As the date for President Donald Trump’s high-stakes trip to Beijing approaches, the American media landscape is once again fractured by a familiar paradox.
If you tune into one network, you will hear that China is the ultimate victor of the current U.S.-Iran conflict, allegedly reaping the rewards of regional instability while secretly funneling military materials to Tehran. Switch the channel, and the narrative flips: China has supposedly betrayed its “strategic partner” in Iran, quietly siding with Washington to protect its global trade interests.
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This cognitive dissonance reveals a fundamental truth about American foreign policy: For decades, the U.S. has been dealing with “two Chinas.” One is the real China: a complex, pragmatism and polarization hybrid, and deeply historical actor. The other is the imaginary China: a projection of Western reasoning, wishes, and mindset frameworks that often lead to strategic misjudgments and geopolitical flops.
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Why do some people consistently see a China that doesn’t exist? When viewing Beijing through a strictly Western lens, some U.S. strategists and politicians assume that Chinese leaders will react to stimuli such as war, economic pressure, or treaties the same way a Western liberal democracy or the Cold War-type Soviet Union might.
In reality, there are vast distinctions in history, culture, language, and philosophy. China operates on a foundation of “no religion” in the Western sense, replaced by a secular, state-centric Confucian and Marxist hybrid. Its geopolitical environment is not protected by two oceans, but surrounded by fourteen neighbors, many of them nuclear-armed or historically hostile.
The ‘temperature test’ of Chinese strategy
To move past the imaginary and understand the real China, I recommend a “temperature test” model. By observing the “heat” of China’s support or opposition in global conflicts, we can see a pattern of calculated schemes rather than the erratic trajectory often portrayed in the media.
The “hot” 1980s: During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, China took a “hot” stand. Beijing aligned firmly with the U.S. position, providing material support to the mujahideen guerrilla to check Soviet expansion. The result? China won. It secured a decade of “Golden Years” with the West, gaining the technology and investment that sparked its economic miracle.
The “lukewarm” 2000s: Post-9/11, during the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, China’s position was lukewarm. It offered rhetorical support for the “War on Terror” but remained cold toward material involvement. This was a strategic win for Beijing; by not being an enemy, China enjoyed a “period of strategic opportunity” to grow its GDP while the U.S. was bogged down in the Middle East.
The “warm” 2022: When the Russia-Ukraine war broke out, China pivoted to “warm” support for Moscow, refusing to condemn the invasion and instead bolstering Russia’s sanctioned economy. However, unlike previous eras, this has not been a win. China found itself in a quagmire, losing the trust of the EU and the U.S., as well as trade benefits. Even many Global South countries are disappointed with China’s fence-sitting stance in the face of Russia’s flagrant aggression in Ukraine.
Today, as the U.S. engages in strikes against Iranian interests, China is attempting a “Double Cold” strategy. It is cold toward U.S. military action, yet remains cold in its actual support for Iran. Beijing wants the cheap oil, but it has no desire to be the guarantor of Tehran’s security.
Can China win this time? Likely not, because its overall losses exceed the gains strategically.
Checking the health of China’s strategic intentions
One primary reason the “imaginary China” persists is that Western observers often fail to distinguish between the interests of the Chinese Communist Party and the interests of the Chinese nation.
There is a profound internal tension in Beijing’s foreign policy. The leadership knows that a stable China-U.S. relationship benefits the country’s economy and its people. However, a close relationship with the U.S. often brings “subversive” Western values that threaten the CCP’s absolute grip on power.
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Conversely, the China-Russia relationship offers almost no value to ordinary Chinese citizens or private enterprises. Yet, for the CCP, Russia is the perfect ally: a fellow autocracy that poses no threat to the party’s internal safety. In the triangular interaction between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow, such a dilemma in China’s policies and positioning has been persisting.
The takeaway for the upcoming summit in Beijing is simple: If the U.S. continues to chase the “imaginary China,” whether that is the “China as a collapsing house of cards” or “China as an unstoppable monolith,” then opportunities for genuine problem-solving will slip. To manage this relationship effectively, the real China must be the only one at the chessboard. Any other player is just a ghost of one-way making. To determine the health of China’s strategic intentions, apply the ‘temperature test” first.
David W. Wang is a senior international business executive, geopolitical affairs consultant, analyst, and writer based in the Washington, D.C., metro area. David is the author of Decoding the Dragon’s Mindset: Inside China’s Destiny and its Hint to the World and can be contacted at [email protected].
