In 2008, Barack Obama promised that he would not use signing statements, but last night he released one to accompany his signing of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.
Here’s Obama’s pledge:
He said that signing statements are a presidential power grab, and made clear he believed it violated the Constitution.
Overnight, however, Obama released this signing statement, in an attempt to try to change the meaning of the defense bill Congress sent to him for his signature:
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release January 2, 2013
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
Today I have signed into law H.R. 4310, the “National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.” I have
approved this annual defense authorization legislation, as
I have in previous years, because it authorizes essential
support for service members and their families, renews vital
national security programs, and helps ensure that the
United States will continue to have the strongest military
in the world.
Even though I support the vast majority of the provisions
contained in this Act, which is comprised of hundreds of
sections spanning more than 680 pages of text, I do not agree
with them all. Our Constitution does not afford the President
the opportunity to approve or reject statutory sections one by
one. I am empowered either to sign the bill, or reject it, as
a whole. In this case, though I continue to oppose certain
sections of the Act, the need to renew critical defense
authorities and funding was too great to ignore.
In a time when all public servants recognize the need to
eliminate wasteful or duplicative spending, various sections in
the Act limit the Defense Department’s ability to direct scarce
resources towards the highest priorities for our national
security. For example, restrictions on the Defense Department’s
ability to retire unneeded ships and aircraft will divert scarce
resources needed for readiness and result in future unfunded
liabilities. Additionally, the Department has endeavored to
constrain manpower costs by recommending prudent cost sharing
reforms in its health care programs. By failing to allow
some of these cost savings measures, the Congress may force
reductions in the overall size of our military forces.
Section 533 is an unnecessary and ill-advised provision,
as the military already appropriately protects the freedom of
conscience of chaplains and service members. The Secretary of
Defense will ensure that the implementing regulations do not
permit or condone discriminatory actions that compromise good
order and discipline or otherwise violate military codes of
conduct. My Administration remains fully committed to
continuing the successful implementation of the repeal of Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell, and to protecting the rights of gay and lesbian
service members; Section 533 will not alter that.
Several provisions in the bill also raise constitutional
concerns. Section 1025 places limits on the military’s
authority to transfer third country nationals currently held at
the detention facility in Parwan, Afghanistan. That facility is
located within the territory of a foreign sovereign in the midst
of an armed conflict. Decisions regarding the disposition of
detainees captured on foreign battlefields have traditionally
been based upon the judgment of experienced military commanders
and national security professionals without unwarranted
interference by Members of Congress. Section 1025 threatens to
upend that tradition, and could interfere with my ability as
Commander in Chief to make time-sensitive determinations about
the appropriate disposition of detainees in an active area of
hostilities. Under certain circumstances, the section could
violate constitutional separation of powers principles. If
section 1025 operates in a manner that violates constitutional
separation of powers principles, my Administration will
implement it to avoid the constitutional conflict.
Sections 1022, 1027 and 1028 continue unwise funding
restrictions that curtail options available to the executive
branch. Section 1027 renews the bar against using appropriated
funds for fiscal year 2012 to transfer Guantanamo detainees into
the United States for any purpose. I continue to oppose this
provision, which substitutes the Congress’s blanket political
determination for careful and fact-based determinations, made by
counterterrorism and law enforcement professionals, of when and
where to prosecute Guantanamo detainees. For decades,
Republican and Democratic administrations have successfully
prosecuted hundreds of terrorists in Federal court. Those
prosecutions are a legitimate, effective, and powerful tool in
our efforts to protect the Nation, and in certain cases may be
the only legally available process for trying detainees.
Removing that tool from the executive branch undermines our
national security. Moreover, this provision would, under
certain circumstances, violate constitutional separation of
powers principles.
Section 1028 fundamentally maintains the unwarranted
restrictions on the executive branch’s authority to transfer
detainees to a foreign country. This provision hinders the
Executive’s ability to carry out its military, national
security, and foreign relations activities and would, under
certain circumstances, violate constitutional separation of
powers principles. The executive branch must have the
flexibility to act swiftly in conducting negotiations with
foreign countries regarding the circumstances of detainee
transfers. The Congress designed these sections, and has here
renewed them once more, in order to foreclose my ability to shut
down the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. I continue to
believe that operating the facility weakens our national
security by wasting resources, damaging our relationships with
key allies, and strengthening our enemies. My Administration
will interpret these provisions as consistent with existing
and future determinations by the agencies of the Executive
responsible for detainee transfers. And, in the event that
these statutory restrictions operate in a manner that violates
constitutional separation of powers principles, my
Administration will implement them in a manner that avoids
the constitutional conflict.
