At the beginning of the Iran war, I argued that whatever one thought of President Donald Trump’s justifications for striking Iran, the more consequential strategic consequence was to target China’s access to Iranian energy at a moment of maximum vulnerability. In a great power rivalry, every part of the globe interacts with and is dependent upon the other.
But energy is a double-edged sword. From Ukraine to the Strait of Hormuz, the wars of the 2020s reveal that energy is no longer one battlefield, but the keystone of modern warfare, which changes how America must approach conflict in the years to come.
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Russia’s war on Ukraine laid the template. By September 2024, Russian strikes had destroyed 80% of Ukraine’s thermal power capacity and damaged or destroyed more than a third of its hydroelectric generation, leaving millions without heat or electricity through the winter. The goal was to plunge Ukraine into darkness, collapse the economy, and break its industrial capacity that sustained its resistance. Ukraine survived the onslaught but then used Russia’s strategy against it. Ukraine soon launched a drone campaign against Russian oil infrastructure that has disabled an estimated 17% of Russia’s refining capacity.
The systematic destruction of energy refining, power plants, substations, and other infrastructure is not incidental to the combatants’ strategies. It is the strategy.
The Iran war took that template and applied it to a global chokepoint. Nearly 20 million barrels of oil used to move through the Strait of Hormuz every day. The International Energy Agency calculates that only 3.5 million to 5.5 million barrels per day could realistically be rerouted through available Saudi and UAE alternatives. When Iran threatened that passage, insurance premiums spiked globally, refiners scrambled, and governments with no direct stake in the conflict felt it immediately in their energy costs and supply chains.
Now, we’re at an impasse. Every time the Trump administration announces a deal or a near-deal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, Iran quickly closes it again. It isn’t just China dealing with oil-restriction-induced economic pain, but the entire world.
This provides a valuable lesson for policymakers. American energy dominance does not insulate us from the impacts of energy warfare. Indeed, in an energy war, every side loses.
The final result of the Iran war may or may not be an Iran stripped of nuclear capabilities. But what we know for sure is that Hormuz now carries a permanent risk premium.
And “permanent” is the operative word. At some point, hopefully soon, a lasting ceasefire will be reached. However, safe and free passage can never again be assumed. The risk is now structural, and no agreement will change that.
The timing could not be more consequential. The global buildout to power artificial intelligence — data centers, dedicated power plants, transmission infrastructure, critical mineral supply chains — represents the largest coordinated investment in energy infrastructure in modern history. The IEA projects 15 to 27 gigawatts of onsite natural gas power generation alone serving American data centers by 2030. Globally, total data center electricity consumption will more than double by 2030, reaching over 900 terawatt-hours annually — roughly equivalent to Japan’s entire electricity consumption today.
The Iran war is accelerating a shift already underway. Nations and industries spooked by oil price shocks are moving faster toward localized power generation — solar, nuclear, geothermal, and domestic gas. Global corporate power purchase agreements for renewables hit record levels in 2025, driven in part by the desire to hedge against supply disruptions. That trend will only continue.
But while localized energy can mitigate risk, it cannot insulate us completely. The first targets in modern warfare are now energy infrastructure — precisely what the United States and China are spending trillions of dollars to construct. In response, the U.S. is diverting substantial resources to strengthen the U.S. power grid against electromagnetic pulses, whether through dedicated EMP weapons or high-altitude bursts generated by intercepted nuclear missiles.
All of this is a sign of the strategic trap that the most recent wars of our century have revealed — energy infrastructure has never been more valuable and never been more vulnerable. As Russia, Ukraine, and Iran have demonstrated, every actor with a missile, a mine, a dinghy, or a drone knows that it can outmaneuver its enemies by striking its energy sources.
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For American policymakers, the lesson is simple. Yes, diversify our energy sources as much as possible with everything from liquefied natural gas to solar to nuclear to geothermal. Yes, establish defensive systems for energy infrastructure. But recognize that diversification and kinetic defenses alone are not a sufficient strategy.
The best way to win an energy war is not to start one at all.
Chet Love is the managing partner of Cornerstone Group International. He also served as director of policy and legal counsel for SolarCity, now Tesla.
