George Will echoes the concerns of many on the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. There’s no doubt that killing a dedicated insurgency is frustrating, indeed dislodging an indigenous enemy force from the local population could be the trickiest maneuver in warfare. But winning there, in the graveyard of empires, isn’t impossible or even improbable. Like any military operation, Afghanistan simply requires the right formula of logistics, manpower, and strategy. The perception of hopelessness is precisely what a well-trained, dyed-in-the-wool insurgent strives to project. That’s how they win, by encouraging the notion that victory is an impossibility. But history has proven the exact opposite. The British put down three rabid insurgencies in the latter half of the 20th century (Northern Ireland, the Malayan Emergency, and the Mau Mau Uprising), the French were militarily successful in Algeria (though, like the British, opted to hand over the colony after military victory), and the U.S. effectively dismantled a tough rebellion in the Philippines at the start of the 20th century. The COIN efforts that have failed in the past 40 years (and there are plenty), were — interestingly enough — the fights that were prosecuted according to George Will’s concept of operations, specifically “forces should be substantially reduced to serve a comprehensively revised policy: America should do only what can be done from offshore, using intelligence, drones, cruise missiles, air strikes and small, potent special forces units, concentrating on the porous 1,500-mile border with Pakistan.” Obsession over kill counts and kinetic-ops is the quickest way to turn the local population against you and to ultimately lose the war, as exemplified by Vietnam, the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the Rhodesians during their Bush War. Unfortunate as it is, Afghanistan is just the beginning. Thanks to globalization and advances in transport and communications, the United States has been tasked with fighting the first real global insurgency. Because insurgencies are ultimately won by controlling entire populations, our strategy is wholly centered around developing strong, functional allied nations in locations of supreme strategic importance. That’s why winning in Iraq was so important, that’s why we’re building strong alliances with key sub-Saharan Africa and Asiatic states, and that’s exactly why we absolutely must win in Afghanistan.