As my Administration previously informed the Congress,
certain provisions in this bill, including sections 1225, 913,
1531, and 3122, could interfere with my constitutional authority
to conduct the foreign relations of the United States. In these
instances, my Administration will interpret and implement these
provisions in a manner that does not interfere with my
constitutional authority to conduct diplomacy. Section 1035,
which adds a new section 495(c) to title 10, is deeply
problematic, as it would impede the fulfillment of future U.S.
obligations agreed to in the New START Treaty, which the Senate
provided its advice and consent to in 2010, and hinder the
Executive’s ability to determine an appropriate nuclear force
structure. I am therefore pleased that the Congress has
included a provision to adequately amend this provision in
H.R. 8, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, which I will
be signing into law today.
Certain provisions in the Act threaten to interfere with
my constitutional duty to supervise the executive branch.
Specifically, sections 827, 828, and 3164 could be interpreted
in a manner that would interfere with my authority to manage
and direct executive branch officials. As my Administration
previously informed the Congress, I will interpret those
sections consistent with my authority to direct the heads of
executive departments to supervise, control, and correct
employees’ communications with the Congress in cases where such
communications would be unlawful or would reveal information
that is properly privileged or otherwise confidential.
Additionally, section 1034 would require a subordinate to submit
materials directly to the Congress without change, and thereby
obstructs the traditional chain of command. I will implement
this provision in a manner consistent with my authority as the
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and the head of the
executive branch.
A number of provisions in the bill — including
sections 534(b)(6), 674, 675, 735, 737, 1033(b), 1068, and
1803 — could intrude upon my constitutional authority to
recommend such measures to the Congress as I “judge necessary
and expedient.” My Administration will interpret and implement
these provisions in a manner that does not interfere with my
constitutional authority.
BARACK OBAMA
THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 2, 2013.
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release January 2, 2013
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
Today I have signed into law H.R. 4310, the “National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.” I have
approved this annual defense authorization legislation, as
I have in previous years, because it authorizes essential
support for service members and their families, renews vital
national security programs, and helps ensure that the
United States will continue to have the strongest military
in the world.
Even though I support the vast majority of the provisions
contained in this Act, which is comprised of hundreds of
sections spanning more than 680 pages of text, I do not agree
with them all. Our Constitution does not afford the President
the opportunity to approve or reject statutory sections one by
one. I am empowered either to sign the bill, or reject it, as
a whole. In this case, though I continue to oppose certain
sections of the Act, the need to renew critical defense
authorities and funding was too great to ignore.
In a time when all public servants recognize the need to
eliminate wasteful or duplicative spending, various sections in
the Act limit the Defense Department’s ability to direct scarce
resources towards the highest priorities for our national
security. For example, restrictions on the Defense Department’s
ability to retire unneeded ships and aircraft will divert scarce
resources needed for readiness and result in future unfunded
liabilities. Additionally, the Department has endeavored to
constrain manpower costs by recommending prudent cost sharing
reforms in its health care programs. By failing to allow
some of these cost savings measures, the Congress may force
reductions in the overall size of our military forces.
Section 533 is an unnecessary and ill-advised provision,
as the military already appropriately protects the freedom of
conscience of chaplains and service members. The Secretary of
Defense will ensure that the implementing regulations do not
permit or condone discriminatory actions that compromise good
order and discipline or otherwise violate military codes of
conduct. My Administration remains fully committed to
continuing the successful implementation of the repeal of Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell, and to protecting the rights of gay and lesbian
service members; Section 533 will not alter that.
