TURKEY IS TESTING NATO’S LIMITS AND EXPOSING ITS WEAKNESS

What Ankara seeks to achieve

Fundamentally, the Erdogan government’s use of outlets such as Clash Report constitutes a wider strategy to shape international perceptions while continuing plausible deniability. In contrast to traditional propaganda, which is overtly state-driven, these platforms operate in a gray zone, presenting themselves as independent while softly advancing state-aligned narratives.

The objectives are three-part.

The first objective is legitimacy laundering. By embedding pro-Ankara narratives within ostensibly neutral reporting, these platforms lend credibility to Turkish foreign policy positions, ranging from Syria to Gaza, without provoking the skepticism typically directed at official state outlets.

The second objective is agenda-setting. Platforms such as Clash Report selectively amplify specific conflicts, actors, and interpretations, therefore influencing Western audiences toward perspectives favorable to Turkey’s regional ambitions. Given the increasing influence of social media on elite discourse, this impact is considerable.

The third objective is information disruption. By combining verifiable reporting with misleading or conspiratorial content, these outlets obscure the information environment. This approach results in confusion, polarization, and a reduced capacity for audiences to distinguish between credible journalism and calculated messaging.

A wider ecosystem

Clash Report is not an isolated case — it is part of a well-established and expansive influence architecture.

Turkey’s state broadcaster, TRT World, offers perhaps the clearest example. The U.S. Department of Justice has required TRT World’s Washington operations to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, citing government control over its leadership, funding, and editorial direction. Critics have long described it as a propaganda arm of Erdogan’s government, providing overwhelmingly favorable coverage of Turkish policies while ignoring dissenting perspectives.

Beyond TRT, Turkey’s domestic media sector has been systematically reshaped over the past decade. A network of pro-government outlets — often referred to as “pool media” — has emerged through a mix of political pressure, financial coercion, and calculated acquisitions. These outlets reliably echo government narratives, attack political opponents, and frame international events in line with Ankara’s priorities.

CNN-Turk is another concerning example. Operating under license from its U.S. parent since 1999, CNN-Turk has become a symbol of initially self-censorship, after refusing to air scenes from major public protests against the Erdogan government in the 2013 Gezi protests. Since then, the outlet has morphed into a channel that routinely broadcasts the Erdogan regime’s propaganda and talking points, so much so that a Newsweek piece described CNN-Turk as “a platform that engages in conspiracy theories, antisemitic tropes and racist rhetoric.”

This system goes beyond television and print media. Digital channels, news portals, and social media accounts increasingly serve as primary channels for influence operations. As demonstrated by the Clash Report case, the objective is to reach worldwide audiences directly, particularly in English, lacking the constraints of overt state affiliation.

Coordinated messaging and psychological operations

Leaked documents and investigative reporting indicate that these efforts are coordinated rather than ad hoc. A directive from Turkey’s Directorate of Communications outlined strategies for conducting “psychological operations” to steer public perception, including framing scandals as foreign conspiracies and mobilizing pro-government media to reinforce preferred narratives.

This degree of coordination points to a critical point: These are not simply biased media outlets. Rather, they function as components of a wider state strategy that integrates messaging, diplomacy, and domestic politics into a unified information campaign.

Risks to the US and its allies

The risks associated with this ecosystem are both instant and long-term.

For the United States, the major concern is policy distortion. When lawmakers and analysts rely, whether knowingly or unknowingly, on sources connected to foreign influence operations, their understanding of conflicts and actors will become skewed. Such reliance risks shaping policy decisions based on limited or manipulated information.

A second concern is alliance cohesion. Although Turkey remains a NATO member, its information operations frequently promote narratives that undermine Western unity, question U.S. intentions, or legitimize actors hostile to American interests. Over time, these actions diminish trust and complicate coordination on shared security challenges.

Third, these campaigns help address the wider issue of information degradation. By saturating the information environment with content of varying quality — some accurate, some misleading — state-linked outlets such as Clash Report make it increasingly difficult for audiences to distinguish truth from manipulation. This tactic has long been employed by Russia and China, and Turkey is now adapting it to serve its own geopolitical objectives.

A familiar playbook, a new player

In several respects, Ankara’s approach resembles that of other authoritarian or hybrid regimes that have invested significantly in information warfare. However, Turkey’s case is distinct in one important aspect: It is a NATO ally with deep institutional ties to the West.

This status renders Turkey’s influence operations both more subtle and more challenging. These efforts originate not from an obvious adversary, but from within the alliance itself.

RUBIO SHOULD RECOGNIZE ERDOGAN’S ATTACK ON PEACEFUL AMERICANS

The exposure of Clash Report is not limited to a single account. Rather, it provides insight into a broader strategy aimed at shaping global perceptions of conflicts, alliances, and power.

It is imperative that policymakers in Washington carefully observe these developments.

Sinan Ciddi is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he directs the Turkey program.