When it comes to the strange sonic attacks which have afflicted American diplomatic personnel across the globe, most national security officials who have been briefed on the available intelligence are highly confident that Russian state actors are responsible.
Separate stories in the New York Times and GQ Magazine, this week, brought new weight to the idea of Russian culpability. GQ’s noting of big data analysis relating to cellphone records is especially interesting in its pointing toward Russian FSB officers being responsible for the attacks. The Russians use the FSB for their most sensitive deniable operations abroad, partly in that the FSB’s standard domestic remit makes it harder for foreign intelligence services to recruit FSB officers as spies.
This issue is important. Since 2016, dozens of American diplomats, CIA officers, and civilian officials have suffered physical ailments, some very serious, as a result of exposure to suspected sonic or microwave-based attacks. But by those who know best, Russia is strongly suspected as the culprit. The best evidence for Russia’s responsibility is the fact that only Russia had the matching of motive to operational targeting, means of action, and global presence, to carry out all of the best-verified attacks.
For a start, we should note that the Russian intelligence services invested in brain-targeting weaponry during and since the Cold War period. Unconventional but destructive, such weapons also fit in the broader Russian intelligence culture of dark, Chekist humor. Then there’s the anti-American motive so singularly sustaining within the Russian intelligence community. The big three Russian intelligence services — the FSB, GRU, and SVR — all retain a cultural, ideological reflex toward viewing the United States as “the main enemy.” Which is to say, an enemy to bleed, undermine, and eventually destroy. The personal animus motivating the leadership of these agencies cannot be underestimated here. A desire to harm the U.S. informs the most aggressive of intelligence operations, such as the GRU plot to support the Taliban’s killing of Americans in Afghanistan. With time, that report will be verified.
Then there’s the geography factor. The attacks’ locations indicate Russian involvement. Vladimir Putin is deeply opposed to the possibility of an increasing U.S.-Cuba détente. That gives him ample reason to ensure America’s withdrawal from Cuba and Washington’s declining interaction with Havana. Considering the U.S. expulsion of Cuban intelligence officers over the dozens of reported attacks in Cuba, Putin could claim success here. On that point, it is almost certain that the Cuban government is not responsible for the attacks (it seeks the lifting of U.S. financial restrictions, not more restrictions, and could not operate freely in the locales of other attacks in Moscow or China). Still, Cuba’s excellent DI intelligence service might know that the Russians were the guilty party in Havana. The DI’s counterintelligence resourcing makes the otherwise extensive counterintelligence operations of the Russian FSB look minimal in comparison.
In relation to the attacks in Guangzhou, China, it should be noted that the Russian consulate in that Chinese city is just two blocks from the U.S. Consulate, and, like all Russian consulates, staffed by as many intelligence officers as actual diplomats. Putting the Chinese intelligence services to one side for a second, measured against intent, operational capability, and the risk of detection, only the Russians can credibly be viewed as responsible for the Guangzhou incidents. The Chinese Ministry of State Security, responsible for domestic counterintelligence, tends to target U.S. recruited agents rather than actual CIA officers. Considering China’s strategy for a slow roll overturning of the U.S.-led international order, attacking Americans with crude brain-damaging weapons would be nonsensical.
That takes us back to the Russians.
The attack on a CIA officer in Moscow and a White House official in Washington, D.C., also indicate Russian responsibility. The Moscow attack is the most indicative of Russian culpability in that the Russian FSB saturates human surveillance coverage of foreign intelligence officers on its soil. It would have controlled who went near the CIA officer’s hotel room. In addition, the Chinese would not risk being caught in an operation on Russian soil, which they know would likely be compromised and lead to furious retaliation from Putin. Against that context, it’s also worth noting that the FSB is sometimes exceptionally physically aggressive with U.S. and British intelligence officers operating out of their embassies. Some of the FSB’s attacks on these personnel have been reported, but others have remained classified. The video of an attack on a CIA officer outside the U.S. Embassy in summer 2016 was not an exception nor the worst such incident, for example. One challenge, here, is the U.S. and British unwillingness to adequately retaliate — this feeds the Russian sense of opportunity.
In short, judged by the considerations of intent, capability, and modus operandi, the Russians stand out overwhelmingly as the most likely culprit for these attacks.
