In early September, it appeared that the United States and the Taliban were a few quick signatures away from finalizing an agreement. After nearly a year of frustrating and at times hostile discussions between U.S. chief negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban representatives, the two settled on a transaction: The U.S. would withdraw approximately 5,000 of its troops if the Taliban committed themselves to breaking ties with al Qaeda, ensured terrorists are unable to use Afghanistan as a launch pad for attacks against Americans, and entered discussions with the Afghan government on a comprehensive political settlement.
That deal, of course, was never signed. President Trump rescinded his invitation to the Taliban for a Camp David summit and pulled out of the talks completely, declaring them “dead” after a Taliban attack killed a dozen Afghans including a U.S. soldier. This was just the latest casualty, as 21 American troops have died in Afghanistan this year.
The war has only gotten worse since September: Taliban operations have picked up just as U.S. air strikes have increased in scope and intensity. Some of those airstrikes have killed civilians, one of the most tragic cases of faulty targeting being a September 19 attack against Afghan workers resting after a day working the fields.
This violence has only worsened the plight of Afghans who were still recuperating from last year, the deadliest year of the war on record. Such a grim reality may be pushing Washington and the Taliban to reassess their positions. While the State Department has yet to confirm, Ambassador Khalilzad reportedly met with Taliban officials in Pakistan last week.
Exploratory talks, it seems, are back on.
It’s difficult to imagine Trump not knowing Khalilzad’s itinerary in advance. The president scuttled the negotiations, so it’s highly likely the president would need to give his authorization to bring the negotiations back from the dead.
There could be a political motive driving Trump’s calculations — what better way to counteract an impeachment inquiry with a deal that finally allows the U.S. to pack up and go home after 18 years at war? But a significant factor driving the decision-making may be the blunt realization that all of the additional bombing is ultimately a worthless exercise.
We can’t bomb the Taliban out of existence anymore than we can stop every narcotic that comes across the U.S.-Mexico border. If you are banking on a war of attrition, you are banking on failure, pure and simple. As the International Crisis Group wrote in a report released Oct. 2: “The sooner U.S. political leaders allow their diplomats to get back to the table, the better.”
The U.S., however, cannot solve Afghanistan’s systemic weaknesses and problems — nor should U.S. diplomats, however capable they may be, pretend they have the power to do so. The Afghan government has been complaining about the U.S. diplomatic strategy, and in a way, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani is right: Negotiating a peace agreement is simply not a U.S. responsibility.
Just like American political issues need to be resolved by Americans, Afghanistan’s issues need to be handed over to the Afghans. To think the answer lies in Washington, D.C., is hubris at its most extreme.
The Afghans may very well be too divided at the moment to come to a consensus about how their country should be governed. The Taliban are stubborn old men who continue to refuse to talk directly to Kabul, viewing the entire Afghan political system as the product of foreign occupiers. Nobody said striking peace in Afghanistan would be smooth sailing. Indeed, with or without U.S. troops on the ground, the country will remain violent for years.
It’s not out of the question that another round of U.S.-Taliban talks could spring up weeks from now. Trump can’t stay away from dealmaking for very long. But Washington should have clear eyes about what it wants to achieve. Right now, the objective is to withdraw the troops as soon as possible. The rest can only be discussed by the Afghans.
Daniel DePetris (@DanDePetris) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner‘s Beltway Confidential blog. His opinions are his own.