Several provisions in the bill also raise constitutional
concerns. Section 1025 places limits on the military’s
authority to transfer third country nationals currently held at
the detention facility in Parwan, Afghanistan. That facility is
located within the territory of a foreign sovereign in the midst
of an armed conflict. Decisions regarding the disposition of
detainees captured on foreign battlefields have traditionally
been based upon the judgment of experienced military commanders
and national security professionals without unwarranted
interference by Members of Congress. Section 1025 threatens to
upend that tradition, and could interfere with my ability as
Commander in Chief to make time-sensitive determinations about
the appropriate disposition of detainees in an active area of
hostilities. Under certain circumstances, the section could
violate constitutional separation of powers principles. If
section 1025 operates in a manner that violates constitutional
separation of powers principles, my Administration will
implement it to avoid the constitutional conflict.
Sections 1022, 1027 and 1028 continue unwise funding
restrictions that curtail options available to the executive
branch. Section 1027 renews the bar against using appropriated
funds for fiscal year 2012 to transfer Guantanamo detainees into
the United States for any purpose. I continue to oppose this
provision, which substitutes the Congress’s blanket political
determination for careful and fact-based determinations, made by
counterterrorism and law enforcement professionals, of when and
where to prosecute Guantanamo detainees. For decades,
Republican and Democratic administrations have successfully
prosecuted hundreds of terrorists in Federal court. Those
prosecutions are a legitimate, effective, and powerful tool in
our efforts to protect the Nation, and in certain cases may be
the only legally available process for trying detainees.
Removing that tool from the executive branch undermines our
national security. Moreover, this provision would, under
certain circumstances, violate constitutional separation of
powers principles.
Section 1028 fundamentally maintains the unwarranted
restrictions on the executive branch’s authority to transfer
detainees to a foreign country. This provision hinders the
Executive’s ability to carry out its military, national
security, and foreign relations activities and would, under
certain circumstances, violate constitutional separation of
powers principles. The executive branch must have the
flexibility to act swiftly in conducting negotiations with
foreign countries regarding the circumstances of detainee
transfers. The Congress designed these sections, and has here
renewed them once more, in order to foreclose my ability to shut
down the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. I continue to
believe that operating the facility weakens our national
security by wasting resources, damaging our relationships with
key allies, and strengthening our enemies. My Administration
will interpret these provisions as consistent with existing
and future determinations by the agencies of the Executive
responsible for detainee transfers. And, in the event that
these statutory restrictions operate in a manner that violates
constitutional separation of powers principles, my
Administration will implement them in a manner that avoids
the constitutional conflict.
As my Administration previously informed the Congress,
certain provisions in this bill, including sections 1225, 913,
1531, and 3122, could interfere with my constitutional authority
to conduct the foreign relations of the United States. In these
instances, my Administration will interpret and implement these
provisions in a manner that does not interfere with my
constitutional authority to conduct diplomacy. Section 1035,
which adds a new section 495(c) to title 10, is deeply
problematic, as it would impede the fulfillment of future U.S.
obligations agreed to in the New START Treaty, which the Senate
provided its advice and consent to in 2010, and hinder the
Executive’s ability to determine an appropriate nuclear force
structure. I am therefore pleased that the Congress has
included a provision to adequately amend this provision in
H.R. 8, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, which I will
be signing into law today.
Certain provisions in the Act threaten to interfere with
my constitutional duty to supervise the executive branch.
Specifically, sections 827, 828, and 3164 could be interpreted
in a manner that would interfere with my authority to manage
and direct executive branch officials. As my Administration
previously informed the Congress, I will interpret those
sections consistent with my authority to direct the heads of
executive departments to supervise, control, and correct
employees’ communications with the Congress in cases where such
communications would be unlawful or would reveal information
that is properly privileged or otherwise confidential.
Additionally, section 1034 would require a subordinate to submit
materials directly to the Congress without change, and thereby
obstructs the traditional chain of command. I will implement
this provision in a manner consistent with my authority as the
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and the head of the
executive branch.
A number of provisions in the bill — including
sections 534(b)(6), 674, 675, 735, 737, 1033(b), 1068, and
1803 — could intrude upon my constitutional authority to
recommend such measures to the Congress as I “judge necessary
and expedient.” My Administration will interpret and implement
these provisions in a manner that does not interfere with my
constitutional authority.
BARACK OBAMA
THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 2, 2013.
