This might be the most interesting exchange from yesterday’s Senate Armed Services Committee hearing with Admiral Mullen (though Mullen’s insistence that additional Afghan forces will not be sufficient to defeat the Taliban or even slow the deterioration of security conditions there has gotten the most play in the press as it seemed to indicate Mullen’s support for additional U.S. forces). While the left has suddenly started to question their support for what they once called the “Good War” in Afghanistan, Mullen explains to Senator Lieberman the danger of being seen — by our allies and enemies in Afghanistan and Pakistan — as not fully committed to the effort:
MULLEN: I’ve said in my opening statement that its very clear to me we will need more resources to execute the president’s strategy from the end of March. And I really await this submission from General McCrystal which I think is going to occur here very quickly to evaluate specifically what that means and to look at the risk associated with various options. So it is — and this — maybe I can give a little better answer to the chairman on why we weren’t doing a program like the one Graeme Lamb is now in charge of. We very badly under resourced Afghanistan for the better part of four or five years. Now I’ve spoken about a culture of poverty there. That’s been interpreted to focus on the poverty level in the country. That isn’t what I meant and certainly that is a problem. But we have a culture of poverty there amongst us in terms of being under resourced in economy of force for this extensive period of time. To get to a point where we didn’t have the where with all to create a program like that. And not that we didn’t think it would be needed. And the totality of that under resourcing is something we’re just coming to grips with. And it’s not as simple as trainers or not as simple as combat troops. LIEBERMAN: Right. MULLEN: It’s “Are you committed?” LIEBERMAN: Right. MULLEN: As the Afghan people look at it. “Are you committed” as the Paks look at it. This is a regional area that is the epicenter of terrorism and every time I go — and I’m sure it happens to you as well — when you’re in Afghanistan or in Pakistan the question that is on their lips is, “Are you staying or are you going?” LIEBERMAN: “Are you staying or you’re going to go?” MULLEN: “Are you with us or not?” LIEBERMAN: Right. And my concern is that — Chairman Levin, I know, is well intentioned, but if we just send trainers and don’t send more combat troops, particularly if it’s clear that General McCrystal has requested them, then I believe the Afghan people and the Pakistani people are going to decide we’re essentially on our way out. And they’re going to make some judgments based on that and take actions that will not be what we’ll want them to do. Do you agree? MULLEN: Well, I’m very concerned about — I mean, the Afghan people are waiting on the sidelines for how committed we are. And quite frankly so are the people of Pakistan. LIEBERMAN: Right. MULLEN: I said in my opening statement: I believe in a fully resourced counter insurgency. These are the lessons from Iraq.
