In his meeting with President Donald Trump this week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented fresh intelligence that he says shows Iran is rebuilding elements of its nuclear program, apparently seeking to compel a resumption of the full-scale war. The decision rests almost completely with Trump, and no one knows where it will go.
The first path would amount to accepting Iranian demands. It will charge for passage through the Strait of Hormuz, give little on the nuclear issue, give nothing on the proxy terrorist militias or ballistic missiles, and effectively retain the right to massacre protesters. Markets would welcome the immediate reduction in risk. Oil prices and insurance premiums would return to normal levels, and investors would breathe easier. Yet every authoritarian government would be emboldened, and other maritime choke points would be endangered by copycats, while Iran’s leadership would emerge stronger. Temporary calm would mask a lasting deterioration in deterrence.
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The second option would revive the war largely as it existed before, a campaign of recurring strikes, interceptions, retaliation, and gradual escalation. But wars of attrition almost always favor regimes structured around ideological endurance. Democracies answer to voters, economic pressures, coalition politics, and elections. Revolutionary governments possess extraordinary tolerance for destruction inflicted upon their own societies while preserving their grip on power through repression. Iran’s behavior throughout this confrontation illustrates precisely that dynamic.
It might be possible to ramp up the pressure by occupying certain assets — the land around Hormuz, of Kharg Island, Iran’s major oil depot. Such actions are risky, and they would hope to persuade. Iran’s leadership, like other jihadists from Hamas to Hezbollah to the Houthis, has shown, however, that they cannot be persuaded.
Practical questions abound. American interceptor inventories have become an increasingly visible concern. Gulf allies whose business model depends on predictable calm hate the idea of prolonged war for incremental as opposed to decisive gains. A prolonged conflict would likely impose continuing disruptions on global trade and energy markets while creating persistent uncertainty for financial markets. Domestically, the political costs for any American administration would accumulate steadily.
The third option would be a genuinely crippling blockade, fundamentally altering the strategy. Air campaigns would cease. Missile exchanges would cease. Instead, the U.S. and its partners would impose a comprehensive land, air, and maritime blockade alongside total exclusion from the international financial system. Iranian commerce would effectively stop. Revenue flowing to the regime would collapse. Economic isolation would become the principal weapon rather than aerial bombardment.
Such an approach would inflict immense hardship. Water shortages, energy shortages, food scarcity, medical shortages, and widespread economic deprivation would fall first upon ordinary Iranians before reaching those who govern them. Humanitarian planning would therefore become critical. Refugees seeking temporary safety in neighboring countries would require organized international support. Regional governments would need assistance in absorbing large civilian flows while maintaining stability.
The economic burden would also extend well beyond Iran. Shipping through the Gulf would remain vulnerable to Iranian harassment. Energy markets would experience continuing volatility. Consumers across advanced economies would pay higher prices for an extended period until the regime falls. Terrorism in the West is possible. Political leaders would have to persuade voters that this is simply unavailable. Advocates of this course have one basic argument: However costly, it will work.
The fourth option would abandon incrementalism and dive into regime change. Washington would declare that the objective is replacing the regime itself. This is rarely a great idea in history, but rarely is the world confronted with a menace like the Islamic Republic. Military operations would expand exponentially in a blitzkrieg that would obliterate institutions that sustain political power and aim to produce rapid collapse rather than gradual degradation. It would be wise to spare the Iranian military, because a military coup in Iran, as a transition to a democratic government, is the best way this ends.
Supporters of this approach believe only decisive action can end decades of regional instability driven by Tehran’s nuclear program and support for armed proxy groups across the Middle East — and would be an immense favor to the Iranian people, the vast majority of whom hate and fear the murderous regime.
Such a strategy would promise clarity after years of limited objectives but also introduce extraordinary risks: possible regional escalation, uncertain postwar governance, humanitarian emergencies, and demands for long-term international involvement should state institutions fragment.
So each path carries costs, and the choice is unforgiving. One calculation is which creates the greatest chance of avoiding even greater costs tomorrow. If asked, I would say that the comprehensive blockade is the least-bad option — and that the resumption of a prolonged war of attribution, a dynamic that favors the regime, is the worst.
Whichever path it chooses, the U.S. also faces a problem of presentation. Trump’s outrageous provocations with long-standing allies, including repeated suggestions about annexing Canada and acquiring Greenland, refusing for a time even to rule out force against NATO ally Denmark, have devastated America’s diplomatic standing at precisely the moment coalition-building matters most.
AMERICA DOESN’T HAVE AN IRAN STRATEGY. IT HAS A 50-YEAR ILLUSION
To project a more reassuring version of U.S. leadership, it would be very helpful to place a widely respected statesperson at the forefront of the effort. Figures such as William Burns, Robert Gates, or Condoleezza Rice possess the experience and international credibility to reassure partners that American strategy rests on enduring statecraft rather than shifting political impulses. That, in effect, the war against Iran is not another Trumpian boondoggle.
Many Americans are wary of being pushed into war by Israel, and the war has not been popular. But one reality stands above the debate. The Iranian regime is a menace to Iranians, the Middle East, and the world. Like all empires and would-be empires, good or bad, it will eventually disappear. Sooner is better than later in this case.
Dan Perry is the former Cairo-based Middle East editor and London-based Europe/Africa editor of the Associated Press, the former chairman of the Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem, and the author of two books. Follow him at danperry.substack.com.
