart-like, just-in-time, supply systems that save money on inventory. Alas, war is far less predictable than business; insurgents from the local five-and-dime don’t ambush Wal-Mart convoys. For 15 years, U.S. politicians and Pentagon leaders have been dreaming of a transformation of war that barely requires troops on the ground, and the perfect situational awareness that will obviate the need for armored vehicles and even personal body armor. The real solution to the problem of immediate readiness rates is a larger force.

Tom Donnelly is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a contributing writer to The Daily Standard.