In a wide-ranging interview with Reuters, President Trump indicated that a second meeting with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un was likely saying, “I don’t want to comment on that, but it’s most likely we will.”
If the president does meet Kim again, watch Trump’s approach to alleged secret nuclear sites – apparently a roadblock during Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s meetings this summer.
U.S. allegations of these possible secret sites were brought to international attention when Rodong Sinmun, a publication that is the mouthpiece of the Central Committee of the Worker’s Park of Korea, called the prospect of undisclosed sites “fiction” and said that focusing on them was “derailing dialogue.”
North Korea’s stance underscores the difficulty of working with the reclusive regime. Reaching an agreement on denuclearization in North Korea has been an elusive goal of U.S. foreign policy and would be a clear victory for Trump who has struggled on the international stage.
Unfortunately, for the administration, since the Singapore summit earlier this summer, talks have stalled and North Korea has continued to move forward with its nuclear program. This doesn’t mean that progress isn’t possible, just that Trump might need to try something different.
If Trump does have a second meeting, it would be good to try a less confrontational approach based on past successfully negotiated arms treaties. As Pompeo’s discussions on secret facilities reveals, an upfront demand for Kim to reveal all his cards on his nuclear program is not only unlikely to work but will also create hostility and hold up talks. Moreover, even if Kim did acknowledge that such sites exist, without an agreement in writing for dismantling, verification and monitoring, that would not move negotiations any closer to a resolution.
Instead, as happened with previous U.S. deals on nuclear arms – such as treaties with the Soviet Union – only after the terms of the treaty were laid out were arms stores and facilities revealed as a condition of the agreement.
This approach offers a much more workable, although perhaps less satisfying step towards mitigating or even eliminating the threat from North Korea. A first step to reaching an agreement would be to decide what denuclearization actually looks like and then put it in writing. That way, neither side could dispute the terms later on. From there, establishing how verification and monitoring would occur as well as solidifying what the U.S. would offer North Korea, among other steps, are also necessary.
Negotiations are a slow process. Trump and his team should recognize this and, strategically, be on the same page so as to not send conflicting messages.
If Trump is motivated and does have the good relationship he claims to with Kim, that might bring unprecedented progress. At the same time, meetings with the U.S. president convey legitimacy and should be a carrot offered in exchange for progress. North Korea must signal its willingness to engage in good faith negotiations by, for example, halting nuclear production. Thus far, it has failed to do so.
Trump has a tough road ahead as he ponders another meeting with Kim. In the long run, that road could lead to a safer world and that would be a victory for everyone. Getting there requires a cautious and well thought out approach and, perhaps, the wildcard factor of the president’s unique personality.
